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Abstract 
 
Based on the work of leading theorists within peace and conflict studies, this thesis develops a 
theoretical framework in order to analyse the seemingly deadlocked ‘peace vs. justice’ debate 
to explore the possibility of expanding the perspectives in a combined approach. It finds that 
the debate is based on a narrow perception of both concepts, where they are perceived as 
negotiations and punishment respectively. Only through applying such a combined approach 
is it thereby possible to move beyond this current situation. This theoretical framework is then 
applied on the case of the ongoing conflict in Northern Uganda, where the empirical aspects 
of this debate have lasted for the longest period of time since the International Criminal 
Court’s involvement in 2004. With basis in the Juba peace agreement from 2008 that would 
have balanced retributive and restorative forms of justice, this study finds that the only way to 
create sustainable peace is by striking a balance between the transitional justice mechanisms 
of the ICC, conditional amnesties and more traditional forms of justice in the affected 
communities in Northern Uganda. 
 
Opsomming 
 
Op grond van die werk van voorste teoretici op die gebied van vrede- en konflikstudie, 
ontwikkel hierdie tesis ŉ teoretiese raamwerk vir die ontleding van die oënskynlik vasgevalle 
debat tussen vrede en geregtigheid, ten einde die moontlike verbreding van perspektiewe met 
behulp van ŉ gekombineerde benadering te ondersoek. Die studie bevind dat die debat tussen 
vrede en geregtigheid op ŉ baie eng opvatting van dié twee konsepte berus, naamlik dié van 
onderhandeling en straf onderskeidelik. Slegs deur ŉ gekombineerde benadering toe te pas, is 
dit dus moontlik om die huidige toedrag van sake te bowe te kom. Die teoretiese raamwerk 
van die studie is vervolgens op die voortslepende konflik in Noord-Uganda toegepas, waar die 
empiriese aspekte van dié debat steeds sedert die betrokkenheid van die Internasionale 
Strafhof in 2004 voorkom. Met die Juba-vredesooreenkoms van 2008 as uitgangspunt, wat 
veronderstel was om ŉ balans te vind tussen vergeldende en herstellende vorme van 
geregtigheid, bevind dié studie dat volhoubare vrede slegs bereik kan word deur ŉ 
gebalanseerde kombinasie van die Internasionale Strafhof se 
oorgangsgeregtigheidsmeganisme, voorwaardelike amnestie, en meer tradisionele vorme van 
geregtigheid in die geaffekteerde Noord-Ugandese gemeenskappe. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background to the study and identification of the research topic 
Ever since the seminal work of Johan Galtung (1969), peace and conflict studies have evolved 
from a very small field into a variety of different perspectives and multidisciplinary 
approaches. They range from disciplines as disparate as the social sciences, economics and 
international law, which are all dealing in different ways with the challenges involved in the 
process of creating sustainable peace in conflict zones (Lederach, 1997; Mani, 2002, 2005; 
Mendeloff, 2004; Miller, 2008; Nielsen, 2008).  
 
One of the multidisciplinary subfields of peace and conflict studies addressing these 
challenges is known as transitional justice. The concept of transitional justice refers to a 
number of mechanisms, stretching from amnesties, truth and reconciliation committees 
(TC/TRCs), international proceedings and local justice procedures. These various transitional 
justice mechanisms are used by states and the international community to deal with both 
massive human rights abuses and war crimes after a violent conflict or oppressive rule has 
ended, in order to create a stable and peaceful future (Kritz, 1995; Oomen and Marchand, 
2007; Teitel, 2000).                                                                                                       
 
A large amount of theoretical and empirical research has been conducted in this sub-field 
concerning how, when and which transitional justice mechanisms should be applied in order 
to address these challenges in the best possible way. The result is the debate known as ‘peace 
versus justice’, where the arguments range from how justice through national and 
international proceedings will contribute to peace, or whether justice must be put aside in 
favour of amnesty laws and local healing procedures in order to achieve peace. After the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) was established in 2002, this debate became more 
complicated and intensified with the prospects of the Court charging and prosecuting those 
individuals seen as most responsible for human rights abuses and war crimes (Nielsen, 2008; 
Oomen and Marchand, 2007). Until now the ICC has been preoccupied with four African 
conflicts in the Central African Republic (CAR), the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), 
Sudan and Uganda. The Court is currently in the process of prosecuting the warlord Tomas 
Lubango Dyilo for using child soldiers in the DRC and charged Sudan’s President Omar 
Hassan al-Bashir for alleged war crimes in Darfur in March 2009 (Clark, 2008:39; HRW, 
2009; New African, 2009). It is however in Northern Uganda that the ICC has been involved 
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for the longest period of time and where the Court’s presence can be said to be mostly 
disputed (Nielsen, 2008).  
 
In the region known as Acholiland1 in Northern Uganda, a conflict has been ongoing for more 
than two decades between the Government of Uganda (GoU)2 and a rebel group known as the 
Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). In the course of this conflict, the LRA has been accused of 
crimes against humanity and war crimes, having committed numerous atrocities against 
civilians, resulting in an unknown number being killed, molested or abducted. The conflict 
has also forced between one and two million people away from their homes into Internally 
Displaced Person’s (IDP) camps with appalling living conditions, thereby further intensifying 
the immense suffering to the population living in the region. Several attempts have been 
initiated both by local and international mediators in order to engage the warring parties in 
peace talks that would ideally bring an end to the conflict with one of the most promising so 
far taking place at Juba in Southern Sudan between July 2006 and April 2008. These have 
apparently been unsuccessful in achieving this until now, as none of them has had any major 
breakthroughs resulting in an end to the hostilities. Furthermore, the GoU has on numerous 
occasions launched military offensives against the LRA. Although it thereby has been able to 
force the guerrilla movement out of Northern Uganda and into the territories of neighbouring 
countries, the LRA’s military capabilities have never been fully neutralised, thereby allowing 
it to reorganise and return to spread great havoc repeatedly (Bøås, 2004; Doom and 
Vlassenroot, 1999; ICG, 2004, 2008; Latigo, 2008; Oomen and Marchand, 2007; Van Acker, 
2004).  
 
After the ICC became involved by charging the LRA’s top five leaders for crimes against 
humanity and war crimes in 2005, the ‘peace versus justice’ debate can be said to have gone 
from being purely theoretical to include more empirical aspects as well. In this case, the 
practical side to the debate has centred around which transitional justice mechanisms are best 
suited to help bring an end to over twenty years of violent conflict in Northern Uganda, 
namely: neo-traditional justice procedures aimed at reconciliation and conflict resolution; 
amnesty laws, or; international proceedings (Oomen and Marchand, 2007:161).  
                                                           
1
  Acholiland consists of the three districts of Gulu, Kitgum, and Pader, which is the region in Northern Uganda 
where the ethnic tribe known as the Acholis live (see appendix A and B).  
 
2
 The abbreviations GoU, National Resistance Army (NRA) and Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF) in this 
study refer to Museveni and the central authorities in Kampala. 
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Now in 2009, 4 years after the charges against the LRA’s leadership became known, the 
conflict has yet to be solved, and the prospects for peace seem distant. This is not only 
illustrated by the ICC’s failure to bring them to justice, but it also stems from the several 
unsuccessful attempts to end the conflict that have been undertaken by local and international 
mediators, as well as the GoU’s military offensives.  
 
However, what has been described as the second generation of scholars and activists within 
transitional justice all seems united in a goal to overcome this current deadlock on a more 
theoretical level (Simpson, 2008; Nielsen, 2008; Oomen and Marchand, 2007). In various 
ways they argue that in order to properly address the challenges involved with achieving some 
sort of sustainable peace in conflict zones, it is necessary to combine elements from both 
perspectives by looking at how the various mechanisms can be optimised to work together in 
a joint approach. The combined approach proposed by this new literature in transitional 
justice therefore appears to be a possible solution to the deadlock created by the current 
‘peace versus justice’ debate. But at the same time it also raises some important questions 
concerning what the future of this field holds, both with regards to the general theoretical 
development and its empirical implications.  As scholars engaged within this new school of 
thought ponder: is it possible to overcome the existing deadlock by using a theoretical 
framework to analyse the strengths and weaknesses of the various transitional justice 
mechanisms debated over, in order to come up with a joint approach that can contribute to 
sustainable peace? Or is it nothing more than a flawed attempt, meaning that the current 
debate will remain the same? Assuming that this joint approach actually turns out to solve the 
academic side of the ‘peace vs. justice’ debate, how will it fare when contrasted with being 
practically applied by implementing it in conflict zones in order to create sustainable peace? 
 
This thesis is inspired by the prospects of how this second generation of literature within 
transitional justice can solve the current deadlock created by the shortcomings in the more 
established literature, but it also remains critical to what the outcome might be. This study 
will therefore place itself in the middle between the more established and the new studies to 
analyse this phenomenon. On a general level it will, by using the works of leading theorists 
within peace and conflict studies, such as Johan Galtung (1969, 1996) and John Paul 
Lederach (1997), seek to develop a theoretical framework that can be used to look at the 
prospects of combining these two different perspectives in a joint approach. More 
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specifically, this study will apply this theoretical framework in the case of the ongoing 
conflict in Northern Uganda. By doing so, the purpose is to analyse how relevant the 
contribution of a combined approach will be in attempts to bring an end to violent conflicts.  
 
1.2 Significance of study and research theme 
As the process of gathering information and doing research about this topic of interest started, 
it soon became clear that over the last two decades, since the Cold War ended, the ‘peace vs. 
justice’ debate has occurred at four different periods of time. What is evident about the way it 
has appeared in one form or another throughout all of these time periods illustrates a debate 
that remains in a stalemate, as the same arguments are used repeatedly.  
 
These arguments in the debate over whether justice through trials would contribute to or 
prevent peace first came about with Neil J. Kritz’s publication of his seminal work 
‘Transitional Justice: how emerging democracies reckon with former regimes’ in 1995. This 
was also the period when the international criminal tribunals were established after the 
conflicts in the former Republic of Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR). Thereafter, it 
reoccurred for the second time, which can be identified with the Rome Treaty of 1998, 
leading up to the establishment of the ICC in 2002, coupled with the prominent cases against 
Chile’s former dictator Augusto Pinochet and the Liberian warlord Charles Taylor (Teitel, 
2000, 2006:1; New African, 2009). The intensity of the debate increased with the ICC 
becoming involved in the CAR, the DRC and Uganda by making charges against LRA’s 
leadership and the prosecution of the Congolese warlord Tomas Lubango Dyilo between 2003 
and 2008 (Clark, 2008; Nielsen, 2008). The fourth and so far last wave in this debate came 
very recently in March 2009, when the ICC became officially involved in the Sudanese 
conflict with its charges against President al-Bashir for alleged war crimes in Darfur (New 
African, 2009). With the Sudanese case these arguments were repeated once again with the 
well- known African scholar Mahmoud Mamdani (Mail and Guardian, 2009a) accusing the 
ICC of being nothing more than a politicised venue for a Western human rights dictatorship. 
On the other side were the supportive arguments made by Amnesty International (AI) and 
Human Rights Watch (HRW), illustrated by HRW’s (2009) claim that ‘the ICC’s issuance of 
an arrest warrant for President al-Bashir of Sudan signals that even those at the top may be 
held to account for mass murder, rape and torture’. 
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Despite the large amounts of theoretical and empirical research conducted within both 
perspectives on local, national and international levels by perspectives as disparate as 
international law and social anthropology, this has resulted in a situation where the debate is 
locked on a general theoretical level and where its implications, albeit being very important, 
are at risk of becoming just another element that must be taken into consideration when 
describing ongoing African conflicts. In empirical aspects this is especially evident with 
regards to the case of Northern Uganda, where this debate has been most intense and lasted 
for the longest period of time (Nielsen, 2008; Oomen and Marchand, 2007).  
 
This falls within the logic behind Galtung’s (1969, 1996) notion that peace and conflict 
studies cannot be linked exclusively to one discipline or level only, since the result would be 
losing out on a rich variety of different perspectives. In other words, the demarcation between 
different academic disciplines, such as international law and the social sciences is not a 
foolproof and consistent demarcation, which appears to be particularly evident as a thin 
borderline in the ‘peace vs. justice’ debate. Nevertheless, in a situation where there are no 
simple and straightforward answers, but rather one where these opposing perspectives ideally 
should be optimised to solve the problems together, the reality is something totally different. 
 
It was not until recently that some studies briefly started to explore the possibility of 
combining these two opposing perspectives in a joint approach as an attempt to develop the 
field further by unlocking this debate (see Waddel and Clark, 2008; Mani, 2002, 2005; 
Nielsen, 2008; Oomen and Marchand, 2007; van Zyl, 2005). Although this perspective is 
slowly gaining some ground, it is seemingly surrounded by great uncertainty with regards to 
whether it is able to fully solve the present situation or if the outcome will merely be a return 
to the status quo. However, only a few studies have analysed this approach by using the works 
of Galtung (1969, 1996) and Lederach (1997) within peace and conflict studies as a starting 
point, and even fewer, like Nielsen (2008), have applied them to the case of Northern Uganda, 
where the debate in its present form arguably has lasted for the longest period of time. Uganda 
as a case study therefore seems very apt, given that much research is yet to be undertaken to 
explore this protracted debate and identify potential solutions to break the stalemate. 
 
This thesis is inspired by this uncertainty in the existing literature, especially with regards to 
Northern Uganda, where this debate has been most intense. By analysing the strengths and 
weaknesses of various transitional justice mechanisms using the work of Galtung, Lederach 
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and other prominent writers, it generally aims to explore the possibility of how the combined 
approach might work. By doing so, this study more specifically seeks to address their possible 
impact, in terms of how they can contribute to the creation of sustainable peace in Northern 
Uganda. Limiting the research to just one discipline or level would therefore result in a very 
narrow and limited understanding of this specific conflict’s background and how to create 
sustainable peace, and this thesis will therefore be multidisciplinary in order to avoid missing 
important perspectives.  
 
Thus, as this section has illustrated, a substantial amount of studies have been undertaken in 
this field concerning how certain transitional justice mechanisms can contribute to the 
creation of sustainable peace in conflict zones. Even if this is the case, very little of this 
research has actually been looking at how those various mechanisms can be combined in 
order to achieve this, illustrated by the deadlocked ‘peace vs. justice’ debate. It is therefore 
important to continue by following up on the initial work made by Nielsen (2008) and 
Simpson (2008) by exploring this combined approach even further to determine whether it 
represents the solution to solve this debate. The selection of this theme as the research topic 
for this study is therefore aimed at making a theoretical and empirical contribution by 
outlining some recommendations for how to solve the ongoing conflict in Northern Uganda. 
Thereby, it can hopefully contribute with something unique to this field and inspire more of a 
similar kind of research in other conflict zones, such as Sudan and the DRC.  
 
1.3 Identification of the research problem 
This section will outline the problem statement of this thesis serving as a guideline to how this 
study will seek to address the topic of interest in terms of the two central theoretical and 
empirical research questions. In one of the next subsections these questions will be further 
specified within the theoretical framework as more specific research sub questions. 
 
1.3.1 Problem statement 
Following the logic of Todd Landman (2003:247) many case and comparative studies use 
particular parts of the world to test out the empirical relevance of general theories developed 
elsewhere. Thus, regional case and comparative studies can contribute to more general 
theories in various disciplines of the social sciences, thereby making sure that the insights 
from both communities can inform each other (Landman, 2003:247). This has not been the 
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situation in transitional justice before the second generation of literature was introduced a few 
years ago, meaning that this important link between theoretical and empirical studies was 
missing.  
 
In this field, the general perspectives were seemingly without any common overarching goal, 
but on the contrary appeared to be opposing each other by focusing on very different 
perspectives of peace and justice (Nielsen, 2008). The result of this seems to be that the 
‘peace vs. justice’ debate has evolved into the current stalemate. Not only have the general 
perspectives been affected, but also the more empirical oriented case and comparative studies 
have been influenced as well, most notably in the African context after the establishment of 
the ICC in 2002. This is also the situation with regards to the Ugandan conflict, where the 
debate has been most intense between those who favor local reconciliatory approaches against 
those who uphold the international option with the ICC’s charges against the LRA leaders. 
However, the second generation of transitional justice scholars all attempt to overcome this 
empirical and theoretical deadlock in various ways, ranging from Nielsen (2008), Oomen and 
Marchand (2007) and Waddel and Clark (2008).  
 
Thus, the motivation behind this thesis is to analyse what impact the second generation of 
literature might have on the field of transitional justice by solving the current deadlock 
created by the existing literature. The purpose of this study is therefore to look at the 
relevance of this new approach with regards to whether it is able to solve this situation, or if 
the implications will merely be a return to the current status quo after the initial turbulence 
has been settled. 
 
In order to assess how the various transitional justice mechanisms in general can be combined 
in a joint approach, a theoretical framework will be used to analyse their strong and weak 
elements. To test out the relevance of this joint approach, this combination will be applied in 
the case where the ‘peace vs. justice’ debate has been most intensive, namely Northern 
Uganda.  
 
1.3.2 Research questions     
Based on the problem statements, two primary research questions, the first theoretical and the 
other empirical, will serve as a central overarching guideline to the subject that this study will 
attempt to answer. These primary research questions will accordingly in the following be 
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fitted into the theoretical framework outlined below as more specific research sub-questions 
in the next section. The main theoretical (1) and empirical (2) research questions guiding this 
study are:  
 
(1) To what degree is it possible to reconcile the two opposing perspectives in the ‘peace vs. 
justice debate’ through a combined approach? 
(2) How can such an approach help create sustainable peace in the case of the ongoing 
conflict in Northern Uganda? 
 
Other questions of a more peripheral, but still important, character that this thesis will try to 
answer as the study advances include: Does transitional justice work in societies deeply 
divided over social issues or ethnicity? Based on all the experiences that can be drawn from 
previous empirical and theoretical research conducted on transitional justice, is it possible to 
make generalisations that can be applied in different cases, or should they all be interpreted 
individually because of their unique complexities? Can a study like this thesis partially or 
fully address this gap in the existing literature, or inspire further similar and more thorough 
research in the future? What are the strong and weak aspects of the various transitional justice 
mechanisms that are available to bring an end to, and create sustainable peace in conflict 
zones? Furthermore, how can the positive aspects of a specific mechanism, like amnesties, be 
optimised, and the negative excluded in a joint approach? How can the positive aspects of 
different transitional justice mechanisms available be highlighted and applied in a common 
framework with the goal of creating sustainable peace in Northern Uganda? What are the 
strong sides of various transitional justice mechanisms that in turn can be combined in a joint 
approach to create sustainable peace in conflict zones? How can this joint approach be used to 
create sustainable peace in Northern Uganda?  
 
Thus, the central assertion that this study will test out is that the existing perspectives are 
wholly inefficient in addressing transitional justice in conflict zones, as their attempts have 
clearly failed due to a number of deficiencies, and will continue to fail, unless a combined 
holistic approach is applied instead. 
 
1.4 Theoretical framework  
This thesis will, in order to properly answer the research questions guiding the study, utilise 
the key theoretical framework developed by Galtung (1969, 1996). By applying his work as 
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the main theoretical framework to fully achieve this, the goal is to advance from a negative 
towards a positive understanding of justice to highlight the flaws in the current ‘peace vs. 
justice’ debate. The intention behind this is to give a well-reasoned critique of the highly 
inefficient existing theoretical approaches that have informed the debate until now, in order to 
build the case for a combined approach. 
 
Although Galtung’s theoretical perspective in certain aspects highlights the flaws in the 
debate, it is by itself both too broad and vague to fully address them all, and this will be 
reflected on in one of the next subsections concerning how it can be equated with the much 
wider processes of demobilisation, disarmament and resettlement (DDR). As a consequence 
of this, it is necessary to look at and include the theoretical contributions from other leading 
theorists within peace and conflict studies. Only then is it possible to gain a holistic 
understanding of the structural aspects behind the flaws in the existing ‘peace vs. justice’ 
debate in order to provide a well substantiated critique, which in turn also illustrates why a 
combined approach is needed to solve it. Such a holistic understanding is also more in line 
with the aim of peace and conflict studies elaborated on under section 1.2. Thus, as they 
contribute with important aspects to fully answer the research questions, this study’s 
theoretical framework will therefore also draw on the works of other leading theorists within 
peace and conflict studies, such as Lederach’s (1997) typology of actors and their agendas.  
 
The first step in this process is by using Galtung’s notion of justice in peace building to widen 
the narrow dichotomy used in the current ‘peace vs. justice’ debate. The goal is thereby to 
move beyond this debate’s current focus on a negative understanding of justice with only the 
absence of violence in mind, towards a positive one, where this is extended to include 
processes of demilitarisation, democratisation, development and justice. In sum, his notion of 
justice seeks to address not only one, but the whole range of challenges associated with 
building sustainable peace (Galtung, 1969, 1996:112; Nielsen, 2008). 
 
The next step in this process of outlining the theoretical framework is by using Lederach’s 
(1997) actor oriented typology in peace building to identify the actors involved at the different 
stages, from the local, via the national towards the international level. This will also be used 
to highlight the strategies they employ to achieve the goals on their agenda. Whereas the local 
levels often favour the neo-traditional justice procedures, the national level looks towards 
amnesties and the international levels in the direction of the ICC as the solution for dealing 
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with those individuals perceived as most responsible for atrocities committed during a 
conflict. It is, however, important to stress that these are often, but not always uniform and 
distinct groups, as locals might favour the ICC and the nationals local healing.  
 
After using Galtung’s (1969,1996) notion to advance from a negative towards a positive 
understanding of justice and this has been coupled with Lederach’s (1997) typology within 
peace building at the core of its theoretical framework, the third step in the process is to 
describe the two opposing perspectives and the combined approach. The goal with this is to 
illustrate the actors involved and their arguments. The ‘justice’ perspective consists of authors 
and actors ranging from Neil J. Kritz (1995), Ruti Teitel (2000) and Tim Allen (2005, 2006, 
and 2008) towards various non-governmental organisations (NGOs), such as Amnesty 
International (AI), Human Rights Watch (HRW) and the International Crisis Group (ICG). 
Their opponents in the ‘peace’ camp are represented by scholars and activists such as Zachary 
Lomo, Lucy Hovil and Joanna Quinn (2004, 2005) from the Refugee Law Project (RLP) at 
the Faculty of Law at Makerere University in Kampala, the Ugandan lawyer Adam Branch 
(2005) and James Ojera Latigo (2008) from the Northern Uganda Peace Initiative (NUPI) and 
the International Centre for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) writing for the International Institute 
for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), and numerous NGOs in the civil society in 
Northern Uganda, to mention a few. The combined approach will include authors and their 
arguments ranging from Nielsen (2008), Simpson (2008), Oomen and Marchand (2007).  
 
Since this combined approach can be said to represent an ideal model, this study will 
furthermore, by testing it out on a specific conflict as a fourth step in chapter three, seek to 
confirm or disprove its relevance. As the empirical implications of the ‘peace vs. justice’ 
debate that this thesis will seek to address have been most significant in Northern Uganda, it 
therefore seems most appropriate to apply this approach on that specific conflict as the fourth 
step. Thus, the more specific empirical research sub-question that will be examined is:  
 
How can the positive aspects of different transitional justice mechanisms available be 
highlighted and applied in a common framework with the goal of creating sustainable peace 
in Northern Uganda?  
 
This leads up to the fifth and final step in the theoretical framework guiding this study’s 
attempt to confirm or disprove the possibility of a joint approach on the general level in 
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transitional justice. These various transitional justice mechanisms that will be analysed at this 
stage with basis in item three, concerning accountability and reconciliation, in the Juba peace 
agreement and which also are identified within the literature as the leading mechanisms to 
address human rights abuses or war crimes. They range from amnesties, Truth Commissions 
or Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (TC/TRCs), neo-traditional justice mechanisms like 
the Gacaca courts in Rwanda and Mato Oput3 healing procedures in Uganda, national courts 
and international procedures like the ICC (Oomen and Marchand, 2007). Thus, to achieve 
this, the more specific theoretical research sub-question will be put forward: 
 
What are the strong and weak aspects of the various transitional justice mechanisms that are 
available to bring an end to, and create sustainable peace in conflict zones? Furthermore, how 
can the positive aspects of a specific mechanism, like amnesties, be optimised, and the 
negative excluded in a joint approach? 
 
To answer these questions, the various transitional justice mechanisms will be analysed by 
looking at their historical development, foundation in theory, how they have been applied and 
relate to various empirical cases. From this, their strengths and weaknesses will be derived to 
decide on their relevance in the present context in Northern Uganda.  
 
1.5 Methodological aspects  
No study is complete without a section reflecting on the strengths and weaknesses of the 
methodological aspects, such as data gathering methods and sources, as well as proper 
reasoning for why a certain research design was chosen over another one. This section will 
describe the methodological aspects of this thesis.  
 
1.5.1 Data gathering methods and sources 
This study is mainly conducted as a desk study, where it will rely on resources made available 
through the library at Stellenbosch University and electronic sources from the Internet in 
terms of the gathering and processing of data for the analysis. Thus, the study will thereby 
limit itself to be based primarily on secondary literature sources. At first glance, this can be 
said to represent a disadvantage compared to studies that are able to gain access to first hand 
primary evidence through sources based on field research. However, this study also contains 
                                                           
3
 Mato Oput is an Acholi word referring to one of the ceremonies associated with the Acholi tribe living in 
Northern Uganda’s neo-traditional system of justice (ICG, 2004). 
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elements of primary sources as well, since it will rely on studies based on field research and 
draw upon their findings throughout the analysis. This aspect is addressed more thoroughly 
later in this section.  
 
But for now, with a closer look, for this thesis the disadvantages associated directly with 
conducting field based research clearly outweigh the advantages. These disadvantages include 
that primary sources will not always guarantee accuracy, meaning that the researcher often 
must crosscheck all the material gained from interviews and other forms of direct data 
gathering. Field research also often includes personal interviews, which means that the 
researcher either must know the local language(s) that can take years to learn, or rely on an 
interpreter. With participatory observation, the researcher can without knowing it influence 
the behaviour of the observed, which in turn will affect the findings that further analysis is 
based upon. Furthermore, field research can also mean long periods living under adverse 
conditions to which the researcher is unaccustomed (Grønmo, 2004; Landman, 2003: 30-32).  
 
Before starting the process of analysing the data material gathered from one of the many 
possibilities that are available to obtain information from today, it is important to treat them 
with a certain degree of scepticism in order to avoid possible pitfalls (Grønmo, 2003:121-
123). First and foremost, before analysing the material obtained, one must be sure of that the 
source is not a false one. Secondly, a source found to be reliable must also be independent, 
which means that the author presenting the information shall not be influenced by someone 
else. Thirdly, the source used must not be biased, meaning that the source is intentionally 
distorted, resulting in the reader not being given a correct understanding of the reality. In the 
concluding remark on the criticism of sources, Grønmo (2004:123) argues that if possible an 
independent source shall prevail over a dependent, a primary source over a secondary, a 
contemporary over a previous one, and last but not least, a neutral over a biased one.  
 
Another typical feature of case studies based on peace and conflict studies like this one, is that 
they rely on multiple sources of evidence in order to reach a holistic understanding of the 
topic studied (Babbie and Mouton 2001:282-283; Grønmo, 2004: 90-91; Landman, 2003:215, 
231). Based on that, this thesis should be able to demonstrate the important skill of how the 
knowledge obtained from the secondary literature sources has informed the research 
questions, methodology and analysis. With this in mind, in order to get a thorough 
understanding of the topic, the thesis started off by studying all relevant empirical and 
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theoretical material, based on the following four types of data sources: (1) Academic works in 
books and journals; (2) NGO reports from AI, HRW and ICG; (3) official documents, such as 
primary sources of the United Nations (UN) and ICC documents; (4) works of ‘high 
journalism’, meaning a combination of scholarly works and news reports derived from articles 
in magazines such as the Economist or the South African newspaper Mail and Guardian. 
 
By dealing with the available literature at hand in this way during the gathering and 
processing of data with the purpose of further analysis, it was possible to study the most 
relevant aspects about this topic of interest. This stretches from NGO material, news reports 
and journal articles, which all give a lot of important information about the root causes of the 
conflict and how it has evolved until now. Furthermore, books and articles related to peace 
and conflict studies about transitional justice contribution to solving the challenges associated 
with peace building gave a good insight into the ‘peace vs. justice’ debate. 
 
1.5.2 Demarcation of the study  
This study largely draws upon already existing literature on transitional justice. Due to the 
fact that this literature is quite broad in itself, it has therefore not been possible to go into 
detail on every available source and cover all possible aspects on the subject matter. Hence, 
concerning the purely theoretical aspects of transitional justice, the focus has instead been 
directed towards the literature that is most often quoted in academic books and articles in 
journals, and therefore is perceived as the most central works in this field, such as Kritz 
(1995) and Teitel (2000). With regards to the empirical case study of Northern Uganda, in 
addition to the aforementioned criteria, this thesis will focus almost exclusively on literature 
covering the time period from ICC’s charges against the LRA leadership in 2005 until present 
time in 2009, exemplified by authors such as Allen (2005, 2006 and 2008) and Waddel and 
Clark (2008). However, in order to give an understanding of the entire conflict situation, some 
basic standpoints from the historical background have been provided. In the process of 
achieving this briefing papers on the topic, such as the ‘List of literature on transitional 
justice’ from the Peace Research Institute in Oslo, Norway (PRIO, 2008), Siri Gloppen’s 
article (2002) ‘Reconciliation and democratisation: outlining the research field’ , Dorota 
Gierycz work (2008) ‘Transitional Justice – Does It Help Or Does It Harm?’, Paul Van Zyl’s 
(2005) 'Promoting Transitional Justice in Post-Conflict Societies' and the cross comparison 
with the title ‘Traditional Justice and Reconciliation after Violent Conflict: Learning from 
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African Experiences’ edited by Luc Huyse and Mark Salter (2008) from the International 
IDEA, have all given much valuable and insightful information.                                   
                                                           
Another challenge is represented by the fact that the ‘peace vs. justice’ debate that this study 
seeks to address also contains other important ongoing cases involving the ICC in the CAR, 
the DRC and Sudan (Clark, 2008:39-42; HRW, 2009; New African, 2009). Including them in 
this study would unfortunately have made it too broad, and although these cases will be 
touched upon on several occasions throughout this study, they have therefore been excluded 
from this study. 
 
As mentioned above, this study is therefore further limited to one specific case, namely 
Northern Uganda, where the ‘peace vs. justice’ debate in its present empirical form started, 
and is still taking place after the ICC in 2005 indicted five of the LRA leaders (Allen, 2006; 
Nielsen, 2008; Oomen and Marchand, 2007). But even at this level there are many important 
aspects that could have been covered, but which is impossible within the limited time frame 
of this study. This study is therefore based on item three in the Juba peace agreement 
concerning accountability and reconciliation, limited to what the debate has centred on in 
terms of which transitional justice mechanism is best suited to help bring an end to over 
twenty years of violent conflict, namely: neo-traditional justice procedures, amnesty laws or 
international proceedings (Latigo, 2008; Oomen and Marchand, 2007). For an excellent 
assessment of the LRA, please see Kevin C. Dunn (2007:137-146), who in his article 
‘Uganda: The Lord’s Resistance Army’ lists five main theories used to explain and understand 
the LRA insurgency: (1) Kony as Madman; (2) The Legitimate Complaints of the North; (3) 
Sudanese Hired Gun? The Regional Geopolitical Dimension; (4) Museveni Doesn’t Want 
Peace, and; (5) The Political Economies of Violence’. The time and space available makes it 
impossible and beyond the scope of this thesis to go into all of these different explanations of 
the LRA’s insurgency.  
 
In this study, Galtung’s work (1969, 1996) is used as the central guiding theoretical 
framework. By utilising his theory in order to gain a comprehensive understanding of the 
whole issue surrounding transitional justice mechanisms with regards to their impact on 
solving a conflict, this goal would ideally be achieved through a comparison between several 
conflicts by covering them from the outbreak of hostilities towards the employment of 
transitional justice mechanisms, especially the ICC option. However, the ICTR and ICTY are 
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coming to an end in their respective proceedings and can more or less be perceived as the 
motivation behind establishing the ICC, whereas the Taylor case is being dealt with in a 
tribunal known as the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), which is not directly affiliated 
with the ICC, although the SCSL uses the Court’s facilities in The Hague for security reasons 
(New African, 2009). In the Sudanese case with its origins dating back to the Darfur region in 
2003, research about what the full impact of the charges made against al-Bashir will be is still 
at an infant stage (Clark, 2008). With regards to the situation in the DRC case, this is simply 
an overwhelming task with dozens of guerrillas and crosscutting alliances which is enough to 
cover entire books about the topic. The conflict in Northern Uganda is clearly not a 
straightforward matter either, as it is currently being the longest lasting conflict on the African 
continent. It is nevertheless the place where the whole ‘peace vs. justice’ debate in its present 
form has lasted for the longest period of time since the establishment of the ICC in 2002.  
 
To further clarify and highlight the topic of interest, this study is therefore limited to after the 
ICC became directly involved in Northern Uganda with the indictments against the LRA’s 
leadership in 2005, by looking at how neo-traditional justice procedures, amnesty laws and 
international proceedings as transitional justice mechanisms can be used in a combined 
approach to bring an end to the conflict. As pointed out by critics of Galtung’s (1969, 1996) 
work, such as Roland Paris (quoted in Miller, 2008:267) and David Mendeloff (2004), a clear 
weakness associated with applying his theory and notion of positive peace is that it by being 
very wide encourages rather than discourages the coverage of what is known as the processes 
of DDR. This study is in this regard no exception from this criticism as it uses Galtung’s 
theory (1969, 1996), but instead of including all possible aspects, such as DDR, a deliberate 
choice has therefore been made by using his work and notion to primarily look at the aspects 
associated with how transitional justice contributes to or hinders the establishment of 
sustainable peace in a society torn apart by war. How this weakness will be dealt with, is more 
thoroughly described in the theoretical framework and in the second chapter.   
 
1.5.3 Research design 
In all scientific studies a decision must be made on which type of research design to apply in 
order to give a best possible response to the research questions (Babbie and Mouton, 2001:72-
104). This selection of an appropriate research design in a study relates to whether it meets the 
demands arising from the different forms of validity and reliability in an acceptable way 
(Grønmo, 2004:220-221). These are concepts that will be defined more thoroughly as they are 
16 
 
described in the following. In this part, the first subsection describes the research design of 
this study, while the second part will look at whether it meets the demands that are made by 
the criterions of reliability and validity in a satisfying way.  
 
1.5.3.1 Single case study  
Robert K. Yin (2003:19) defines research design as being ‘the logic that links the data to be 
collected (and the conclusions to be drawn) to the initial questions of the study’. This relates 
to the construction of the research design and whether to apply a statistical quantitative, or a 
more qualitative oriented design, or if both should be combined through triangulation of 
methods.  
 
Selecting the right method to properly achieve the main objectives put forward in the research 
questions furthermore largely depends on the theoretical background of the study and what 
the purpose of the research is (Babbie and Mouton, 2001:72-104). Based on peace and 
conflict theories, this study is focusing upon how both the theoretical and empirical side of the 
‘peace vs. justice’ debate can be solved in the ongoing conflict in Northern Uganda, where it 
in its present form has been taking place for the longest period of time. Since this study is 
based on one unit of analysis, the focus is on a relative low number of independent variables, 
in terms of the various transitional justice mechanisms mentioned elsewhere in this chapter. 
They in turn have a major impact on the dependent variable, which is how to achieve 
sustainable peace in Northern Uganda. In a multidisciplinary study like this one, it is therefore 
necessary to operate with a certain degree of flexibility during the gathering and processing of 
data information for further research and analysis of these variables, even if this means that 
the more precise formulation of the methodology chosen can take quite some time. 
Qualitative designs are used in studies where one or relatively few units are analysed through 
a low number of variables in order to get a more thorough and comprehensive understanding 
of the phenomenon being questioned (Grønmo, 2004: 123-124). This is therefore the 
appropriate one to apply in this study. More specifically, the use of a flexible single case 
study as the research design guiding this study seems to give the most appropriate results in 
order for it to fully achieve its goals and objectives by answering the problem statement put 
forward in the research questions (Babbie and Mouton, 2001:282).  
 
A case study is defined as ‘an empirical study that investigates a contemporary phenomenon 
within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context 
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are not clearly evident’ (Yin, 2003:13).  In theses where the research question guiding it is of 
an explanatory character, and focus on causal mechanisms in terms of how or in what way the 
phenomenon of interests unfolds, the use of a case study design is useful in order to create a 
better understanding of it. According to Yin (2003:9), the use of a case study research design 
is the best solution in studies where a ‘how or why question is being asked about a 
contemporary set of events, over which the investigator has little or no control’. 
 
This study has such a focus on the causal mechanisms of how various transitional justice 
mechanisms contribute to the creation of sustainable peace in Northern Uganda by asking the 
following what and how questions (in a shortened version of the research questions of this 
study):  What are the strong sides of various transitional justice mechanisms that in turn can 
be combined in a joint approach to create sustainable peace in conflict zones? How can this 
joint approach be used to create sustainable peace in Northern Uganda? 
  
Single case studies are divided into two different types. The first type focus on the aspects that 
make the case unique, but without seeking to generalise from the findings made. Whereas the 
second type also takes the unique aspects into account, it departs from the other, as it is also 
an example of phenomenon(s) that there already exists some knowledge about in a broader 
theoretical framework. This latter type of single case studies can be further divided into two 
other and more precise sub-categories, namely theoretical interpretive and theoretical 
developing. In order to get a proper understanding of the phenomenon(s) studied, the first of 
them relies on applying an existing theoretical framework onto the case being questioned. The 
second of them is, by making generalisations aiming at contributing to further development of 
existing theory, based on the findings made from studying the phenomenon(s) being 
questioned (Yin, 2004:39-46).  
 
Although this study has certain ambitions of achieving both, it is however primarily of a 
theoretically interpretative character. By making its departure from already existing peace and 
conflict theories embedded in transitional justice, the knowledge about the phenomenon being 
studied here clearly exists in a broader theoretical framework. This is in terms of what impact 
various transitional justice mechanisms have on the creation of sustainable peace in conflict 
zones. The unique aspect here is however that very few studies have looked at how they can 
be combined in a joint approach to achieve it. Based on these theories, this study is analysing 
the prospects of creating sustainable peace with this approach in the ongoing conflict in 
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Northern Uganda. Nevertheless, this study also seeks to contribute in further developing the 
existing theories, even if it in this regard has a more limited impact. In order to get a better 
understanding of what impact the findings made through the research in this study might have 
on the wider field of transitional justice, it is necessary to take the aspects of validity and 
reliability into consideration, that will be dealt with in the following subsection. 
 
1.5.4 Reliability and validity  
1.5.4.1 Validity 
Achieving an acceptable level of validity in this thesis can best be described as pursuing its 
accuracy. In general the concept of validity refers to how accurate and trustworthy the 
instruments used, data gathered and findings made in the research are. The study should, in 
other words, be measuring what it is intended to measure in terms of that the empirical 
investigation must be correlated with the theoretical level (Babbie and Mouton, 2001:122; 
Grønmo, 2004: 221, 233). In the following, this section will have a closer look at the various 
forms of validity that is likely to have an influence on and possibly could challenge this study.  
 
In order to determine to what extent this study contributes to developing theory in peace and 
conflict studies as mentioned in the previous sub-section, the external validity must be 
assessed. The external validity of a study refers to whether its findings can be generalised 
beyond the immediate case study (Babbie and Mouton, 2001:219-221; Grønmo, 2004:233; 
Yin, 2003:37). According to Yin (2003:10) ‘case studies like experiments are generalisable to 
theoretical propositions and not to populations or universes’. In other words, only based on 
the findings made by this single case study in itself, it is highly unlikely to make a lasting 
impact on the wider field of peace and conflict studies concerning the direction transitional 
justice has taken in the ‘peace vs. justice’ debate. It will however present some important 
findings concerning how such a combined transitional justice approach might work in 
theoretical and empirical terms. Thereby it can hopefully contribute to the development of 
theory by serving as an inspiration for further research that can further develop this field 
through more detailed enquiries of a similar kind in the future.  
 
Another form of validity that also can be questioned here is the internal validity of this study, 
since it is of an explanatory character by being interested in causal mechanisms (Babbie and 
Mouton, 2001:217-219; Grønmo, 2004:219). According to Yin (2003:34), the internal validity 
of a study can be determined by looking at whether the study is ‘establishing a causal 
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relationship, whereby certain conditions are shown to lead to other conditions, as 
distinguished from spurious relationships’. To make sure that this aspect is acceptable, it is 
important to take into consideration other variables that possibly could influence the creation 
of sustainable peace in Northern Uganda. As such, this study is fully aware of this 
shortcoming represented by other variables that are not included in this study might have an 
unexpected influence by creating spurious effects. In order to address that challenge, this 
study will therefore briefly consider other factors that might influence the situation in 
Northern Uganda, for instance the wider regional context including Sudan and the DRC.  
 
Construct validity, refers to whether or not a study measures the phenomenon being 
questioned in a reliable way to reach a satisfying level of understanding (Babbie and Mouton, 
2004:123; Grønmo, 2004:232). The construct validity in this study refers to whether the 
theoretical variables have been properly operationalised so that they measure what they are 
meant to. As the name of the debate ‘peace vs. justice’ in transitional justice indicates, there 
are obviously more than one possibility that can be used by this study in order to measure 
what impact the various transitional justice mechanisms have on creating sustainable peace in 
conflict zones. In order to deal with this problem, this study measures their relevance by 
weighing them up against the theoretical framework developed based on the works of Galtung 
(1969, 1996), Lederach (1997) and others. Thereafter, it discusses how significant the impact 
of the different variables are, based on a study of how they affect the phenomenon in 
question, namely the ongoing conflict in Northern Uganda. 
 
Most of the findings made in this study are based on written secondary sources. This study 
has therefore not fully achieved Yin’s (2003:97) criterion of ‘triangulating from multiple 
sources of evidence’, and its construct validity could clearly have been strengthened by 
triangulating more between primary and secondary sources of evidence. In this thesis, the 
secondary sources used have, however, been coupled with information gathered through quite 
reliable sources of a more primary character. The secondary sources based on academic 
books, articles and electronic sources provide the reader with the historical background to the 
conflict. Primary sources, on the other side, give an insight into the more recent events 
unfolding in the conflict. They are based on scholarly reports and newsletters from various 
UN organs, NGO reports, such as those made by AI, ICG and HRW, newspaper articles and 
analysis from the Economist and Mail and Guardian. In this thesis, Yin’s criterion is partly 
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met, as primary sources are used interchangeably with secondary, and therefore to a certain 
extent can be said to have been triangulated.  
1.5.4.2 Reliability 
Another weakness affecting nearly all forms of qualitative research relates to the concept of 
reliability. Reliability is a factor determined by how precisely the data information used in the 
research of a study have been collected and processed, as it refers to whether a specific 
technique based on the findings made would produce the same results. This means that the 
answer should ideally be the same independently of who conducted the study or where and 
when it takes place (Babbie and Mouton, 2001:119-121; Grønmo, 2004:228-229). This is a 
major problem which is common for qualitative research projects in the social sciences, as 
they unfortunately often have limited levels of reliability, and this study is no exception in 
that regard (Grønmo, 2004:228-229).  
 
The problem with the reliability of this study relates to how the social sciences are mainly 
concerned with problems coming about right ‘here’ and ‘now’. For researchers this is a 
serious challenge, as it therefore can be difficult to secure a desired level of reliability in the 
research, since the probability that other researchers have gathered exactly the same data and 
interpreted them in a similar way is rather low (Grønmo, 2004:6, 28-57; Landman, 2003:10-
16). That means that if this study were to be repeated in a few years time it could be 
problematic as the answers would differ substantially due to changes in time and society.  
 
The research conducted by this study is therefore most likely to have a reliability that is not 
only rather low, but also of a limited character, resulting in that this study cannot empirically 
prove its findings. This is also most likely the case, since conflict situations tend to be 
fluctuating, which is underlined by the fact that despite of the current situation with relative 
peace in Northern Uganda, the conflict is still ongoing and things could change rapidly (ICG, 
2007, 2008).  
 
This implies a very high level of sensitivity with regards to making definitive generalisations 
of any kind, as it would be difficult for someone else to achieve the same results by coming to 
the same conclusions in five years time. But as reflected on in this section, by being critically 
aware of these methodological weaknesses inherent in the research of this study, it is 
nevertheless possible to make some concluding remarks of what the outcome is likely to be in 
the end. These remarks may also hopefully serve as an inspirational guideline for further 
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theory development on this subject, usually an aim for explorative case research (Yin, 
2003:5). 
 
1.6 Focus and structure of the thesis:  
This chapter has first described the background to the study in terms of how the ‘peace vs. 
justice’ debate remains locked with regards to both theoretical and empirical aspects. Its 
significance is evident by its contribution to the field of transitional justice through looking 
for ways to overcome this debate, and by the utilisation of the works of leading theorists 
within peace and conflict studies in order to develop a theoretical framework analysing the 
strengths and weaknesses of various mechanisms in order to come up with a combined 
approach. Furthermore, the weaknesses associated with such an approach have also been 
reflected on. The research questions that will be asked about how to achieve this and critical 
reflections of the methodology have also been assessed. As this debate also has a more 
practical and empirical side to it, a case study is necessary to determine the relevance of this 
combined approach. The Northern Ugandan conflict was selected, as this is where this aspect 
of the debate has lasted for the longest period of time, since the ICC’s involvement in 2004. 
Although this study will touch briefly on other cases and include different transitional justice 
mechanisms, it is further limited to the Court’s involvement in Northern Uganda from 2004 
onwards, and will with basis in item three concerning accountability and reconciliation in the 
failed Juba peace agreement analyse the strengths and weaknesses of neo-traditional justice, 
amnesty and the ICC. 
 
The second chapter of this thesis will look into the historical background of transitional 
justice, and provide a thorough definition of the concept by using authors such as Teitel 
(2000, 2006), the UN (2004) and Oomen and Marchand (2007). Furthermore, the two 
opposing perspectives and arguments made by the ‘justice’ and ‘peace’ camps respectively, as 
well as the more empirical debate taking place in Africa, will all be presented to illustrate the 
need for advancing towards a combined approach. After this, the chapter will describe how 
the combined approach can serve as a model to advance from this current negative 
understanding of peace and justice towards a positive notion of both concepts based on the 
work of both Galtung (1969, 1996) and Lederach (1997), but also describing the weaknesses 
associated with applying such an approach (Mendeloff, 2004). Furthermore, the central role of 
transitional justice within the wider processes associated with peace building in post-conflict 
societies is identified and described in more detail. Based on this reconceptualisation of peace 
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and justice and location of transitional justice within peace building, the last part of the 
second chapter illustrates how the combined approach appears in theory. 
  
The third chapter will describe the two decades long conflict taking place in Northern Uganda 
by analysing key events such as the country’s violent history from independence onwards, the 
failure of successive peace negotiations in 1994, 1996 and 2004 between the GoU and the 
LRA, and consecutive military counterinsurgencies by the government and counterattacks by 
the guerrilla movement against the civilian population in Northern Uganda in retaliation, 
which all forms part of the critical backdrop to the current situation. Other aspects will also be 
touched upon briefly, like the conflict in neighbouring Southern Sudan, the LRA’s targeting 
of and indiscriminate use of violence associated with mutilations, killings and forced 
recruitment of children through abductions to serve as child soldiers committing atrocities 
against their next of kin in Northern Uganda, and the GoU counterinsurgency tactic by forcing 
the civilian population into IDP camps with appalling living conditions. Based on item three 
on the agenda for the Juba peace talks that began in July 2006 concerning accountability and 
reconciliation, the main focus will, however, be on the introduction and use of the transitional 
justice mechanisms associated with the ‘peace vs. justice’ debate in Northern Uganda at 
various stages, namely the ICC, amnesty and neo-traditional justice. Unfortunately, the 
prospects of a final peace agreement collapsed with the warring factions returning to the 
battlefield after the negotiations at Juba had ended in April 2008, but if it had been successful, 
agenda item number three would have resulted in a balance between these three transitional 
justice mechanisms. The last section concludes by briefly describing how the conflict has 
developed since then. 
 
The fourth and penultimate chapter will be based on agenda item number three in the Juba 
peace agreement. It will first by assessing the ICC, the Amnesty Act and the neo-traditional 
justice system analyse the relationship between them, as well as the strength and weaknesses 
of these three transitional justice mechanisms in order to determine whether and to what 
extent they can be utilised in a combined approach. 
 
With basis in the research questions guiding this thesis, the fifth and final chapter will draw 
the conclusions about how these three transitional justice mechanisms used together in a 
combined approach can strengthen the prospects for a lasting and sustainable peace in 
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Northern Uganda, but also touch briefly upon what needs to be done in other areas and reflect 
on this study’s impact on the ‘peace vs. justice’ debate in transitional justice.  
 
1.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has presented an overview of the background of this study, its significance, the 
research questions that will be asked and the methodology used. The background to the study 
describes how the ‘peace vs. justice’ debate remains locked in terms of how the advocates for 
peace and proponents of justice perceive them in two completely different ways. Shortly after 
its establishment in 2002, the ICC was involved as a transitional justice mechanism in the 
CAR, the DRC, Sudan and Uganda. The result of this has been that implications of the debate 
are not only affecting theoretical, but also hampering more empirical aspects concerning how 
to solve conflicts and create the conditions conducive for peace worldwide. This is especially 
with regards to Northern Uganda, where the ICC has been involved for the longest period of 
time after issuing arrest warrants for the LRA rebel leader Joseph Kony and four of his 
commanders in 2005. 
             
What can best be described as a second generation of activists and scholars within transitional 
justice, like Nielsen (2008), Oomen and Marchand (2007), Simpson (2008) and van Zyl 
(2005), are all in different ways looking for venues to overcome this current situation and 
advance the field further in a more open and inclusive direction through a combined approach 
where elements from both perspectives are included. 
          
This thesis is situated in the middle between this new school of thought and the current ‘peace 
vs. justice’ debate, as it seeks to assess whether it is possible to come up with a new and 
combined theoretical approach, or if  it is a flawed and futile attempt and everything will 
remains the same. Based on Nielsen (2008) and Simpson (2008), who utilises Galtung’s 
(1969, 1996) theoretical contribution within peace and conflict studies, this study takes this 
one step further by using Galtung’s contribution and those of other leading theorists within 
this field, like Lederach (1997). It will thereby develop a theoretical framework to analyse the 
current ‘peace vs. justice’ debate to illustrate its inherent flaws, as peace is equated with 
negotiations and justice with punishment only. After having substantiated the need for such a 
combined approach, this study’s significance is to contribute with an analysis of how this can 
come to affect the conflict in Northern Uganda, where the more practical and empirical 
implications of this debate currently have lasted for the longest period of time after the ICC 
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arrest warrants against the top five LRA leaders in October 2005. Based on item three in the 
Juba peace agreement this will be done by analysing the strength and weaknesses associated 
with the three transitional justice mechanisms of the ICC, amnesty procedures and neo-
traditional justice in chapter four.  
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2 From a negative to a positive understanding of justice when building 
sustainable peace: A theoretical and conceptual framework 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter will outline the first, second and third steps in the theoretical framework that will 
be utilised throughout this thesis, namely how to advance from a negative towards a positive 
understanding of the notion of peace and justice. In order to achieve this outcome, this chapter 
will first describe the historical background of transitional justice before looking at the 
definitional aspects of the concept.                                                                      
 
After having illustrated how transitional justice has evolved as a phenomenon in a historical 
context and by defining the contents and characteristics of the concept, the next part will take 
a closer look at the two opposing perspectives. By doing so, the aim is not only to gain a more 
thorough understanding of what this debate is about, but also to illustrate that although they 
seemingly perceive peace and justice in fundamentally different ways, it is nevertheless based 
on the same negative interpretation of both concepts. A brief illustration of the more ‘African’ 
version of this debate is also given. This is done in order to be able to move beyond this 
reductionist interpretation to a positive understanding of these concepts based on Galtung’s 
theories (1969, 1996).  
 
By utilising Galtung’s work in this manner, the goal is therefore to describe the combined 
approach and illustrate how it can serve as a model to move from a negative towards a 
positive understanding of peace and justice, to create sustainable peace in conflict zones. As 
his perception of these concepts is criticised on several grounds for being too broad and 
vague, it is in order to illustrate how this goal can best be achieved, and therefore it is 
necessary to include and use the work of other scholars writing in the Galtung tradition, such 
as Lederach (1997), as they have further developed these concepts more precisely.       
 
However, describing what the concepts of peace and justice constitutes in theory is one thing, 
but how they best can be achieved in practice a totally different one. The next part in this 
process of moving from a negative to a positive understanding of peace and justice will be to 
explain the concept of peace building and illustrate how transitional justice also forms a 
central part of peace building. After having described how it is possible to advance from a 
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negative towards a positive understanding of peace and justice as concepts in theory and how 
they can be used in practice through peace building, the last section will look at how all of 
these elements meet in and can be utilised through the combined approach. This is necessary 
in order to illustrate how this can be done before moving on to look at the conflict in Northern 
Uganda in chapter three and the different transitional justice mechanisms that have been used 
in this context to bring about an end to the war stretching from the ICC, amnesties and the 
Acholis neo-traditional justice procedures, like the Mato Oput reconciliation ceremony. 
Chapter four will with basis in item three, concerning accountability and reconciliation, in the 
Juba peace agreement, assess strength and weaknesses, but also the relationship between these 
three mechanisms, in order to analyse the possibility for applying such a combined approach. 
 
2.2 The historical background of transitional justice   
Good reviews of the transitional justice literature can be found elsewhere Gierycz, 2008; 
Gloppen, (2002); Huyse and Salter, (2008); Oomen and Marchand, (2007); PRIO, (2008), and 
as it is both beyond the scope and not the intention of this study to provide such an exhaustive 
literature review, this cannot and will not be attempted or repeated here. But in order to locate 
this study within the wider historical context in this field of transitional justice, a brief account 
of the broader historical development within this field will be outlined. Here it is possible to 
distinguish between three different historical periods concerning transitional justice; (1) the 
interwar years; (2) post-1945, and; (3) the post-Cold War (Elster, 2004; du Plessis, 2005:174-
178; Teitel, 2000).  
 
2.2.1 The interwar years 
Until World War One from 1914 to 1918, the idea of bringing a head of state or political 
leaders of a country to justice was perceived as totally unheard of. Yet, nearly one century 
later, the situation is the other way around, with a large number of political leaders either 
being indicted or facing the threat of indictments, going from Slobodan Milosevic, Saddam 
Hussein, Augusto Pinochet, Charles Taylor, Alberto Fujimori and Omar al-Bashir (Economist 
2009a; du Plessis, 2005: 174; New African, 2009; Teitel, 2000, 2006:1).  
 
To understand why this fundamental change in the perception of bringing such leaders to 
justice has happened, it is necessary to look at a process that started with the Versailles 
Treaty. It dictated the conditions for Germany’s surrender after World War One, and had 
provisions that would have made it possible to establish an international tribunal conducting 
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criminal prosecutions against this country’s political leaders and head of state, since they were 
seen as responsible for the mayhem unfolding over these four years. However, the German 
emperor escaped to the Netherlands, which consequently refused to extradite him on the 
grounds that he as a head of state enjoyed immunity and that an eventual indictment would be 
based on retroactive justice. As a result, only a handful of Germans faced national sham trials 
where they were given relatively short sentences (Elster, 2004; du Plessis, 2005:174; Teitel, 
2000). 
 
Nevertheless, throughout the 1920s and 1930s, in the period known as the ‘interwar years’, 
the UN’s predecessor, the League of Nations tried to establish an ‘high court of international 
justice’ dealing with both individual and state responsibility. Because of massive resistance 
from the member states it only succeeded in establishing the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) concerning state responsibility, meaning that individuals such as heads of states and 
political leaders of a country would still enjoy impunity for decisions made prior to and 
during wars (Elster, 2004; du Plessis, 2005: 174-175; Teitel, 2000).   
 
2.2.2 Post-1945 
Even if the origins of transitional justice can be traced back to World War One and the 
interwar years, its full impact only came about in the aftermath of the Second World War.     
With the establishment of the International Military Tribunals (IMT) in Nuremberg and 
Tokyo in the post-war period after 1945, a new trend had emerged in international criminal 
justice. Reacting against the holocaust genocide and other heinous war crimes, these tribunals 
convicted those German and Japanese leaders perceived as most responsible for committing 
these acts during the war, based on their individual responsibility (Allen, 2006:5-7; du Plessis, 
2005:175; Teitel, 2000).     
 
Although these IMTs later have been criticised for representing the ‘victor’s justice’ with 
rather selective and politicised prosecutions resulting in retroactive punishments, it cannot 
overshadow the fact that they were the first attempt ever to establish an international criminal 
court dealing with individuals. These tribunals served to illustrate that the character of certain 
grave acts, such as crimes against humanity and genocide, are of such a serious matter that 
they simply cannot be ignored by the international community. Where no other means or 
options were available, the justice of international criminal law would therefore as a solution 
of last resort be able to reach out and prosecute the individuals responsible for such crimes, 
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independently of whether they had committed them in the capacity as serving heads of state, 
political leaders of a country or individual citizens. This meant that under certain conditions 
state sovereignty could be put aside, with national laws and domestically lawful orders 
overruled as unlawful (Allen, 2006:5-7; du Plessis, 2005:175).  
 
2.2.3 Post-Cold War  
Despite these milestones being achieved in the aftermath of the Second World War, the field 
of transitional justice was, however, largely neglected and further developments in the 
direction of a universal human rights regime upheld by an international criminal court stalled 
for nearly five decades during the Cold War period. As a consequence of the rivalry unfolding 
between the major powers in their competition for dominance and power on a global scale 
throughout the Cold War, many countries and armed groups in Asia, Africa and Latin 
America were supported directly or indirectly from one of the sides. This created a situation 
where perpetrators responsible for committing various human rights violations independently 
of being a political leader or a serving head of state issuing an order, as well as the soldiers 
obeying them enjoyed impunity, without facing any kind of consequences at all. But it also 
resulted in a stalemate serving as a lid that kept many of the conflicts in this period under a 
certain form of control, giving them the distinction of being proxy wars fought with low 
intensity. As that era came to an end with the collapse of the Soviet bloc in the early 1990s, 
this lid was removed and resulted in that many of these conflicts exploded in full scale 
warfare (Allen, 2007:5-9; Bøås and Dunn, 2007:17-20; du Plessis, 2005; 175-176).          
 
Nevertheless, several of these conflicts raging throughout the 1990s have now come to an 
end, and many of these countries have in recent years become what is known as ‘transitional 
societies’ situated somewhere between war and peace, offering new and in many ways unique 
possibilities of capturing and punishing perpetrators for the crimes they have committed 
against humanity in these conflicts. The international community was in two of these cases 
faced by the massive crimes against humanity committed in the wars in Rwanda and former 
Yugoslavia, and responded by establishing the two ad hoc tribunals ICTR and ICTY to deal 
with the individual perpetrators perceived as most responsible for committing them (Allen, 
2006: 9-15; du Plessis, 2005:175-176).  
 
Motivated by the results of the work made by ICTR and ICTY in upholding international 
criminal law to guarantee justice in the proceedings against the responsible perpetrators, led 
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the international community to initiate multilateral negotiations, resulting in the Rome Treaty 
of 1998 and finally the creation of the ICC in 2002. The ICC’s establishment was intended to 
send out a clear signal to existing and prospective perpetrators to restrain themselves, as the 
practice of impunity for them through amnesties or exile had come to a definitive end, since 
the international community would no longer remain passive by accepting it, with this Court 
prosecuting them instead (Allen, 2006:16-24; du Plessis, 2005:176-178). 
 
The American human rights lawyer Charles T. Call (2004:101) argues that because of this 
development, transitional justice has made a significant contribution to international criminal 
justice by creating an ‘array of innovative and evolving instruments to expose and punish 
human rights abusers’, and it will thereby have an ‘unexpected influence on state sovereignty 
and on hopes for global justice’.  
 
Despite Call’s optimism, the result has also been the ‘peace vs. justice’ debate where the 
focus of concern for the international community, human rights activists, legal practitioners 
and social science scholars alike has been about whether to deal with previously oppressive 
rulers or brutal guerrillas through amnesties with impunity or through prosecution with trials 
throughout the phase of transitional justice in order to secure the transition to a more peaceful 
future. Transitional justice has as such been given widespread attention and considered to be a 
subfield of peace and conflict studies both addressing and dealing with past human rights 
abuses through the use of both judicial and non-judicial mechanisms (Huyse, 2008; Nielsen, 
2008; van Zyl, 2005).  
 
2.3 Definitional aspects of transitional justice as a concept  
As outlined above in the previous section describing the historical background, transitional 
justice is not a new phenomenon, even if it returned after the Cold War in the early 1990s. 
The field has constantly developed ever since alongside these historical events throughout the 
‘peace vs. justice’ debate, both in terms of the general academic development of theory about 
what the concept actually constitutes, to the practical implications concerning which 
transitional justice mechanism should be applied when in order to create sustainable peace in 
conflict zones worldwide, ranging from Africa, Asia, Europe and Latin-America (Huyse, 
2008; Nielsen, 2008; Oomen and Marchand, 2007; van Zyl, 2005).  
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But as a consequence of its relatively newfound role, which is seemingly confirmed by the 
fact that many authors like Mani (2005), PRIO (2008), Gierycz (2008), Gloppen (2002), and 
also includes most of those mentioned in the following, such as Järvinen (2004), Oomen and 
Marchand (2007), all have despite their differences in common that they refer to Kritz’s 
(1995) contribution as representing the seminal work in transitional justice. This implies that 
the theoretical and practical development within this field in its present and modern form is 
constantly evolving, inasmuch as no common overarching definition being agreed upon 
exists, and whereas some scholars and practitioners define the concept in broad terms, others 
define it more narrowly. It has thereby gone from being perceived in a narrow perspective 
purely as a legal matter to the broadest and most inclusive perception, where it is seen as 
being a political process as well. The concept now comprises the full range of judicial and 
non-judicial mechanisms (UN, 2004; van Zyl, 2005:209), where some of the most recent 
definitions includes a combination going from prosecuting individual perpetrators perceived 
as most responsible for committing human rights violations in a conflict through national and 
international trials, as well as dealing with the needs and grievances in the society at large 
through TRCs and neo-traditional justice procedures aimed at reconciliation and conflict 
resolution (Oomen and Marchand, 2007:162).     
 
To fully understand these nuances in the terminology used to describe this concept, it is 
necessary to examine some of the most central definitions encompassing these elements, 
going from the narrowest judicial one to the widest covering political aspects as well. 
 
Seen from a legal perspective, Teitel (2003:1) defines transitional justice as the ‘conception of 
justice associated with periods of political change, characterized by legal responses to 
confront the wrongdoing of repressive predecessor regimes’. From her point of view, 
transitional justice refers to how a new and democratic regime emerging after the downfall of 
an undemocratic regime pursues certain legal measures in order to properly address the 
human rights violations committed by the latter in the past (Teitel, 2003:1). 
 
This definition can be criticised for putting too much emphasis on how to respond in a legal 
manner, as it by entirely focusing on how to deal with the past through judicial mechanisms 
like prosecutions ignores the importance of how other non-judicial mechanisms, such as 
TRCs, contribute to the process as well. Furthermore, as she is seemingly assuming that the 
process of transitional justice only unfolds with the alternation of power between oppressive 
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regimes and their democratic successors, it leaves out political transition from conflict to 
peace in war-torn societies, and thereby neglects the need for such a process in these 
situations (Call, 2004; Newman quoted in Järvinen, 2004:37).  
 
The other end of the spectrum, with transitional justice being defined at its broadest is 
represented by Call (2004:101). According to him, it ‘refers to how societies transitioning 
from repressive rule or armed conflict deal with past atrocities, how they overcome social 
divisions or seek reconciliation, and how they create justice systems so as to prevent future 
human rights violations’ (Call, 2004:101). Call’s definition is seemingly able to overcome the 
shortcomings in Teitel’s more narrow definition by offering a perspective that incorporates 
both the past and the future, armed conflict and how to overcome social divisions. But in 
terms of ‘the creation of a justice system’ he is still presenting transitional justice as if it was 
merely a legal process. His definition should therefore be seen in accordance with Edward 
Newman’s (quoted in Järvinen, 2004:37) argument about it being a political process as well. 
In addition to the elements mentioned by Call, his definition also takes into consideration 
whether the political environment is conducive or hostile, as this important aspect is more 
than likely to have an influence on post-conflict or post-authoritarian settings. According to 
Newman (quoted in Järvinen, 2004:37), transitional justice is both a political and a legal 
process being affected by political compromises and practical constraints that are not 
necessarily evident in a ‘normal’ societal situation.  
 
The UN Secretary-General report ‘Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post 
Conflict Societies’ (2004: 4,12), occupies the middle ground between these two extremes by 
providing a thorough definition where it is seen as being:  
 
The notion of ‘transitional justice’ (…) comprises the full range of processes and mechanisms 
associated with a society’s attempts to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, 
in order to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation. These may include 
both judicial and non-judicial mechanisms, with differing levels of international involvement (or 
none at all) and individual prosecutions, reparations, truth-seeking, institutional reform, vetting 
and dismissals, or a combination thereof. (…)  Similarly  due regard must [also] be given to 
indigenous and informal traditions for administering justice or settling disputes to help them to 
continue their often vital role and to do so in conformity with both international standard and 
local tradition.   
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Oomen and Marchand (2007:162) have in one of the most recent definitions continued that 
trend by using this middle ground as a starting point to describe this concept. They argue that 
as a term, transitional justice describes the various judicial and non-judicial institutions used 
to assist societies in the transition they undergo away from a period dominated by human 
rights violations into one with sustainable peace and respect for human rights instead. In 
institutional terms, the notion is comprised of international tribunals, TRCs, vetting of former 
government officials, amnesty procedures, but also neo-traditional justice procedures aimed at 
reconciliation and conflict resolution. This last institution mentioned here is maybe the most 
important in this regard, as it has not been acknowledged and taken into consideration by 
being mentioned in previous definitions, although it has played an important role in this 
process with Gacaca courts in Rwanda and the Mato Oput procedures in Northern Uganda. 
Such customary mechanisms are based on traditional values and teachings, which in many 
instances resembles the same type of mechanisms that existed in pre-Western times before the 
introduction of colonialism. In other instances they are, however, modeled after old 
institutions and necessary changes are made to them in order to make them more relevant in 
the current and changed circumstances, hence they become ‘neo-traditional’ institutions4 
(Batanda, 2009; Hovil and Quinn, 2005:23; Ogora, 2009; Oomen and Marchand, 2007:162).  
Based on these various definitions examined here it is possible to conclude on how 
transitional justice relates to a number of mechanisms, going from trials, TRCs, vetting, 
institutional reforms and neo-traditional justice procedures aimed at reconciliation and 
conflict resolution, which is available for transitional societies in their endeavors made at 
addressing and thereby coming to terms with human rights violations of the past, whether it 
was caused by oppressive rule or conflict (Järvinen, 2004:36-37; Oomen and Marchand, 
2007:162; van Zyl, 2005). As this thesis deals with Northern Uganda as a post-conflict society 
striving for sustainable peace (ICG, 2008), the transition away from oppressive to democratic 
rule has, despite its importance, deliberately been left out of further discussion, as it is not 
relevant here.  
 
Various societies undergoing this process of transitional justice have chosen different ways to 
deal with a difficult past. But what unites them all is how they have experienced it as being 
the product of a political tradeoff between what is sometimes conflicting demands for 
                                                           
4
 For practical reasons, throughout this thesis, ‘neo-traditional’ refers to such mechanisms irrespectively of 
whether they are being practiced like they were in the past or as they appear in present time.  
33 
 
development, justice, peace, stability and truth. This process is thus a delicate balance where 
important decisions have to be made about whether justice can be served through pardon, 
investigations and prosecutions, or whether it all must be put aside temporarily or 
permanently for the sake of a fragile peace (du Plessis, 2005:193-195; Järvinen, 2004:36-39; 
van Zyl, 2005). If it is possible to serve justice for the human rights violations of the past, they 
must furthermore decide about whether to pursue individual or collective accountability or a 
combination of both, by identifying and providing reparations for the victims, with 
investigations and prosecutions of the perpetrators, as well as collective pardon and/or 
forgiveness. When being performed at its best, the process of transitional justice is able to 
strengthen the peace in a post-conflict society. At the opposite end, in a worst case scenario 
various transitional justice mechanisms, whether they are trials or TRCs, are either projected 
randomly without properly addressing the root causes of a difficult past, or deliberate with the 
purpose of revenge, thereby laying the foundations for new conflicts in the future (Järvinen, 
2004:36-39; van Zyl, 2005). 
 
2.4 Presentation of the opposing perspectives and arguments used in the 
‘peace vs. justice’ debate 
 
After illustrating the historical development of transitional justice as a phenomenon and 
defining it as a concept, this section will look at the two opposing perspectives and their 
arguments, in order to substantiate the need to move away from the negative interpretation of 
peace and justice that this debate is centred around towards a positive understanding based on 
the Galtung tradition in peace and conflict studies. 
 
2.4.1 The ‘justice’ approach 
The justice approach is dominated by legal theorists and practitioners, as well as human rights 
activists from various international NGOs, such as AI and HRW (Huyse, 2008:5; Järvinen, 
2004:37-38). 
 
The foundations of the ‘justice’ approach are based on the principles of universal justice and 
individual accountability derived from international criminal law that have evolved 
throughout the history of transitional justice, as illustrated in the historical section of this 
chapter. According to international criminal law, states are obliged to provide justice for the 
victims of human rights violations taking place on their territories (du Plessis, 2005; Järvinen, 
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2004; van Zyl, 2005). Under normal circumstances this would imply that the affected state 
initiated criminal investigations of the alleged perpetrators accused of committing such crimes 
and resulted in punishment with prosecutions against them in an entirely domestic setting 
through national courts. But in situations where states for various reasons prove to be unable 
or unwilling to do so themselves, there was previously very little that could be done about this 
situation. It is hoped that the renewed emphasis and focus in recent years on further 
development of the legal human rights regime in international criminal law will eliminate 
such loopholes. This gives third party countries both a right and a duty to prosecute alleged 
perpetrators staying or living on their respective territories to prevent them from turning into 
safe havens for such persons. But if everything else fails, the consequences of this are that the 
international community will have to get involved with international criminal prosecutions, as 
happened through the ad hoc tribunals ICTR and ICTY, or hybrid courts like the SCSL, and 
more recently with the establishment of the ICC as a permanent criminal court at the 
international level. This will, over time, result in a strengthening of this legal version of 
transitional justice primarily based on prosecution, thereby bringing about a definitive end to 
the acceptance and practice of impunity through various amnesty procedures as an alternative 
transitional justice mechanism (du Plessis, 2005:156-159; Elster, 2004;  Kaufman, 2005:66; 
Teitel, 2000).   
 
In what is described as the ‘retributive argument’, the advocates of this approach perceive 
individual accountability and universal jurisdiction as the two cornerstones serving several 
important purposes with regards to past human rights violations at both the individual and 
societal levels in post-conflict societies. The main assumption of this approach is how the 
only relevant transitional justice mechanisms, when it comes to achieve a successful transition 
from war to peace in a post-conflict society, are legal mechanisms, as it will require individual 
accountability for perpetrators responsible for committing human rights violations in the past 
by bringing them to justice through investigations, prosecution and punishment (Järvinen, 
2004:38; du Plessis, 2005:156-159). 
  
At the individual level, justice is meant to serve individual victims by assigning individual 
accountability and thereby holding individual perpetrators criminally accountable for the 
crimes they have committed. This is seen as crucial as it serves as a deterrence, not only 
preventing them from doing it again, but also forces prospective perpetrators to reflect on the 
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consequences of committing such crimes, thereby avoiding a repetition with similar violations 
of human rights from taking place elsewhere (Järvinen, 2004:38).  
However, the focus of this approach goes way beyond merely assigning accountability to 
individual perpetrators by convicting them for the crimes they have committed through 
criminal trials, as it is also concerned about wider societal matters and issues (Järvinen, 
2004:38). In order to avoid the curse of collective guilt and a resulting indiscriminate search 
for revenge in the affected society, trials also have an important effect in this regard, by 
preventing it from happening through assisting in the process of identifying and putting the 
guilt where it rightfully belongs, namely on those individuals who are to blame for instigating 
and committing crimes in the name of ethnicity or nationalism on behalf of a larger group 
(Chopo, 2007:24; Järvinen, 2004:38; van Zyl, 2005).  
 
Furthermore, in the aftermath of prolonged conflicts, the authorities responsible for upholding 
the necessary respect for the rule of law and human rights, like the judicial system or the 
police and army, which are seen as the pillars in a functioning society, are often either non-
existent or have simply collapsed, thereby increasing the potential risk of a return to violence. 
The only way to avoid this throughout the transitional stage is by breaking the cycle of 
impunity for violence through prosecution and punishment of alleged perpetrators responsible 
for committing human rights violations, as well as strengthening these societal institutions, so 
that the society operates properly on a daily basis (Järvinen, 2004:38; Kamali, 2001). This 
will help assist in the attempts made to legitimise the existence of peace in a post-conflict 
society, and serve as an illustration of the continuous efforts being made by such societies to 
come to terms with their past by upholding or creating the necessary respect for the rule of 
law and human rights as they are perceived as the pillars supporting attempts to build a 
peaceful future society where such rights are respected (Järvinen, 2004:38; Kamali, 2001).  
 
A failure to do so could therefore have the opposite effect than intended, by creating an 
intolerable situation where the practice of impunity for past crimes becomes accepted in some 
form or another, whether it is deliberate by not prosecuting based on a political compromise 
or lack of engagement to undertake such a demanding procedure. If, because of this, 
influential persons realise that they have something to gain from committing such crimes, 
with no costs attached to it, they might at some stage in the future bring a post-conflict society 
back to the days when violence was the rule and not the exception. Thus, if these societies for 
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whatever reason fail or choose not to establish a practice of punishing extreme violations of 
human rights, this will later come back to haunt them (Järvinen, 2004:38; Kamali, 2001). 
 
Reducing the important role that legal forms of transitional justice should play to such a 
subordinate position must therefore be strongly discouraged as it not only wreaks havoc on 
these attempts being made to create peace in post-conflict societies, but as it also undermines 
the international legal regime put in place to combat such procedures by protecting and 
promoting human rights and the rule of law instead. Because of this, the proponents of the 
‘justice’ approach therefore tend to favour judicial proceedings at the national or international 
level, and be similarly hostile to, if not outright dismissive of, all other alternative forms of 
transitional justice mechanisms of a non-judicial character (Järvinen, 2004:38; Kamali, 2001). 
 
As can be understood from the above discussion, the main reason for why non-legal forms of 
transitional justice, such as TRCs and neo-traditional justice mechanisms giving out 
conditional amnesties or blanket amnesties being issued through a decree, are perceived in 
such a negative way is because of the fact that these, in the past, have been used to cover up 
crimes against humanity and war crimes, which according to international law cannot be 
amnestied (du Plessis, 2005:193-195; van Zyl, 2005). Amnesty procedures in one form or 
another will therefore give the wrong impression to perpetrators that they can get away with 
their actions, thereby creating a possible precedence for further abuses in the future with 
impunity being an accepted practice. Based on this they argue that the international 
community will no longer tolerate the practice of blanket amnesty issued by decree for 
perpetrators accused of committing the worst kind of atrocities imaginable, such as the LRA 
(Allen, 2005, 2006 and 2008; du Plessis, 2005:193-195; Järvinen, 2004:38).  
 
With regards to amnesties being handed out by TRCs, it is perceived as discrediting the 
international fight against impunity through the ICC by letting the worst perpetrators off the 
judicial hook, as it thereby creates an intolerable situation where crimes against humanity 
become accepted one way or another. TRCs are therefore heavily criticised by the ‘justice’ 
approach on the grounds that this mechanism has an inherent flaw that cannot be overlooked, 
represented by the fact that it, by accepting the practice of impunity through amnesties in 
many instances, have proved to be completely unable to create a genuine peace process that 
actually lasts (du Plessis, 2005:193-195; van Zyl, 2005). 
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In terms of neo-traditional justice mechanisms dealing with this issue, such as the Gacaca 
courts in Rwanda and Mato Oput healing procedures in Northern Uganda, these are perceived 
as lacking foundations in legal theory and practice, and relevance concerning how this process 
should be performed, who it should be targeting, and a limited capacity to handle the scale of 
atrocities. There are also accusations being raised about how NGO’s with their own agenda 
are financing and creating such a local notion of neo-traditional justice that was previously 
non-existing (Allen, 2005, 2006 and 2008; Huyse, 2008). These are aspects that will be 
analysed in chapter four.  
 
2.4.2 The ‘peace’ approach 
The other side in this ‘peace vs. justice’ debate consists of a wide group ranging from social 
scientists, NGOs, as well as religious and traditional leaders in the civil society of the local 
communities affected by an ongoing conflict (Allen, 2006; Järvinen, 2004:38-39). 
 
They acknowledge that transitional justice is an important and necessary component in the 
peace building process taking place in post-conflict societies, but it does not automatically 
imply that justice can only be served by performing formal judicial proceedings alone, as this 
can also be achieved through non-judicial mechanisms (Chopo, 2007:2; Kaufman, 2005:66).  
 
In these situations proponents of the ‘justice’ approach have a tendency to focus exclusively 
on how to establish and serve the rights and interests of the individual victims by punishing 
individual perpetrators for the crimes they have committed against them through trials in 
national courts and international tribunals. They are thereby only able to uncover and 
establish the partial truth about the past. Unlike them, the advocates of this approach argue 
that the need for social cohesion in a post-conflict society must be properly addressed to 
overcome the crimes and injuries of the past, making it necessary to apply forward looking 
strategies associated with truth-telling, forgiveness, reconciliation and rehabilitation instead of 
backward looking punishment only. Proponents of the ‘peace’ approach are therefore hostile 
towards judicial proceedings, as they are seen as having a divisive effect by only taking the 
bits and pieces into consideration, without looking into the needs of the whole society to come 
to terms with what happened in the past and how to be able to move on into a stable and 
peaceful future (Chopo, 2007:2; Kaufman, 2005:66).  
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A deliberate distinction is therefore made between retributive and restorative justice. Whereas 
the ‘justice’ approach is perceived as exclusively focusing on retributive justice, which is 
adversarial and past oriented, only focusing on guilt and blame, thereby delivering pain and 
suffering, the restorative justice of the ‘peace approach’ is, on the contrary, participatory and 
future oriented, by focusing on the needs and obligations by trying to heal and resolve the 
problems (Chopo, 2007:2; Hovil and Lomo, 2005; Hovil and Quinn, 2005; Zehr, quoted in 
Järvinen, 2004:39). Based on this they criticise the perception of their opponents in the 
‘justice’ camps perception of judicial proceedings through prosecution as being the only 
solution to properly deal with massive human rights violations in the aftermath of disastrous 
conflicts, as this is not necessarily desirable and often much less possible to achieve for 
several reasons (Hovil and Lomo, 2005; Hovil and Quinn, 2005; Järvinen, 2004:39). 
 
First and foremost, prosecution is more often than not a rather costly and time consuming 
procedure creating an unnecessary delay in the final settlings of the accounts in the 
transitional stage, and many societies struggling with coming to terms with their past while 
undergoing this process are therefore simply not in the position where they have the necessary 
power, popular support, legal mechanisms or conditions that are conducive to effectuate 
prosecutions (Aukerman, 2002). Furthermore, where a conflict has turned into a stalemate and 
a transitional society with prospects for peace is slowly emerging, any attempts being made to 
prosecute alleged perpetrators in such situations could instigate a feeling of revenge and result 
in a return to violence (du Plessis, 2005:193-195; van Zyl, 2005).  
 
But also in opposite cases, if trials take place in situations with already existing peace 
processes that are unstable or on the brink of collapse they would touch upon such delicate 
political matters and might thereby have the potential to push them over the edge by 
increasing rather than decreasing the probability of renewed conflict. Amnesty for violations 
of human rights is in many situations therefore the only viable solution guaranteeing that what 
would normally be a highly problematic political transition from war to peace can develop in 
a peaceful manner. In these situations, the only way to protect a newly won peace or an 
existing peace process is therefore not with prosecutions, but through amnesty and 
reconciliation (du Plessis, 2005:193-195; Hovil and Lomo, 2005; Hovil and Quinn, 2005; van 
Zyl, 2005).  
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Reconciliation processes with amnesties are, as such, preferred over legal proceedings, as 
these, rather than by merely punishing perpetrators for the sake of individual victims, instead 
seek to address the societal needs and grievances by establishing the whole truth about past 
atrocities through dialogue, communal healing and renewal of community relationships 
between the warring factions (Järvinen, 2004). 
In order to achieve the goal of creating sustainable peace in a post-conflict society, these non-
judicial transitional justice mechanisms are in this process serving as a tool that gives a ruling 
authority of some kind in the affected society the option of using it either to hand out 
conditional or unconditional amnesties to perpetrators for offences they have committed in the 
past (Kaufman, 2005:63). Unconditional amnesties usually do not require the establishment of 
a TRC or any other non-legal forms of conflict resolution procedures as they are in most 
situations primarily based on how the ruling authority issues a general blanket amnesty to 
alleged perpetrators without them having to give a thorough and detailed testimony of the 
atrocities they have committed in return or with any other conditions attached to it (Kaufman, 
2005:63). Conditional amnesties are on the other hand only given to perpetrators by a TRC or 
similar institutions if they in return give an honest testimony of their actions in the past, but if 
their testimonies are either perceived as, or later turn out to be, incomplete or dishonest, the 
consequence will be that they face a prosecution instead at a later stage (Kaufman, 2005:63).  
 
In this regard, the South African TRC is perceived as the most distinguished example 
illustrating the practical application of this approach, as it has also served as a model for the 
establishment of similar commissions elsewhere, as for instance in Sierra Leone and East 
Timor. This TRC was acknowledged as an institution with the authority to give amnesties to 
alleged perpetrators for the atrocities taking place under apartheid, where they in return were 
required to testify in a public inquiry with cross examination about the political motivation 
behind the crimes they had committed and give a complete account of the facts surrounding it. 
Although the TRC thereby took precedence over a legal proceeding to achieve the objective 
of a peaceful transition from a warlike situation to peace in South Africa, those perpetrators 
who failed to meet these two conditions were nevertheless faced by the threat of a judicial 
prosecution instead of amnesty (Chopo, 2007:10; du Plessis, 2005:194-195; Järvinen, 
2004:39).  
 
Even if the advocates of this approach’s various perspectives differ somewhat concerning 
whether amnesties should be given conditionally or unconditionally, from a TRC or through 
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neo-traditional justice procedures, they all have in common that they perceive international 
legal proceedings through the ICC as a top down ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach based on a 
Western understanding of justice. By abolishing the amnesty option once and for all, rebels 
and dictators alike will refuse to put down their arms or give up power out of fear of being 
prosecuted. This approach therefore represents a serious obstacle, threatening the prospects 
for negotiating peace in war-torn societies, as well as undermining already fragile peace 
processes. Instead they propose this more local bottom-up perspective providing amnesties 
that are either based on TRCs or neo-traditional justice procedures with a healing aspect for 
the whole society, or a combination of both to guarantee that justice is served (Hovil and 
Lomo, 2005:37; Mani, 2005:29; New African, 2009).  
 
As this serves as an illustration of the debate on a more general level, the next subsection will 
therefore in the following illustrate the more empirical version of this debate in Africa. 
 
2.4.3 The African version of the ‘peace vs. justice’ debate 
The magazine ‘New African’ which portrays itself as ‘the best selling pan-African magazine’ 
represents the African version of this debate, with relatively strong arguments in favour of 
dismissing the perception of a universal human rights regime based entirely on an ‘Western’ 
understanding of justice, expressed by AI and HRW and enforced by the ICC. Barely two 
months after the charges against Sudan’s president al-Bashir were made known in March 
2009, the magazine published the 33 page special report ‘Targeting Africa: The case for and 
against the ICC’ consisting of a number of articles in the May 2009 edition. Here the editors 
of the New African (2009:20) argue that:   
 
Prosecuting presidents and rebels in Africa has huge implications for reconciliation, national 
stability and future peace. The SCSL and the ICC may not be compatible with reconciliation 
processes and amnesties for those accused of human rights abuses as part of peace agreements. 
Why would a dictator give up power if he knows that he will end up in The Hague? Why would 
rebel leaders come to roundtable talks if they think that such talks might just be a trap to arrest 
them and send them to The Hague?  
 
By comparing the cases against al-Bashir in Sudan and Taylor in Liberia in the magazine’s 
special report, the editors’ answers these questions in the following way: 
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In Taylor’s case, the charges against him were deliberately made public at the same time as he 
met his counterparts from neighbouring countries in Ghana to negotiate his conditions for 
stepping down by going into exile (Kaufman, 2005:69-71). According to David Crane, the 
former chief prosecutor of the SCSL, his intention by doing so was to ‘humble and humiliate 
Charles Taylor before his peers, the leaders of Africa, and to serve notice to Taylor and others 
that the days of impunity in Africa were over’ (New Africa, 2009:13). Although Taylor 
reluctantly stepped down and went into exile in Nigeria, this resulted in a two-year long man 
hunt between 2004 and 2006, when Nigeria allegedly relented to massive US pressure and 
extradited him to face justice at The Hague in the Netherlands (Kaufman, 2005:69-71). The 
editors of ‘New African’ argue that this was a case with a genuine African solution to 
adequately deal with the root causes and the more imminent problems caused by an African 
conflict. This solution stood against a narrow ‘Western’ response to the whole situation that 
was only concerned with punishing the individual perpetrators seen as most responsible, and 
where this latter and much more influential position unfortunately took precedence. The 
ongoing trial against Taylor is therefore perceived as merely being a politically motivated 
showcase to satisfy the demands from this ‘Western’ human rights regime that completely 
ignores local attempts to negotiate a settlement and create peace in such conflicts (New 
African, 2009:10-13, 18). 
 
Similar accusations are also made in the case against al-Bashir about how the whole process 
was instigated by the USA and the UK, using the ICC as a stick with which to hit China, India 
and Malaysia in order to gain full control over Sudan’s vast oil resources. They hope that the 
charges against al-Bashir will sooner or later result in a situation where he is ousted from the 
presidency, handed over to the Court and leading to the establishment of a new regime being 
friendlier towards the West, especially when it comes to awarding their companies with oil 
contracts. Contrary of these expectations, by excluding the previous solutions with exit 
possibilities through amnesty or exile, as was done in Taylor’s case, with the pursuit, arrest 
and prosecution of him instead, al-Bashir will neither surrender nor step down, but rather dig 
in and hang on to power by all means possible (New African, 2009: 14-15, 22-29). 
 
The editors of the magazine ‘New African’ (2009:17-19) therefore clearly have a valid point 
when asking, and in their answer, as to whether the bigger question facing Africans today are:  
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Why are the indictments mainly against African leaders and/or rebels? Africa does not have a 
monopoly on atrocities. (...) What comes out of all of this is what most Africans see as organised 
hypocrisy, selective justice, orchestrated double standards, and a refusal by the Western world 
to see and treat Africans as equals and responsible’.  
 
They are thereby able to illustrate how their opponents in the ‘peace vs. justice’ debate 
demonstrate a narrow one-sided belief in the ICC as the only solution to achieve peace in 
conflict zones. Unfortunately, when it comes to other parts of their response with possible 
alternatives concerning how justice best can be served in a transitional society when dealing 
with massive human rights violations in the aftermath of a conflict, this seems to be rather 
unrealistic (New African, 2009:20):  
  
If in the end justice has to be dispensed, then it has to be done in Africa by Africans. To that end 
(...) an African Union Supreme Court [must] take over the jurisdiction of the ICC and any ad 
hoc courts in Africa, such as the Rwanda and Sierra Leone special courts. It must be justice 
done in Africa by Africans. We need African solutions for African problems. 
  
The ICC represents the incarnation of legal theory and practice in international criminal 
justice for nearly a century. But as this Court, unlike previous tribunals, also happens to be a 
permanent international criminal court, it will not be a simple straightforward matter to 
disperse it by handing over its jurisdiction and cases to another court on the African continent 
as the argument made above implies. This rhetoric can in many ways be said to make the 
same flawed assumptions demonstrated by their counterpart, as their alternative with an 
‘African solution for African problems’ seems rather vague (du Plessis, 2005:556-568; Mail 
and Guardian, 2009b). 
                                                     
The African Union (AU), which is comprised of all of the 53 independent African states 
except for Morocco, has already put in place a number of instruments to address human rights 
on the continent. In 1981, the ‘African Charter on Human Rights and Peoples’ Rights’ came 
into existence, and is now ratified by all of AU’s member states. An oversight body, the 
‘Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ was established in 1987 to guarantee that the 
Charter is respected by the member states (du Plessis, 2005:556-565). The Commission 
enforces the Charter through state reports and complaints by individuals or NGOs, but the 
track record of submissions is however poor, as only 23 countries have given reports to the 
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Commission until now. Its work is therefore almost entirely based on complaints, and even 
then the acceptance of its recommendations largely depends on the goodwill of member 
states. In 1998 the then Organisation for African Unity (OAU), now the AU since its official 
launch in July 2002, adopted the ‘Protocol on the African Court of Human and Peoples’ 
Rights’ to complement the Commission, but like the Commission it has not been able to fully 
enforce its mandate, since anyone who bring a complaint to it needs the acceptance of the 
member state accused of breaking its obligations to proceed with the case (du Plessis, 
2005:556-568; Siballa in Mail and Guardian, 2009b). By pointing to these and a number of 
other Protocols implemented by the AU in his article ‘The People vs. their leaders’, 
Humphrey Siballa therefore argues that; ‘(...) this is Africa’s paradox. We have arguably the 
world’s finest human rights laws, but have done very little to implement it’ (Siballa in Mail 
and Guardian, 2009b). 
 
With its member states lacking the will to fully implement the Protocols agreed upon and 
much less respecting the decisions that its organs make, the AU has yet to become the 
powerful continental organisation it was intended to be. It therefore seems highly unlikely that 
it will be able to establish such an independent African court with the strength and resources 
necessary to make judgments that go against the interests of the member states any time soon. 
For all its flaws and weaknesses, the ICC is therefore so far the only functioning alternative to 
properly deal with individual perpetrators responsible for committing crimes against humanity 
and war crimes in Africa and elsewhere.   
 
But whereas this most recent part of the debate focus on state leaders, exactly the same 
arguments have been made before with regards to guerrilla leaders, which is the point of focus 
in this thesis. Some few years ago, when the ‘peace vs. justice’ debate about ICC’s charges 
against LRA’s leaders took place exactly the same arguments as has been outlined above here 
were put forth in publications such as those from the RLP researchers Hovil, Lomo and Quinn 
with titles like ‘Peace First, Justice Later: Traditional Justice In Northern Uganda’ (2005), 
or the Norwegian researchers Morten Bøås and Kathleen M. Jennings in their feature article 
‘To Catch a Monster’ (Dagbladet, 2007). Thus, these arguments being expressed by both 
sides in the ‘peace vs. justice’ debate can now be said to have made a full circle. The time 
therefore seems ripe to break it and move beyond this simple and narrow understanding of 
whether justice hinders or contributes to peace by actually looking at how the different 
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mechanisms’ associated with transitional justice can best be optimised to achieve the 
opposing perspectives common goal of creating sustainable peace in conflict zones.  
 
2.5 Reconceptualising peace and justice 
As can be understood from the previous discussion, these two opposing perspectives in this 
debate are seemingly fundamentally at odds with each other. The main issue in this debate 
about transitional justice is seen as a dilemma about either making peace or doing justice 
between advocates for ‘justice’ favouring judicial mechanisms, known as retributive justice, 
and proponents of ‘peace’ favouring non-judicial mechanisms, known as reconciliatory or 
restorative justice. Whereas those favouring ‘justice’ argue that international justice must 
prevail in order to end impunity and deter future crimes, their counterparts in the ‘peace’ 
camp oppose this on the grounds that indictments must be dropped in favour of peace 
negotiations to achieve peace in post-conflict societies (Nielsen, 2008; Järvinen, 2004:36-39).  
 
The common misperception on both sides revolve around the view that there must be a trade-
off between them, either with peace sacrificed in favour of justice or the other way around, 
meaning that different societies in transition are forced to make a deliberate choice between 
one of the two approaches in order to come to terms with the truth about and enable them to 
attain some form of accountability for human rights violations in the past to lay the 
foundations for the creation of a stable and peaceful future (Nielsen, 2008; Simpson, 2008; 
van Zyl, 2005).  
 
The perception of how a dichotomy exists between the concepts of peace and justice, and that 
they because of this are fundamentally at odds with each other has clearly dominated the 
broader theoretical debate about ‘peace vs. justice’. However, after the establishment of the 
ICC and its involvement in Northern Uganda and elsewhere, this has not only intensified, but 
also added this dichotomy as a practical element to the already ongoing debate about what is 
the best way to achieve peace and justice in post conflict societies. As a consequence of the 
ICC becoming more involved in conflicts it will, to a much larger extent, be faced by this 
daunting challenge and it is therefore imperative to look for solutions to solve it (Nielsen, 
2008).  
 
By yielding Galtung’s theories it is, according to Nielsen (2008) and Simpson (2008), 
possible to understand how the underlying driving force fuelling this debate where peace and 
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justice are seen as fundamentally at odds with each other is based on a very narrow 
understanding of both concepts, as peace is merely perceived as the absence of war and 
equated with peace negotiations, while justice is understood to be retributive justice with 
punishment through ICC prosecutions respectively.  
 
By moving away from a negative to a positive understanding of both concepts, this would 
turn the whole dilemma superfluous. The combination of the best aspects from both 
perspectives in one makes it possible to build the case for an alternative approach to deal with 
these issues concerning transitional justice more appropriately, by reconstructing the truth 
about the past massive human rights violations through prosecuting those individual 
perpetrators deemed most responsible for committing them, and reconciling the warring 
parties through conditional amnesty and neo-traditional justice procedures aimed at healing 
and reconciliation in order to create the foundations for a peaceful future (Nielsen, 2008; 
Oomen and Marchand, 2007; Simpson, 2008).   
 
This is in other words to ask for the link between peace and justice. But with these concepts 
currently being perceived as fundamentally at odds with each other, in order to build the case 
for how such a combined model actually might work by incorporating the best elements from 
both sides, it is therefore necessary to deconstruct their common misperceptions of both 
concepts, in order to be able to broaden them and reconceptualise the perspectives in this 
debate to gain a deeper and more thorough understanding (Nielsen, 2008; Simpson, 2008). 
Before returning to the main research questions guiding this thesis about how the various 
transitional justice mechanisms, such as the ICC, amnesty and Mato Oput ceremonies best can 
be optimised to contribute to the creation and building of a self-sustaining peace in the 
Northern Ugandan context, they must, for now, be treated analytically as two distinctively and 
different concepts in order to do so. This will subsequently be done in the next subsections in 
order to be able to use them interchangeably in the following chapters. In the following, this 
section will outline the third step in the model for a combined approach by moving from a 
negative to a positive understanding of peace and justice through the use of Galtung’s (1969, 
1996) theoretical framework. As his approach can be criticised on several grounds for being 
too broad and vague, Lederach’s (1997) theoretical contribution to the Galtung tradition is 
subsequently used to avoid these weaknesses.   
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2.5.1 Reconceptualising peace 
The proponents of the justice approach take a top-down perspective concerning how peace 
should be achieved, assuming that this international legal human rights regime expressed by 
the ICC prohibiting impunity through amnesties with prosecution of the most responsible 
perpetrators instead, will no matter what contribute to creating the conditions conducive for 
peace in post-conflict societies undergoing the transitional stage worldwide (Huyse, 2008; 
Järvinen, 2004, Nielsen, 2008). 
 
Advocates of the ‘peace’ approach consider such assumptions about how legal forms of 
justice will contribute to peace in a global context accordingly to be something totally 
unrealistic. That said, their more bottom-up assumption about peace negotiations being the 
magic formula to create peace can also be perceived in the same manner as rather naive 
(Allen, 2008; Nielsen, 2008).  
 
However, this dichotomy between the two perspectives concerning what the concept of peace 
actually implies relies on a very limited understanding, by merely assuming that it means the 
absence of direct or physical violence in any given society (Nielsen, 2008). Graeme Simpson 
(2008:74-75) has, because of this current obsession with peace negotiations, argued that it 
‘undermines attempts to address the deeper underpinnings of violence or to anticipate some of 
the fault lines for its potential re-emergence’. For those who try to overcome it, this has 
clearly been unsatisfactory and it is therefore, according to them, the first common 
misunderstanding that must be broken down in order to create the conditions conducive for 
conflict transformation from war to peace through a combined approach (Nielsen, 2008; 
Simpson, 2008).  
 
Based on the pioneering work of Galtung, the inventor of and also a prominent scholar within 
the discipline of peace and conflict studies himself, other scholars who have followed in his 
footsteps have now started to seriously challenge this misperception by offering a much more 
inclusive interpretation of peace instead (Lederach, 1997; Mani, 2002, 2005; Nielsen, 2008; 
Simpson, 2008). 
 
In the late 1960s, Galtung (1969) in the article ‘Violence, Peace and Peace Research’ 
introduced his conflict triangle, suggesting that a conflict is moving between the triangle’s 
three corners. In corner A, Galtung refers to conflicting attitudes, in corner B to conflict 
47 
 
behaviour, and in corner C to the conflict or contradiction itself, meaning the 
incompatibilities. The conflict originates in one or several corners and is reinforced by the 
others. Hence, it can and must be resolved in the originating corner (Galtung, 1969).    
 
With basis in this conflict triangle, it is, according to Galtung (1969:169, 171, 175) possible to 
make a distinction between a ‘negative’ reductionist and an expansive ‘positive’ interpretation 
of peace. Whereas the former merely implies the absence of the more direct and physical 
forms of actor-generated violence, such as violent conflicts and war, it fails to take the deeper 
and underlying root causes of conflicts into consideration (Galtung, 1969:169, 171, 175).  
 
Galtung therefore argues that it is necessary to move away from this strictly negative point of 
view, by instead perceiving the concept through the lenses of positive peace, as this 
perspective, in addition to actor-generated violence, incorporates this latter aspect in terms of 
what he describes as ‘structural violence’. Unlike these more direct forms of actor-generated 
violence associated with negative peace, structural violence originates from the structures and 
institutions dominating the cultural, economic, social and political aspects of everyday life in 
all societies. Not only does it result in inequality that effectively hinders people from meeting 
their basic needs, but also creates unequal distribution of power, preventing them from 
realising their full potential (Galtung, 1969:169,171,175). Examples of such structures and 
institutions symbolising ‘structural violence’ can be anything from colonialism, racism, 
aggressive capitalism and sexism, but also endemic socioeconomic and cultural racial, ethnic 
and religious inequalities (Galtung, 1969:183; Mani, 2002, 2005; Nielsen, 2008:39). Positive 
peace is therefore not only about the absence of the more direct and physical forms of actor-
generated violence associated with negative peace, although it requires the establishment of 
physical security. It also requires the absence of these more indirect forms of ‘structural 
violence’, meaning the absence of formal and informal discrimination, with respect for human 
rights and the rule of law instead (Galtung, 1969:183). 
 
What can be derived from this more ‘positive’ and dynamic understanding of the concept is 
that if there are no direct or structural forms of violence, there must be peace. That said, by 
this understanding, ‘positive peace’ is not about banning conflicts by trying to create a 
situation where they are not merely avoided, but effectively rendered obsolete. It is, on the 
contrary, about transforming them, as conflicts are necessary for any given society, under the 
condition that it is able to transform them in a nonviolent manner. The fulfilment of this 
48 
 
necessary precondition for conflicts to be transformed non-violently depends upon the 
economic, cultural, political and social structures that exist within any given society (Galtung, 
1969; Lederach. 1997). In other words, these structures and institutions must be analysed in 
order to determine their capacity and capability when it comes to transforming conflicts 
within a society in a nonviolent way (Galtung, 1969). In this thesis, that refers to analysing 
nonviolent means to end conflicts like the ICC, the Ugandan Amnesty Act and the Acholis 
neo-traditional justice.   
 
Since ‘positive peace’ is not a concept that can be explained in a consistent and 
straightforward manner, much less quantified or easily operationalised, it is acknowledged 
from the onset here that Galtung’s (1969) perception of the concept can be criticised for being 
both too wide and vague  because of this (Nielsen, 2008:39). Lederach’s (1997) theoretical 
contribution to the Galtung tradition is subsequently used to avoid these weaknesses in 
Galtung’s work.  
 
As another scholar writing in the Galtung tradition, Lederach (1997) offers a possible solution 
to this impasse with a more comprehensive understanding of peace than Galtung himself, 
which is utilised here in order to avoid these weaknesses pointed out by the criticism. The 
essence of his understanding can be summarised as: The concept of peace is preserved to 
characterise a more or less specific type of societal and political state that over a certain 
period of time proves to be of a sustainable character. It is not always clear which factors will 
create the conditions conducive for a sustainable peace in every single case, but no matter 
how it is defined, peace must somehow exist in altered relationships. But how and in which 
ways these societal relations must be altered depends upon the more specific context being 
analysed (Lederach, 1997:20-30).  
 
By perceiving peace in this more formalised manner, it is possible to avoid mixing up a 
unique societal political phenomenon with the different factors coming in advance and paving 
the way for it, meaning that peace is not necessarily the same thing as the way in which it was 
achieved. In the following, some of the criticism that can be raised against the notion of 
‘positive peace’ will be illustrated. 
 
Other scholars, who have also written extensively on this subject, most notably Roland Paris 
(quoted in Miller, 2008:267), criticise Galtung’s use of the term ‘structural violence’ as it has 
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been defined in such broad and vague ways that it, as a result, has become both conceptually 
and empirically indeterminate with regards to what it actually contains. 
 
Similarly, David Mendeloff (2004), who in his article ‘Truth-Seeking, Truth-Telling, and 
Post-conflict Peace building: Curb the Enthusiasm?’ raises objections against what he 
describes as the ‘truth telling’ literature, but which can be expanded to other who also writes 
in the Galtung tradition on ‘positive peace’, can serve as an useful example of why the use of 
‘negative peace’ so far has remained in place instead. 
 
Mendeloff (2003:363-364) criticises the use of such an expansive ‘positive’ definition as it 
raises the larger issue of defining and measuring peace itself by requiring social, racial and 
economic equality, the absence of poverty or discrimination, intergroup harmony and 
cooperation through fully functioning social institutions. According to him, although these are 
valuable and important aims to strive for achieving in a society, they are not necessarily the 
same as peace, and this ‘wish list’ approach to peace is instead obfuscating analytically 
distinct concepts such as peace and democracy, peace and reconciliation, and peace and 
human rights (Mendeloff, 2004:363-364). In contrast to this definition, Mendeloff (2004:363-
364) instead offers what he describes as a modified minimal definition of peace: ‘the absence 
of large scale organised violence or war and the extremely low probability of the resumption 
of war’. This definition is situated somewhere in between the two extremes by using a 
‘negative’ position as a starting point with peace meaning the absence of war, but that it also 
incorporates some ‘positive’ elements through the use of certain minimum qualitative 
indicators of peace. The latter means that certain practices and institutions that are needed for 
the nonviolent resolution of conflicts and preventing the return to war have been established 
and are functioning in a stable way (Mendeloff, 2004:363-364). 
 
Although it is necessary to have these aspects in mind, being critically aware of the possible 
weaknesses in the main theoretical foundations of this thesis is however not the same as 
dismissing them once and for all, as this move from a negative to a positive understanding of 
peace is seemingly the only possible way forward in order to overcome this dichotomy in the 
‘peace vs. justice’ debate. 
 
Despite this criticism that can be raised against it because of this understanding being very 
broad, the use of the ‘positive peace’ approach in this thesis has, according to the logic of 
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Nielsen’s argument (2008:39), clearly several benefits attached to it compared with the 
negatively loaded reductionist perception of peace that has come to dominate within the 
debate. Whereas this dominating ‘negative’ perception of peace is treating negotiations that 
might at the best result in a negative peace where only physical violence is absent as the only 
relevant way forward in a peace process, a positive approach would in comparison not only be 
preoccupied with this aspect, but also be concerned with building a sustainable peace by 
addressing the underlying root causes of the violence. Thus, any attempts being made at 
creating sustainable peace must therefore begin long before any negotiations can be 
undertaken, but also continue a long time after their conclusion, which serves as a recognition 
of how the process is just as important as the final outcome (Nielsen, 2008:39).  
 
2.5.2 Reconceptualising justice 
Whereas peace has only been associated with negotiations, justice has, in a similar way in the 
current ‘peace vs. justice’ debate, merely been assumed to mean legal prosecutions either 
through national courts or the ICC (Nielsen, 2008:39-40; Simpson, 2008). Not only does this 
limited perception of justice fail to acknowledge the fact that the retributive form of justice 
pursued by the ICC is only one among several other mechanisms at disposal to achieve the 
same thing (Nielsen, 2008:39-40; Simpson, 2008; van Zyl, 2005). 
  
It also fails to take into consideration for whom justice actually is made for, the victims or an 
international legal regime put in place to punish the perpetrators in these affected post-conflict 
societies, as the obsession with criminal prosecutions to uphold it by punishing alleged 
perpetrators has resulted in that this pursuit of making justice through prosecutions instead of 
being a means to achieve an end thereby has become an end to achieve in itself (Nielsen, 
2008:39). This lack of understanding for whom this justice actually is made for can be 
illustrated with a brief example from the conflict in Northern Uganda that will subsequently 
be discussed over the next chapters. Many of the victims of the atrocities committed by the 
LRA in Northern Uganda, especially with regards to the Acholi people, who have borne the 
brunt of violence throughout more than two decades of conflicts, have clearly expressed their 
support for using neo-traditional justice mechanisms, such as the Mato Oput aimed at healing 
and conflict resolution, instead of prosecution and punishment (Nielsen, 2008:39-40). 
Whereas the ICC’s focus is solely on punishment and imprisonment, this puts it in a sharp 
contrast compared with the Mato Oput’s strong emphasis on reintegration, forgiveness and 
reconciliation instead (Allen, 2008:47-49; Nielsen, 2008:39-40). That said, this is far from 
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arguing that the only form of justice worth pursuing in order to achieve this would be in a 
neo-traditional and restorative manner, as both this and the ‘Western’ retributive form of 
justice pursued by the ICC has serious flaws that the ‘current peace vs. justice’ debate has 
clearly failed to address. This would to the contrary be nothing more than a mere repetition of 
the misleading polarisation dominating until now and would only result in yet another dead 
end (Nielsen, 2008:40). 
  
Nielsen (2008) and Simpson’s (2008) criticism of both perspectives for only focusing on 
retributive or restorative forms of justice respectively, and their search for a much more 
inclusive perspective with an acceptance for and incorporating different ways and forms of 
doing justice other than merely these two, is met by Mani (2002, 2005).  
 
As a scholar writing in the Galtung tradition of peace and conflict studies, Mani (2002, 2005) 
argues that justice is clearly needed in the pursuit of achieving positive peace in post-conflict 
societies. This tradition puts an emphasis on justice being a multi-dimensional concept where 
retributive and restorative forms of justice are included as elements among cultural, 
economic, political and social forms of justice. Accordingly, in Mani’s approach (2002:17, 
2005) each of these dimensions of justice correlates to ‘an area of positive peace building’.  
 
Nevertheless, the very same objections raised against extending the concept of peace from a 
negative to a positive understanding can also be used against the Galtung tradition with 
regards to reconceptualising the concept of justice. Following Mani’s approach (2002, 2005), 
every single aspect of what constitutes a society can be included in some kind of justice, 
resulting in that the concept not only becomes confusing, but also too wide and vague 
concerning what it actually constitutes.  
 
The main problem with Mani (2002, 2005) and other scholars writing in the Galtung tradition 
of peace and conflict studies in this regard is that the perception of ‘cultural, economic, 
political and social’ justice and ‘positive peace’ are two sides of the same coin, as they mean 
exactly the same thing (Mendeloff, 2004; Paris, quoted in Miller, 2008:267).  
 
Following this tradition, ‘positive peace’ is only reached if the institutions and structures 
encapsulating structurally defined violence in terms of cultural, economic, political and social 
inequalities are reformed or removed altogether, which in other words is only meaning that 
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these forms of justice is coming into existence (Galtung, 1969; Mani, 2002, 2005;  Mendeloff, 
2004:363-364). But in opposite situations, where ‘positive peace’ for some reason is missing, 
and with the threshold for what it contains made extremely low, this can mean anything from 
a situation where economic policies deliberate or unintentionally creates some form of social 
injustice with inequalities against one or more groups in a society, to situations where such 
grievances have resulted in the outbreak of a violent conflict. Taken literally to an extreme 
point, there has never existed peace in a true and genuine sense of the word and ‘positive 
peace’ as a concept should therefore be dismissed in favour of more precise benchmarks and a 
more accurate understanding of justice (Mendeloff, 2004:363-364).  
 
That said, the intention behind this combined approach to transitional justice does, however, 
neither exclude retributive nor restorative forms of justice, but requires a negotiation over 
whether, which and to what extent these accountability mechanisms associated with them 
should be employed in order to achieve this objective in transitional societies (Nielsen, 2008). 
Thus, a much more productive and inclusive interpretation would therefore instead be if those 
responsible for initiating and undertaking these processes to take into consideration that they 
ultimately belongs to the victims of such heinous atrocities, where mechanisms associated 
with restorative and retributive forms of justice must be pursued on a parallel track in order to 
achieve this objective (Nielsen, 2008).  
 
In other words, justice cannot be properly achieved if it is either rushed or forced through 
without taking into consideration if it is actually serving the interests of the victims (Nielsen, 
2008). This process must therefore be owned genuinely by those who are supposed to benefit 
from it in order for justice to be done in such a way that it not only supports the victims and 
reduces impunity for perpetrators responsible for committing these human rights violations 
against them, but that it also helps building sustainable peace (Nielsen, 2008).  
 
2.5.3.      Peace and justice as central elements within reconciliation 
This much more thorough analysis of the two concepts illustrates how justice when being 
properly applied by using the multitude of transitional justice mechanisms at disposal can 
serve as an important contribution to efforts aimed at peace building, rather than 
compromising and leading them to a certain failure (van Zyl, 2005; Nielsen, 2008). 
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Based on all of this, it can be concluded that the two concepts are far from being 
fundamentally at odds with each other, but that the negative reductionist misinterpretation of 
peace and justice which is common in both camps not only created, but has also served to 
continue this misperception of incompatibility between the two until recently (Nielsen, 
2008:40).  
 
One aspect that has not been taken properly into consideration until now is that whereas the 
justice approach is past oriented, and the peace approach is concerned with the future, both 
are clearly needed and must be used interchangeably in order for the warring factions to be 
able to overcome the difficult and troublesome past and build a stable, peaceful and 
prospective future together (van Zyl, 2005:212). 
 
In his work, Lederach (1997:27) takes this assumption one step further, by suggesting that 
peace and justice meets in reconciliation. According to him, this concept addresses both 
aspects, as it ‘represents a place, the point of encounter where concerns about both the past 
and the future can meet’. He further elaborates on this argument (Lederach, 1997:29) by 
explaining how these two paradoxes of peace and justice, in addition to truth and mercy, 
meets within reconciliation, where these four elements are perceived as: 
 
Truth is the longing for acknowledgement of wrong and the validation of painful loss and 
experiences, but it is coupled with mercy, which articulates the need for acceptance, letting go, 
and a new beginning. Justice represents the search for individual and group rights, for social 
restructuring, and for restitution, but it is linked with peace, which underscores the need for 
interdependence, well-being and security. 
 
As an important component of the broader process of peace building, the concept of 
reconciliation is essentially about a permanent restoration of relationships by terminating past 
cruelty thereby facilitating the reaching into a cooperative future. Reconciliation is therefore 
perceived as being both a goal to reach in itself and as a much wider process that is necessary 
to undertake in order to successfully overcome and transform the hostilities that has 
developed during violent conflicts to create a situation where the conflicting parties can live 
peacefully side by side (Lederach, 1997).  
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Thus, a precondition for ‘positive peace’ to come into existence in a post-conflict society, 
thereby allowing the victims to realise their full potential in the future, an important first step 
for them to take in order to achieve this, is reconciliation with the past through the 
mechanisms of transitional justice, where these are optimised so that justice is done by 
serving their interests in a best possible way (Nielsen, 2008:40).  
 
2.6 Peace building 
Discussing peace and justice as theoretical concepts is one thing, but how this best can be 
achieved in practice a totally different one, as there is always a certain risk of returning to the 
previous situations associated with violence and conflict in the transitional stage going from 
war to peace. After having reconceptualised peace and justice, the following section will 
therefore take a closer look at how transitional justice strategies and mechanisms are not only 
related to, but also form a central part of post-conflict peace building efforts in transitional 
societies, as the former will most often than not have a significant impact on the latter (van 
Zyl, 2005). 
 
2.6.1 Building sustainable peace 
As was discussed in the previous sections of this chapter, based on his conflict triangle, 
Galtung (1969) made a deliberate distinction between ‘negative peace’ and ‘positive peace’. 
In a later work with the title’ Peace by peaceful means: Peace and Conflict, Development and 
Civilization’ he further elaborates on this distinction between them (Galtung, 1996). ‘Negative 
peace’ roughly equates the objects of peacekeeping and peacemaking respectively. Whereas 
peacekeeping is about reducing the level of destructive behaviour, peacemaking is intended to 
change the existing attitudes through mediation, conciliation and negotiation. Contrary to this 
position, that only results in the mere absence of physical violence, ‘positive peace’ refers to 
peace building, which is intended to create a kind of ‘self sustaining peace’, by properly 
addressing and transforming the root causes of the conflict through the means of DDR, 
development and justice (Galtung, 1996:112). As stated in the introductory chapter, this thesis 
will primarily look at the justice element. Thus, the overall goal with peace building then is to 
constructively transform conflicts by properly addressing the underlying structural issues and 
the long-term relationships between the conflicting parties in order to create an environment 
conducive for sustainable peace (Galtung, 1969; 1996:112).  
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Based on Galtung’s work, in his book ‘Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided 
Societies’, Lederach (1997:20) offers a more specific understanding of peace building by 
defining it as: ‘A comprehensive concept that encompasses, generates and sustains the full 
array of processes, approaches and stages needed to transform conflict towards a more 
sustainable, peaceful relationship’. 
 
The basic idea behind Lederach’s work (1997:63) is based on this to develop a theory 
illustrating how peace building as a process that is intended to solve conflicts is made up of 
several different functions and roles. This is important, since one of the central aims of this 
thesis is to examine how the functions and roles of various transitional justice mechanisms 
can assist in such a process.  
 
In his theorising about peace building, Lederach (1997:ch.3) argues that to be able to create a 
viable and well functioning peace process in deeply divided societies or in situations with 
internal armed conflict, this will require a practically-oriented framework. Based on this, 
Lederach draws a deliberate distinction between what he sees as peace building being a top- 
down problem-solving perspective applying mechanical ‘one-size-fits-all’ strategies and 
solutions to solve conflicts, versus peace building as a frame of reference that instead put an 
emphasis on focusing on the restoration and rebuilding of relationships in order to solve 
conflicts (Lederach, 1997: ch.3).  
 
Lederach furthermore claims that the concept is treated and used in such a way as if it was 
merely about implementing a rather common and clearly defined set of activities in every 
post-conflict society in order to create sustainable peace (Lederach, 1997:63). As a direct 
consequence of this, the result has been that international peace operations have a clear 
tendency to be guided by this problem-solving, rather than the conflict transformation 
approach. These operations arrive from the outside and impose their own conditions for how 
peace should be achieved without necessarily taking into consideration the need and 
aspirations of the local populations they are intended to assist, thereby resulting in that their 
intentions are not always shared by them. As these operations follow a specific timeline for 
when to start and be concluded, where every possible aspect of peace building has to be 
achieved in between, this results in a checklist mentality with ‘quick fix’ solutions that often 
collapse as soon as the operation is coming to an end (Lederach, 1997:ch.3). Furthermore, 
with the international presence, the existing social conflicts are often temporarily put on hold 
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by being either suspended or hidden, but unless constructive and effective ways and channels 
to deal with conflicts in a war torn society are found or developed, these conflicts will emerge 
again sooner or later (Lederach, 1997:ch.3).  
 
The reality is, however, often something completely different, as the more specific details and 
exact procedures for building peace adds up to form a rather complex and multifaceted 
endeavour to undertake that most often than not will vary significantly in different settings 
(Lederach, 1997:63).  
 
In sharp contrast to the problem-solving approach towards peace building, Lederach on the 
other hand therefore stresses the importance of transforming the destructive processes that led 
to the outbreak of violence in the first place, or grew out of the dynamics of conflict 
(Lederach, 1997:63). This form of peace building requires fundamental changes in the 
attitudes and perceptions originating from a legacy of violence, by using the existing channels 
to deal with conflicts in a society in a more peaceful way. A major problem in post-conflict 
societies is unfortunately that these channels either tend not to function adequately if they 
happen to exist at all. Another requirement will thus often be to create an institutional 
framework, responsible for establishing reconciliation mechanisms, functioning justice 
systems, democratic and accessible political participation mechanisms, which all serve as 
such channels for building peace in post-conflict societies (Lederach, 1997:ch.3). This will, 
however, require sustained intervention by these local, national and international actors 
operating on several different levels in a well orchestrated effort, with a comprehensive set of 
short, medium and long term strategies that must not be obsessed with only dealing with the 
gruesome events of the past, but also be future oriented in order to prevent the recurrence of 
conflict and abuse from happening again at a later stage (Lederach, 1997; van Zyl, 2005).  
 
Over the last two decades, peace processes that were intended to end violence between the 
warring factions in a conflict have seldom been concluded without some kind of assistance or 
involvement from the international community’s side. With this internationalisation of 
conflict settlements, which to a larger degree has come to involve the international 
community has as a result given it a leading role in deciding how much and what kind of 
transitional justice should be applied in post-conflict peace building. The ICTR and ICTY, the 
hybrid courts in Sierra Leone and East Timor, as well as the ICC, can thus all be said to 
represent this form of transitional justice over the last decade (Järvinen, 2004; Lederach, 
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1997:ch.3; van Zyl, 2005). The international community has unfortunately had a tendency to 
perceive transitional justice in post-conflict peace building purely from a legalistic top-down 
perspective and demonstrated a tendency to dismiss the more local bottom-up mechanisms 
abilities and capacities to assist in or achieve the same thing, resulting in that the various 
actors at these levels have reacted by treating the international response with a similar disdain 
(Järvinen, 2004; van Zyl, 2005).  
 
As has been discussed throughout this chapter, this has formed part of the creation of the 
current debate, where peace and justice are treated as loggerheads dividing these various 
actors’ involved in peace building over whether transitional justice enhances peace or 
increases the risk of a return to violence (Järvinen, 2004:36-39; Nielsen, 2008). This 
somewhat different approach also reflects the need to solve another pressing challenge that 
must be dealt with sooner or later in war-torn societies, namely how to build a sustainable 
peace through transitional justice in post-conflict peace building after a violent conflict with 
massive and/or systematic human rights abuses (van Zyl, 2005).  
 
As peace is a multi-dimensional objective to achieve, where several different tasks must be 
paid attention to and done simultaneously, this means that the objective of achieving 
transitional justice in all of this is only one among several important tasks to undertake in a 
peace building process. Nevertheless, transitional justice is beyond doubt one of the most 
important preconditions for sustainable peace (Järvinen, 2004; Nielsen, 2008;  van Zyl, 2005).    
 
Transitional justice in peace building providing victims with justice means undertaking a 
broad process that involves addressing the root causes of the conflict by seeking redress for 
the social injustice that has been allowed to unfold deliberately or unintentionally, but also to 
address the more direct and imminent consequences caused by conflict both through 
restorative and retributive forms of justice by initiating investigations, inquiries and trials in 
order to identify and prosecute the perpetrators perceived as most responsible and by 
promoting TRCs and other forms of reconciliation processes. However, as transitional justice 
strategies are quite often being crafted and deployed in situations where peace is fragile or 
perpetrators are in possession of bargaining power as possible spoilers of peace, they must 
carefully balance the demands for justice with what can be achieved in the short, medium and 
long term perspectives (du Plessis, 2005:194-195; van Zyl:209-210). 
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Unlike this flawed debate, in a different and changed approach that occupies the middle 
ground post-conflict transitional justice is perceived as an crucial and important component in 
post-conflict peace building, but only as long as the mechanisms associated with it are being 
combined in order to be able to fully address the victims needs and grievances by promoting 
and supporting a combination of various reconciliation processes through TRCs, judicial 
proceedings, amnesties and various local justice procedures (Lederach, 1997:ch.3; Nielsen, 
2008; van Zyl, 2005).  
 
In order to achieve such a coordinated post-conflict transitional justice effort in peace 
building, each of these elements will have to be carefully coordinated, integrated and matched 
with an appropriate political, operational and financial support from a range of stakeholders 
(van Zyl, 2005). It is this the last subsection of this chapter now will turn to.    
 
2.7 A combined approach in theory 
Based on this discussion about the two approaches in the current ‘peace vs. justice’ debate 
with their differing perspectives and opposing arguments concerning what transitional justice 
embodies in terms of different strategies and mechanisms at disposal, whether, to what extent 
and under which circumstances it should be applied, if at all, they are as a consequence 
widely perceived to be two loggerheads with little if anything in common. A transitional 
society moving from war to peace must therefore deliberately choose one over the other in 
order to stabilise and avoid a recurrence of violence (Haldemann, 2008; Järvinen, 2004; 
Nielsen, 2008; van Zyl, 2005). 
 
There is however no magic formula with a specific combination of transitional justice 
mechanisms that can be applied in all of the different transitional societies going from war to 
peace, and depending on the circumstances they might express a wish to use either retributive 
or restorative justice or a combination of both (Aukerman, 2002:45). This means that as long 
as different transitional societies want to achieve different things by undergoing a process of 
transitional justice and while legal proceedings is perceived by some of them as the most 
efficient way to reach these goals, it cannot automatically be assumed that all other 
transitional societies would or should do the same thing (Aukerman, 2002:45). However, as 
serious human rights abuses are, contrary to normal crimes, not only offences committed 
against transitional societies, but crimes against humanity as a whole, the international 
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community’s stake and interest in influencing the decision-making process concerning which 
transitional justice mechanisms to apply cannot be neglected (Aukerman, 2002:47).  
 
As being part of the essence in the current deadlocked ‘peace vs. justice’ debate, this decision 
over which transitional justice mechanisms to apply is far too important to be made entirely 
by the international community or the local society alone (Aukerman, 2002:47). Nevertheless, 
this third and different approach being elaborated on here has in recent years challenged and 
made an attempt to overcome this fallacious gap between these two perspectives by offering 
an possible alternative route by occupying the middle ground between them (Nielsen, 2008; 
Oomen and Marchand, 2007; Simpson, 2008; van Zyl, 2005).  
 
Based on this, some authors argue that the only solution to achieve a sustainable and lasting 
peace is by broadening the concepts used and incorporating the various perspectives and 
approaches to transitional justice that exists, in order to be able to include restitution, 
acknowledgement, apology, forgiveness and equality in addition to retributive characters of 
justice (Chopo, 2007:31). Other proponents of this alternative approach argue that when these 
affected societies are selecting judicial or non-judicial transitional justice mechanisms, this 
will largely depend on what they want to achieve by undergoing such a process by addressing 
the past and preventing it from happening again (Aukerman, 2002:45). Transitional societies 
should therefore neither have to nor be forced to choose one approach over the other, but 
rather be encouraged to use both restorative and retributive forms of justice through carefully 
balancing them in an appropriate manner in order to achieve the goal of a prosperous future 
with sustainable and lasting peace (Kamali, 2001).  
 
In a combined approach, when undergoing the process of transitional justice, the decision 
about which mechanisms to apply in the process must therefore be informed by the needs and 
desires of the victims, as well as what the political realities are in the affected society, but also 
acknowledging that the international community has a role to play (Aukerman, 2002:47; 
Newman, quoted in Järvinen, 2004:37; Nielsen, 2008; van Zyl, 2005). This approach is 
therefore intended to combine the different forms of retributive and restorative forms of 
transitional justice in order to achieve peace. Whereas TRCs and more local neo-traditional 
justice procedures are intended to be used for low- to mid-level officers and the rank and file 
combatants by giving them conditional amnesty and forgiveness from their victims and a 
return to society, prosecutions must be undertaken against those individual perpetrators who 
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committed the most heinous crimes during a conflict, such as leaders of a guerrilla movement, 
or as was done in the South African case against those who for some reason failed to step 
forward by asking for amnesty in return for full disclosure of the crimes they committed (du 
Plessis, 2005:193-195; Järvinen, 2004; Kamali, 2001).  
 
This form of transitional justice should therefore not merely be understood as primarily 
concerned with the past like the ‘justice’ approach or forward looking as the ‘peace’ 
approach, but as a combination of both; by taking the interest of the victims into consideration 
by revealing the truth about the past through TRCs and other reconciliatory transitional justice 
mechanisms, but also by prosecuting those individual perpetrators found most responsible for 
committing crimes in this period, as well as addressing and transforming violent conflicts in a 
peaceful manner in order to avoid a return to violence at a later stage by laying the 
foundations for channels where both individual citizens and a larger group can express their 
needs and grievances (Posener and Vermeule, 2004:766).  
 
This alternative offers a more comprehensive approach to transitional justice, where peace 
and justice are not fundamentally at odds, but to the contrary two mutually and reinforcing 
elements that meets through the concept of reconciliation, and where each of the transitional 
justice mechanisms addresses a specific part of the victims needs and grievances, but also 
takes the society as a whole into consideration (Armstrong, 2006:3; Nielsen, 2008; Simpson, 
2008).  
 
The intention behind this theoretical discussion has therefore not been to favour either the 
peace or the justice approach. To the contrary, by highlighting how their contributions to and 
differences in the current debate have been based on a narrow misinterpretation of these 
concepts, it is intended to illustrate that only a third and alternative approach can adequately 
address these inherent flaws.  
 
In this combined perspective, the two approaches to transitional justice and the various 
mechanisms associated with them are far from being perceived as opposing, but to the 
contrary complementary. Based on this discussion, the next chapter will discuss the conflict in 
Northern Uganda by assessing the key events and illustrating at what stage the various 
transitional justice mechanisms were introduced in the process to bring about an end to the 
conflict leading up to the Juba peace talks between July 2006 and April 2008, and the signing 
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of item number three concerning accountability and reconciliation on this agenda that would 
have regulated the relationship between them. The fourth chapter will be based on chapter two 
and three, and will analyse the strengths and weaknesses of these three transitional justice 
mechanisms to determine how what can be seen as their possible positive impact in Northern 
Uganda can enable the local civilian population there to adequately deal with its past, while at 
the same time allowing them to create the foundations for a prosperous future with sustainable 
and lasting peace. 
 
2.8 Conclusion  
This chapter has provided a brief summary of the history behind transitional justice from 
World War One, the interwar years, the IMTs at Nuremberg and Tokyo in the aftermath of 
World War Two, the struggle during the Cold War and the development in the 1990s with the 
ICTR and ICTY leading up to the establishment of the ICC in 1998. Furthermore, transitional 
justice is defined as a concept that has evolved from a narrow legal reductionist perspective to 
a broad process where judicial and political aspects encompasses both legal and more 
unconventional mechanisms like TC/TRCs, amnesty, and neo-traditional justice aimed at 
reconciliation and conflict resolution. The following subsections describe what the ‘peace vs. 
justice’ perspectives and their respective arguments are about. This illustrates how they are 
totally dismissing each other, by treating justice as if it was merely about prosecution and 
punishment of alleged perpetrators in front of the ICC or another court. For its part, peace is 
primarily being concerned with bringing about an end to conflicts through negotiations 
(Nielsen, 2008). As these reflects the more theoretical aspects of this debate, the more 
empirical and practical oriented version of this debate unfolding in Africa expressed through 
the magazine ‘New African’ is also included. Concerning the empirical parts of this debate 
unfolding in Africa, ‘New African’ (2009) clearly has a valid point with regards to how the 
ICC has only targeted Africans until now, but unfortunately their alternative with ‘an African 
solution for African problems’ seems rather unrealistic given the AU’s current lack of 
independence to make decisions that go against the interests of its member states (du Plessis, 
2005; Siballa in Mail and Guardian, 2009b). 
  
After having illustrated the weaknesses in the current debate, with these flaws in mind, the 
following subsections mainly based on Galtung (1969, 1996) and Lederach’s (1997) work, 
have first deconstructed the current understanding of what peace and justice implies, before 
reconstructing and extending the contents in the concepts. Whereas ‘justice’ is extended 
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beyond merely being concerned with retribution to include aspects like socioeconomic justice, 
‘peace’ is reinterpreted from meaning negotiations only resulting in absence of violence to 
address the deeper and underlying factors, like the structural violence inherent in all societies, 
such as economic inequalities. As there are clearly weaknesses associated with applying such 
an approach, critical reflections of applying such an approach are included, but it is however 
argued that being critically aware of these weaknesses associated with this approach is not the 
same as dismissing them once and for all, as this combined approach is seemingly the only 
way out of the current impasse. 
  
The penultimate subsection reflects on how transitional justice forms part of the much wider 
processes of DDR associated with peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace building 
respectively, based on Galtung (1969, 1996) and Lederach (1997). Whereas the international 
community over the last two decades has become more involved in these processes, they have 
unfortunately applied it as some sort of ‘one-size-fits-all’ solutions irrespective of the 
differences between post-conflicts societies, resulting in clearly specified timelines for when 
these operations begin and end. Not only does this result in ‘quick fix’ solutions that often 
collapse after the disengagement by the international community, but it often push aside 
existing cleavages for the time being, which re-emerges in the aftermath. Furthermore, the 
international community has had a tendency to treat local transitional justice mechanisms with 
disdain by instead applying a purely legal response, as was done with the ICTR, ICTY, and 
SCSL and more recently the ICC, resulting in that the proponents of these more local bottom-
up approaches to transitional justice appears to be equally hostile to the international legal 
response. According to Lederach (1997), Järvinen (2004) and van Zyl (2005), what is needed 
is therefore a more inclusive approach where elements from both perspectives are 
incorporated in order to deal with the challenges in a transitional society.  
 
Based on this, the last main subsection illustrates how such a combined approach appears in 
theory. In such a combined approach, a transitional society is given more leeway to choose 
between retributive and restorative justice, while at the same time maintaining a balance 
between the obligations to international criminal law and interest of the international 
community with the needs and aspirations of war-torn societies to come to terms with a 
troublesome past to be able to move on to a prosperous future with sustainable and lasting 
peace. This approach will thereby require a thorough examination of the grievances and root 
causes that led to violent conflict in the first place in order to address them and a careful 
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negotiation between the various stakeholders involved in the process about how and with kind 
of transitional justice mechanisms to address them.  
 
With a basis in this theoretical discussion, the next chapter will assess the case of Northern 
Uganda by analysing key events and at what stage the three transitional justice mechanisms 
associated with the empirical debate there concerning the ICC, amnesty and neo-traditional 
justice were introduced. This leads up to the Juba peace talks between 2006 and 2008, where 
item three in the agreement, if it had been successful, would have resulted in such a balance as 
discussed in this chapter.  
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3 The historical background and developments in the Northern 
Ugandan conflict  
 
3.1 Introduction 
The war in Northern Uganda has been described by many activists and scholars as a 
completely forgotten, although brutal conflict, since the fighting between the LRA and the 
Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF) only occasionally received international attention 
until some very few years ago. That changed when the former UN undersecretary Jan Egeland 
visited Northern Uganda in 2003 and described the conflict as ‘the biggest forgotten, 
neglected humanitarian emergency in the world today’ (Oomen and Marchand, 2007:164; 
Ruaudel and Timpson, 2005:2). Following the issuing of ICC arrest warrants against the LRA 
top leadership in 2005, Northern Uganda has also been the scene of a local version of the 
‘peace vs. justice’ debate concerning whether the ICC, amnesty or neo-traditional justice 
procedures is the best transitional justice mechanisms to end this conflict. After this, the 
attention from national and international human rights organisations, researchers and the 
media, who all have been expressing their deep concern about the situation, have literarily 
skyrocketed. As a consequence, the outside world is now aware of the IDP camps, the LRA’s 
forced recruitment of child soldiers, as well as its horrendous mutilation and indiscriminate 
killing of Acholi civilians (Oomen and Marchand, 2007:164-166; Ruaudel and Timpson, 
2005:1-2).  
 
The history behind this conflict between the GoU and the LRA does however go further back 
in time, as its root causes can be found both in the colonial era and pre-colonial times, and is 
also related to the civil war in Sudan between the central authorities in Khartoum and the 
Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) (Oomen and Marchand, 2007:164-166). It is in this 
regard therefore imperative to have a full understanding of the historical context in which this 
conflict has unfolded in order to analyse this local version of the debate, as well as the 
strengths and weaknesses of the transitional justice mechanisms associated with it. This 
chapter will give a thorough background understanding of the conflict by presenting the main 
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events combined with a short analysis, to illustrate how it has evolved throughout the years 
and the different ways of dealing with and trying to solve it.  
 
The first subsection will look at the history of Uganda, mainly from independence in 1962 
onwards, whereas the second subsection will describe the coming into existence of the LRA 
and what its insurgency is about. In the third subsection, the Acholis’ difficult position with 
continued attacks by the LRA and the harsh treatment they receive by the UPDF in the IDP 
camps with appalling living conditions will be discussed. The remaining subsections leading 
up to the Juba peace talks in 2006 will briefly describe and analyse peace negotiations in 1994 
and 2004 respectively, the Sudanese influence on the conflict, failed military 
counterinsurgencies like Operation Iron Fist in 2002, as well as the introduction of these three 
transitional justice mechanisms at various stages with the Acholis’ neo-traditional justice 
aimed at reconciliation and conflict resolution in 1997, the Amnesty Act in 2000 and the ICC 
in 2004/2005 respectively. The Juba peace talks between July 2006 and April 2008 will be 
thoroughly described in the last main subsection, especially with regards to item three on the 
agenda concerning accountability and reconciliation balancing the relationship between these 
three transitional justice mechanisms. The last subsection will briefly touch upon the 
development since the negotiations at Juba ended in April 2008 to stress the need for finding a 
permanent solution to this conflict.  
 
3.2 Contextual background of the conflict in Northern Uganda  
The official start of the current conflict taking place between the GoU and the LRA in 
Northern Uganda is by many commentators thought to be in 1986, when the current president, 
Yoweri Museveni, and his National Resistance Army (NRA) came to power after capturing 
the capital Kampala. But as stated in the introduction of this chapter, the deeper underlying 
root causes of this conflict, which helps to explain the perception among the Acholi people of 
being marginalised, are found in an ethnic division between the north and the south of the 
country, that can be traced back to before both independence in 1962 and the colonial era, to 
pre-colonial times (see appendix C) (Bøås, 2004: 285-286; Doom and Vlassenroot, 1999:7-
10; ICG, 2004:2; Oomen and Marchand, 2007:164-166).  
 
Uganda is a country separated by an ethnic and linguistic divide between the north and the 
south. Whereas the people living in the north are Nilotic speakers, who before the 
introduction of colonialism mostly consisted of small groups of hunters and gatherers, the 
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southern Bantu speaking parts were in comparison dominated by four highly centralised 
kingdoms (Bøås, 2004:285-286; Oomen and Marchand, 2007:164-166). When the British 
colonisers arrived and established their administration in the south, they utilised a divide and 
rule form of politics to avoid a unified revolt against the exploitation of their territory, by 
treating the northern and southern tribes differently. The kingdoms in the south were 
industrialised and the people from this region received formal education, to be later recruited 
into the bureaucracy as civil servants. In comparison, those tribes living in the north became 
soldiers in the colonial army, mainly drawn from the Acholi tribe, but also provided a steady 
supply of cheap labour to plantations producing cash crops for the south (Bøås, 2004:285-
286; Doom and Vlassenroot, 1999; ICG, 2004:2; Oomen and Marchand, 2007:164-166; Van 
Acker, 2004). 
 
The result was that at the end of colonialism, the people from the south had received most of 
the infrastructure and socioeconomic development, whereas the majority of the soldiers in the 
colonial army came from the north. This divide is still present today, as the introduction of 
these ethnic divisions under colonialism resulted in the present manifestation of the cultural, 
economic and political cleavages between the Bantu dominated south and the northern Nilotic 
part of Uganda, and later served as a practical tool for successive post-colonial regimes to 
maintain their power by deliberately manipulating this imbalance. With independence in 
1962, the people from the north were, because of their military skills, able to counterbalance 
what they lacked in economic strength and absolute numbers of the total population. 
Successive Ugandan post-colonial rulers like Milton Obote, who ruled Uganda for two 
periods between 1962 and 1971 and again from 1980 to 1985, Idi Amin from 1971 to 1979, 
and Tito Okello for six months between 1985 and 1986, all had in common that they as 
northerners could rely on a loyal army. This came to an end in 1986, when Museveni, as a 
southerner, and his NRA overthrew Okello (Bøås, 2004:285-290; Hovil and Lomo, 2004; 
ICG, 2004:2; Oomen and Marchand, 2007:166-167; Ruaudel and Timpson, 2005).  
 
The main reason behind the Acholis grievances in the present is in all of this according to 
Bøås (2004:286-289) and Dunn (2007:139), a combination of both colonial and post-colonial 
experiences resulting in a feeling of betrayal. The first time it occurred was in 1913, when the 
colonial administration confiscated and destroyed all firearms among the Acholis and 
subsequently undermined their power and influence. Amin was personally responsible for the 
second round of betraying the Acholis, as he immediately after coming to power in 1971 
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ordered the massacre of the large number of Acholi soldiers in his predecessor and enemy 
Obote’s army. The third and decisive round of betrayal came in 1986, when Okello’s regime 
in its last desperate attempt against Museveni’s NRA recruited large numbers of Acholis, by 
promising them great rewards if they defeated the enemy in battle. Because of their lack of 
training and experience, the Acholi soldiers suffered heavy losses and eventually a total defeat 
against a superior NRA (Bøås, 2004:286-289; Dunn, 2005:139; ICG, 2004:3; Ruaudel and 
Timpson, 2005). While the economic, political and military power had belonged to northern 
ethnic groups for more than two decades after independence, the military defeat meant that 
the northerners now had lost their only real competitive advantage over other southern based 
ethnic groups. This complete concentration of power and patronage in the south under 
Museveni’s rule almost immediately resulted in a collective insecurity with a sense of total 
betrayal and complete marginalisation, which served to fuel the grievances among the people 
in the north, especially with regards to the Acholis (ICG, 2004:3-4; Ruaudel and Timpson, 
2005). 
 
Shortly after gaining power in 1986, Museveni accused the Acholis of being responsible for 
atrocities committed throughout the war and demanded that they should surrender. The 
majority of the former Acholi soldiers refused to do so, as they instead fled back into the 
north in response to the new government’s demand, and ‘the fear of a repetition of the 
massacre of 1971-1972 led many men to keep their weapons and take to the bush to join 
resistance movements such as the Holy Spiritual Movement and [later] the LRA’ (Bøås, 
2004:288; Doom and Vlassenroot, 1999:13; ICG, 2004:4; Van Acker, 2004:339-340).  
 
Since the late 1980s this has resulted in three major successive violent insurgencies 
originating in the north, primarily from within Acholiland, that all were aimed at 
overthrowing Museveni before he could consolidate his power, by retaking the capital and the 
presidency (ICG, 2004:4; Ruaudel and Timpson, 2005:3).  
 
The first rebel group became known as the Uganda People’s Democratic Army (UPDA), as it 
was made up of former Acholi soldiers that had fled back into Acholiland. This inexperienced 
group did, however, soon crumble under the military pressure from the NRA, and after two 
years the rebellion ended with a peace agreement between them in 1988 (Bøås, 2004; Doom 
and Vlassenroot, 1999:14-15; ICG; 2004:4; Ruaudel and Timpson, 2005; Van Acker, 2004) 
68 
 
In late 1986 the Holy Spirit Movement (HSM) was established under the leadership of Alice 
Lakwena, who took over the UPDA’s position by recruiting many of its remaining forces. As 
Lakwena was a so-called spiritual messenger, who claimed to have been possessed by several 
spirits that had not only given her healing powers, but also the ability to guide and lead 
military forces into action, her HSM has later been described as an Acholi millennial 
movement based on a mixture of Christian and traditional beliefs (Allen, 2006:33-37; Bøås, 
2004:289; Doom and Vlassenroot, 1999:15-22; Ruaudel and Timpson, 2005:3; Van Acker, 
2004:346-350). Lakwena exploited the Acholis’ grievances by claiming that their society 
would now experience a complete marginalisation as their dominance had disappeared with 
the recent defeat of the national army in the battles against Museveni’s NRA. The only 
solution to overcome these challenges was therefore an Acholi uprising under Lakwena’s 
leadership that would lead to a return to power. As Lakwena promised to address what the 
Acholis perceived as their grievances and marginalisation by fighting the NRA government, 
the HSM enjoyed large popular support and was able to gather a large group of followers 
(Allen, 2006:33-37; ICG, 2004:4; Ruaudel and Timpson, 2005:3). The NRA seriously 
underestimated this opponent, which allowed the HSM to march all the way to the town of 
Jinja (see appendix A and B), just one hundred kilometres outside Kampala, before being 
totally defeated there in 1987 (Allen, 2006:36; Bøås, 2004:289; Doom and Vlassenroot, 
1999:15-22; Dunn, 2007:132-134; ICG, 2004:4; Ruaudel and Timpson, 2005:3; Van Acker, 
2004:346-350).  
 
3.3 The coming into existence of the LRA 
It was in this context described above that Joseph Kony emerged in late 1987. By proclaiming 
himself as a mystic prophet possessed by the holy spirits of the Acholi people, which had 
provided him with healing powers, Kony mobilised fellow Acholis to establish his own 
movement that started its insurgency with the same name and objectives as Lakwena’s HSM 
had done one year earlier (Doom and Vlassenroot, 1999:20-24; Dunn, 2007:134-136). Kony’s 
rebel movement5 was therefore competing directly with the HSM by offering the same kind of 
spiritual cleansing of the Acholi people and by making the same political claim of providing 
an opportunity for frustrated Acholis to fight against Museveni, who at this stage feared that 
                                                           
5
 Although some analysts, like Prunier (2004:366), have claimed that the reason behind the similarities between 
Kony and Lakwena’s movements was the result of them being cousins or close relatives, this has not been 
proved, but what is known is that Kony unsuccessfully tried to forge an alliance with Lakwena (Allen, 2006:38; 
Dunn, 2007:134). 
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the rise of the southerners dominance under him would result in them ceasing to exist as a 
ethnic group (Allen, 2006; Bøås, 2004:289; Doom and Vlassenroot, 1999:20-22; ICG, 
2004:4; Van Acker, 2004). 
 
With the HSM out of the way, Kony’s movement filled this power vacuum shortly after, as its 
remaining forces quickly joined ranks with his troops to continue their struggle and was 
further strengthened in 1988, when most of the UPDA’s fighters also went over to join him 
after their leaders had signed a peace agreement with the NRA (Allen, 2006:38). The LRA is 
therefore clearly the successor to the two former rebel movements, as it began its insurgency 
in the same period as they were defeated by the NRA (Bøås, 2004:289; Prunier, 2004:365-
366). It was also at this stage that his group became known under its present name as the 
LRA, which illustrates how Kony by 1990 had consolidated his position as the leader of the 
only rebel movement remaining in Acholiland (Allen, 2006:39; Bøås, 2004; Dunn, 2007; 
Doom and Vlassenroot, 1999; Van Acker, 2004). 
 
Although it is easy to dismiss the LRA, as its leader Joseph Kony is behaving like an 
irrational madman, and the rebels’ indiscriminate use of violence to subdue the Acholis, it is 
important to be aware of that the insurgency in the beginning had a clear political objective6 
(Dunn, 2007:137-138). As described in the previous subsection, the background and root 
causes of the LRA’s political struggle can be found in its perception of how the Acholi 
society has suffered throughout history in colonial and post-colonial times, with grave 
atrocities and massacres taking place under both Amin and Museveni’s rule (Bøås, 2004:286-
290; Doom and Vlassenroot, 1999; Van Acker, 2004). Fuelled by this long history of ethnic 
marginalisation and exploitation, the LRA perceives itself ‘as fighting to free the Acholis 
from an oppressive government dominated by ethnic groups determined to exclude the 
Acholis permanently from the spoils of state power’ (Bøås, 2004:289). This political objective 
behind LRA’s insurgency was, and to a certain extent still is genuine, which helps to explain 
why the rebels initially enjoyed a substantial amount of popular support from their fellow 
                                                           
6 Although Ruaudel and Timpson (2005:12) claims that most analysts now interpret the LRA’s political 
objective to embarrass the GoU by terrorising the Acholis, no common agreement exists with regards to what it 
actually consists of. Whereas some, such as ICG (2004) argues that the LRA has no political agenda whatsoever, 
others have claimed that it has been lost after so many years of seemingly purposeless fighting (Doom and 
Vlassenroot, 1999), and yet others again that documents making claims of the end to IDP camps, Acholi 
genocide and the rebels being fully reintegrated into the society after a negotiated settlement of the conflict 
actually means that it has a political agenda (Bøås, 2004; Dunn, 2004, 2007).  
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Acholis because of their complete lack of trust in Museveni’s southern based government. But 
despite this early approval by the Acholis of the insurgency against the NRA, this support was 
gradually reduced to nothing (Bøås, 2004:290; Doom and Vlassenroot, 1999; Ruaudel and 
Timpson, 2005; Van Acker, 2004). This and other aspects that have continued to fuel this 
conflict over more than two decades will be analysed in the following subsections. 
 
3.4 The Acholis’ difficult situation 
There are several interrelated explanations as to why the LRA gradually started to change its 
focus and tactics away from fighting against the NRA by instead through violent attacks 
targeting the very same people whose cause it claimed to be fighting for. This subsection will 
describe how the LRA started out as the latest manifestation of the several attempts made by 
the Acholis to address the deeper underlying root causes of their sense of betrayal, but ended 
up becoming the very reason for why its own people is still experiencing continued 
marginalisation, as they are placed in a very difficult situation between the LRA and the GoU 
(Bøås, 2004:290).  
 
Seen in a historical perspective, the ideological foundation of the LRA’s violent rebellion was 
seemingly the same as its predecessors, by articulating the religious and political objectives 
that the UPDA and the HSM had done before it, respectively (Bøås, 2004:289-290). But Kony 
would, however, soon distinguish himself with an even more extreme millennial belief in 
spiritual symbolism than Lakwena had, by declaring that he was chosen by God to create a 
‘new’ Acholi society based on the Biblical Ten Commandments, which had to be punished 
and cleansed through violence (Doom and Vlassenroot, 1999; ICG; 2005a:3; Ruaudel and 
Timpson, 2005:4; Van Acker, 2004). Allen (2006:40) points to how the LRA, because of this, 
has utilised extremely violent methods as some sort of sacred tool in order to remove the 
unholy and impure Acholis from the ‘new’ generation of pure and holy. 
 
Compared with the HSM’s military offensives mainly against the NRM, the LRA unleashed 
violent attacks especially aimed at targeting their fellow Acholis (Ruaudel and Timpson, 
2005:4). The pursuit of Kony’s idea of a ‘new society’ was given as a reason by the LRA to 
legitimise the abduction of children to serve as fighters in his rebel movement that would 
indoctrinate them into this ‘new society’. This violent strategy has also been used to explain 
why the LRA has especially targeted Acholi elders worshipping traditional beliefs that 
represents a threat against their ‘new society’ by killing or mutilating them (Ruaudel and 
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Timpson, 2005:3; Van Acker, 2004). As the whole notion of spiritual cleansing through 
killing and violence goes against everything that the Acholis traditional beliefs, norms and 
values stand for, the elders has dismissed Kony as a false prophet (Hovil and Lomo, 2004). 
In 1991, the NRA government launched the military offensive ‘Operation North’ which failed 
to defeat the LRA insurgency, and it was at this stage that the Acholis’ complete dismissal of 
the LRA became obvious, as many Acholis participated on the government’s side against the 
LRA in local militias (Ruaudel and Timpson, 2005:4; Hovil and Lomo, 2004). This was 
eventually the event that ‘finally drove Kony over the edge’ as he began accusing the Acholis 
of grave betrayal by abandoning the cause he fought for, as it was they who in the first place 
had given the LRA its blessings to fight against the NRA on their behalf (Bøås: 2004:290; 
Doom and Vlassenroot, 1999:24-25). Since the LRA could no longer rely on the Acholis’ 
support in the insurgency, Kony argued that it was necessary for the LRA to target its own 
people to have access to a steady flow of supplies and new fighters by forcibly recruiting 
children through abductions (Allen, 2006; Branch, 2005; Hovil and Lomo, 2004; Van Acker, 
2004). This indicated a total change in tactics, strategy and policy, as the LRA from now on 
turned its weapons against its very own people (Branch, 2005; Bøås, 2004:290; Doom and 
Vlassenroot, 1999:24-25; Hovil and Lomo, 2004). 
 
One of the most effective ways for the LRA to make sure that the Acholi population is 
prevented from supporting the UPDF is by abducting their children (Allen, 2006; Branch, 
2005; Doom and Vlassenroot, 1999:25-26; Van Acker, 2004). This abduction of children has 
not only become a central element in the LRA’s strategy to terrorise the Acholis, but also 
proved to be an effective solution for the LRA to deal with the lack of a steady flow of 
voluntary recruits, and by now it is relying on forcibly recruiting children through abductions. 
If the LRA had not utilised abduction of children and by turning them into child soldiers as a 
mechanism, it would soon have been completely undermined, and one of the main 
descriptions of the LRA has therefore been the use of child soldiers throughout its insurgency 
(Branch, 2005; Doom and Vlassenroot, 1999; ICG, 2004; Oomen and Marchand, 2007:165; 
Van Acker, 2004). According to a study conducted by Pham et al (quoted in Oomen and 
Marchand, 2007:165), at least 20,000 children have been abducted and trained by the LRA to 
commit atrocities against their own communities.  
 
Another reason behind this change of tactics was that, by joining the militias and taking up the 
fight against the LRA, the Acholis had shown their support to the government, and this move 
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was clearly perceived by the rebels as a betrayal of their common cause. It was therefore at 
this stage that the LRA began their infamous atrocities through reprisal attacks with a massive 
use of violence by spreading fear and terror among the Acholi civilians to prevent them from 
taking the government’s side ever again. The militias are therefore partly to blame for the 
change in the tactics from a war mainly being fought between the LRA and the UPDF to 
increased targeting and use of violence by the rebels against the civilians (Allen, 2006; 
Branch, 2005; Bøås, 2004:289-290; Doom and Vlassenroot, 1999:23-24; Hovil and Lomo, 
2004; Van Acker, 2004).  
 
A unique aspect about the war in Northern Uganda compared to conflicts elsewhere is how 
the LRA, through its insurgency, has targeted its very own people, as the majority of the rebel 
fighters are Acholi children, who after being abducted are forced to take part in the violence 
against their own people or risk being killed themselves. Estimates by Annan et al (quoted in 
Oomen and Marchand, 2007:165) have indicated that the amount of violence related to the 
war has affected most people living in Northern Uganda either directly or indirectly. Even if 
more precise numbers are difficult to come by because of inaccurate and unsystematic reports, 
throughout the conflict tens of thousands of civilians have been targeted by both sides and 
resulted in them being killed, mutilated or otherwise affected and that these atrocities are 
often committed by close relatives, who are themselves forced to do this against their parents, 
siblings and extended clan members (Oomen and Marchand, 2007:164-166).  
 
But if this was not bad enough, in September 1996 the GoU launched a new military 
counterinsurgency strategy to defeat the LRA, by forcibly removing the Acholis from their 
villages in their thousands all over Northern Uganda into ‘protected villages’ (Bøås, 
2004:286; Doom and Vlassenroot, 1999:30-31; Bøås and Hatløy, 2005; Van Acker, 2004). 
The main intention behind this new strategy was allegedly to protect them from continued 
rebel attacks, by denying the LRA’s easy access to supplies in the villages, as well as isolating 
them from any potential supporters they still had left (Bøås, 2004:290; Bøås and Hatløy, 
2005).  
 
After that, these ‘protected villages’, better known as IDP camps, were established all over 
Acholiland until they totalled more than 200, and although they were intended to provide 
shelter and protection as a temporary solution, they have, after more than a decade, become a 
permanent institution in Northern Uganda, as the amount of people living in them has 
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constantly increased ever since (Bøås and Hatløy, 2005; Doom and Vlassenroot, 1999; Dunn, 
2007; Van Acker, 2004). Since their establishment in 1996, between 75 and 90 percent of the 
Acholis, almost the entire Acholi population, or somewhere between one and two million, 
have for various reasons been moving into the IDP camps7 (Oomen and Marchand, 2007:164; 
Ruaudel and Timpson, 2007). Here they experience appalling living conditions with a 
combination of constant hunger and sickness, as a result of being forced to live cramped 
together in extremely squalid and unhygienic conditions (Ruaudel and Timpson, 2005), and 
the ICG (2004:14-15) argues that because of this ‘many of the humanitarian problems facing 
the population living in the conflict area result from displacement’. This is a consequence of 
how the GoU forced the Acholis into these IDP camps in a rushed and unplanned manner, 
with no basic plan for how to run them, resulting in the camps lacking even the most basic 
infrastructure, such as water, food and sanitation, thereby making their inhabitants totally 
dependent on voluntary food aid from organisations like the World Food Programme (WFP) 
(Allen, 2006; Branch, 2005; Gosling and Prendergast and Pham et al quoted in Oomen and 
Marchand, 2007:164; Hovil and Lomo, 2004; Ruaudel and Timpson, 2005:4). As such, this 
permanent displacement symbolises an enormous humanitarian disaster to the Acholis instead 
of providing them with an end to the conflict in the foreseeable future (Bøås, 2004: 290).  
 
Unfortunately for the Acholi people, this counterinsurgency strategy has not benefited them at 
all, as they have not received the much needed protection in these IDP camps. By being put so 
close together without any kind of effective protection by the UPDF has offered the LRA an 
easy target (Ruaudel and Timpson, 2005). The result of this is that these IDP camps have not 
served their original purpose, by instead becoming the very symbol of the UPDF’s complete 
inability to protect their inhabitants (Bøås and Hatløy, 2005; Dunn, 2007; ICG, 2004). As the 
villages were emptied, the LRA perceived the IDP camps as their new resource base, resulting 
in that the Acholis are still experiencing abductions, mutilations and killings, as the camps 
have become main targets for the rebels who frequently attack them (Bøås and Hatløy, 2005; 
Dunn, 2007; ICG, 2004:15).  
 
Few, if any, Acholis any longer support or sympathise with the cause of the LRA’s brutal 
insurgency against Museveni’s policies and the complete political dominance by his ruling 
                                                           
7
 Another study quoted by Ruaudel and Timpson (2005:2) reports that internal displacements now affects even 
more than 90 percent of the total population in the Acholi districts, as the number of people living in IDP camps 
increased from 500,000 to 1,3 millions when the fighting spread into new areas between 2002 and 2003 in the 
aftermath of Operation Iron Fist, which is discussed below.  
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elite in the south. But neither do they trust the government either, as they also disapprove of 
the way national politics is run in Uganda through the exclusive ethnic basis of Museveni’s 
regime (Bøås, 2004:289). This is coupled with the fact that after 1996, Museveni sent a large 
number of troops to fight against the LRA in Northern Uganda, but according to Baker 
(quoted in Bøås, 2004:289-290), numerous reports have documented a worrying trend about 
how the UPDF as the main representative of the GoU in the north, who are supposed to 
protect the population against the LRA in the IDP camps, are instead accused of ‘extrajudicial 
killings, irregular arrests and detention, torture and displacement’. The Acholis are thereby 
being placed in a very difficult position, in the sense that in addition to fearing the constant 
threat of LRA attacks, they also have to face the harsh treatment of the UPDF. 
 
3.5 Peace talks in 1994 
Betty Bigombe, an influential Acholi woman, served as a member of the Ugandan Parliament 
between 1986 and 1996. In 1988 she was appointed Minister of State for Pacification of 
Northern Uganda by Museveni, where her job was to convince the LRA leaders that the 
insurgency was a lost cause and that the only reasonable thing to do in this situation was to 
end their struggle by laying down their arms (Allen, 2006:44-47; Doom and Vlassenroot, 
1999:24-25). Almost at the end of 1993, she was finally able to initiate contact with Joseph 
Kony. This resulted in a ceasefire shortly thereafter, with several rounds of peace talks led by 
Bigombe taking place between high ranking members of the LRA and the NRA. In February 
1994, the LRA rebel leaders declared their willingness to end their struggle and be 
reintegrated into the Acholi society by receiving amnesty upon their return. Kony did 
however argue that he needed an additional six months to regroup all of his fighters (Bøås, 
2004; Doom and Vlassenroot, 1999:24-25; Dunn, 2007). The NRA refused to give in to an 
enemy they believed they had defeated, and according to Kaiza (quoted in Dunn, 2007:143), 
the first rounds of peace talks lead by Bigombe disintegrated because of President Museveni’s 
‘lack of seriousness’ when he gave the LRA an ultimatum of surrendering or be annihilated 
by military means (Allen, 2006:48). In the words of Bøås (2004:290): ‘The peace attempt in 
1994 could have succeeded. Kony clearly indicated that he wanted to come out of the bush 
with all of his fighters (...)’, but the negotiations ended ‘when the NRA commanders insisted 
that the only thing to negotiate was the total surrender of the LRA’. Museveni’s lack of 
interest in negotiating with the LRA rebels has also been confirmed by Doom and Vlassenroot 
(1999:24-25), Dunn (2007:144), Van Acker (2004) and Mwaniki et al (2009:7). 
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As a consequence, the negotiations collapsed completely and the ceasefire came to an abrupt 
end with the LRA returning to the bush and crossing the border into Southern Sudan to 
establish military bases. They soon returned stronger than ever, thanks to Khartoum’s military 
assistance, as they now were in possession of more sophisticated weapons, such as landmines 
(Bøås, 2004; Doom and Vlassenroot, 1999; Van Acker, 2004:337-338). Bigombe is however 
not the only one who made attempts to engage the parties in a dialogue. In 1996, a group of 
Acholi elders unsuccessfully tried to engage with the LRA by launching a new round of 
negotiations that ended in disaster, as two of them were killed since the rebel leaders 
suspected them of being government spies (Allen, 2006:50; Behrend, quoted in Dunn, 
2007:144; Mwaniki et al, 2009:7; Ruaudel and Timpson, 2005:10). 
 
As will be illustrated throughout the following subsections, the 1994 peace talks, and to a 
certain extent the 1996 incident, served as a catalyst for several interrelated events, stretching 
from lobbying by the civil society in Northern Uganda for the introduction of an national 
amnesty law for the LRA, the revival of neo-traditional Acholi justice and the LRA receiving 
financial and military support from the central authorities of Sudan in Khartoum.  
 
3.6 Lobbying for amnesty and revitalisation of the Acholis’ traditional justice   
Following the failure of the 1994 peace talks led by Bigombe and the 1996 incident, the 
Acholis began mobilising at the grassroots level to push for a peaceful end to the conflict 
through a comprehensive blanket amnesty to give the LRA an incentive to lay down their 
arms. As this pressure gradually increased, it resulted in the establishment of an ecumenical 
NGO known as the Acholi Religious Leaders’ Peace Initiative (ARLPI) in 1998, where the 
Catholic, Orthodox, Anglican and Muslim religious leaders within the Acholi society 
formalised their increased cooperation about peace issues (Allen, 2006:78; Dunn, 2007; 
Ruaudel and Timpson, 2005:10). Although the ARLPI was not able to initiate renewed talks 
between the LRA and the GoU, it was influential as one of the leading forces who 
continuously lobbied for an Amnesty Act (Allen, 2006:78; Dunn, 2007).  
 
According to Allen (2006:74) ‘following persistent lobbying from various activists and 
overcoming outright opposition from President Museveni himself, the Amnesty Act passed 
into Ugandan law in November 1999 and was enacted in 2000’. It offers amnesty to all 
Ugandan rebels, including the LRA, and has to a certain extent undermined the guerrilla 
movement as many of its fighters, including several senior commanders, such as Kenneth 
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Banya and Sam Kolo, have laid down their arms in return for amnesty. This Amnesty Act has, 
however, not been successful in bringing about an end to the fighting, as the LRA leaders do 
not believe that it will prevent Museveni from prosecuting and punishing them instead once 
they come out of the bush and lay down their arms. This is evidenced by the fact that even if 
Museveni eventually had to give in, he has not supported this offer of amnesty, by repeatedly 
declaring his preference for a military solution as the only way to end the conflict and deal 
with the problems caused by the LRA, which is illustrated by Operation Iron Fist, that will be 
discussed in one of the next subsections (Allen, 2006; Dunn, 2007:144; Van Acker, 
2004:356).  
 
The lobbying for the Amnesty Act towards 2000 coincided with Dennis Pain’s report ‘The 
Bending of Spears’ from 1997. Pain argued that the Acholis have advanced systems and 
rituals for conflict mediation and resolution, which enabled them to neutralise disputes 
between their clans and other ethnic groups rather effectively. Although there are punishments 
and accountability in this local form of Acholi criminal justice system, it has, unlike the 
western form of justice, no provision for death penalties and prison sentences, as it is rather 
intended to work as a reconciliation and conflict resolution mechanism (Pain, 1997). His work 
is therefore perceived by many other researchers and activists concerned with Northern 
Uganda, like Allen (2005, 2006 and 2008) and Hovil and Quinn (2005) as instrumental for 
understanding how the Mato Oput and other neo-traditional justice procedures were 
introduced to and became a central part of the debate concerning what is the best way to end 
the war and the mechanisms to achieve this. But what was perceived as something vague and 
indefinable back then eventually became fully accepted a decade later as the Juba peace 
agreement and, if it had been successful, would have fully incorporated this element alongside 
legal proceedings, meaning that the complementarity between international justice and local 
perceptions of justice would have been guaranteed (Batanda, 2009; Latigo, 2008; Mwaniki et 
al, 2009; Ogora, 2009). In this sense, justice would not be perceived purely in a narrow way 
only based on arresting and prosecuting the perpetrators, but also have included other and 
much broader elements, such as socioeconomic justice (Ruaudel and Timpson, 2005). These 
are aspects that will be thoroughly analysed in the next chapter. 
 
3.7 The Sudanese influence  
In the first round of peace negotiations led by Bigombe from November 1993 to February 
1994, the LRA commanders clearly expressed their willingness to return to and be 
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reintegrated in Acholiland in return for receiving amnesty and forgiveness (Allen, 2006; 
Dunn, 2007). This could have meant that the LRA had realised its defeat, as its leaders only 
made demands concerned with avoiding prosecution and punishment before returning from 
the bush. It is, however, difficult to draw any conclusions about what would have been the 
final outcome if the negotiations had been successful and the LRA had accepted amnesty, as 
Museveni’s unrealistic demand of complete surrender within two weeks completely 
undermined the process (Bøås, 2004:290; Dunn, 2007:144). 
 
Other facts nevertheless suggest that the LRA only pursued peace talks to buy precious time, 
as they were simultaneously communicating with Khartoum about arms supply (Quaranto, 
2007:5). This is evidenced by the fact that around 1993 the LRA had, according to Gerard 
Prunier (2004:366-367), lost so many fighters that it had been reduced to around 300 rebels, 
but after the negotiations had failed it ‘was suddenly up to over 2,000 well-equipped troops by 
March 1994, and was in a position to raid the whole of Northern Uganda’. The reason for this 
connection is that Ugandan authorities in Kampala and its Sudanese counterpart in Khartoum 
have for many years been mutually hostile towards each other, which have resulted in their 
assistance to rebel groups in their respective territories in an attempt to destabilise each other 
(Bøås, 2004:289; Dunn, 2007:141-143; Doom and Vlassenroot, 1999:24-25; ICG, 2004:7 and 
2006:14; Prunier, 2004; Van Acker, 2004). The result of this is that ‘in many ways Sudan and 
Uganda have been running an undeclared war on their common border since 1986, [where] 
Sudan has been supporting (…) the (...) LRA, which is still fighting the Museveni regime in 
northern Uganda. Meanwhile, Kampala has progressively given increased help and facilities 
to the (...) SPLA, which is fighting the Khartoum regime in the southern Sudan’ (Prunier, 
2004:359).  
 
It was, however, not until sometime after 1993 or 1994 that Khartoum was able to establish 
connections with the LRA, but as a direct consequence of this official support from Sudan to 
the rebels, a new and much more complicated regional dimension to the conflict was 
introduced, as the rebels’ operational and military capacities increased substantially because 
of the Sudanese providing them with financial and military support. The LRA could now 
retreat back into Southern Sudan, by using it as a safe haven, where they could regroup after 
military losses, turn their newly abducted children into child soldiers and get medical 
treatment for combat wounds, but most importantly receive a steady flow of arms and 
ammunition, which included antitank mines, at least until the end of 2002 (Doom and 
78 
 
Vlassenroot, 1999:24-25; Dunn, 2007:141-143; Mwaniki et al, 2009:7; Prunier, 2004:366-
367; Ruaudel and Timpson, 2005:4-5; Van Acker, 1999:337-338).  
 
Before his death in a helicopter accident in 2005, the late SPLA chairman John Garang 
expressed that the removal of the LRA would have to be given priority, as an autonomous 
Southern Sudan experiencing peace and prosperity was depending on making its territory 
inhospitable for the LRA. That had not been the situation until then, as the LRA, after having 
established formal connections with Khartoum, who supplied them with a steady flow of 
weapons, also gave the rebels unlimited access to the border between Sudan and Uganda, 
where they could launch violent attacks in both countries. This made the LRA a force to be 
reckoned with in the wider region throughout the mid-1990s onwards and continued at least 
until 1999, when both countries signed an agreement to end their assistance to the LRA and 
the SPLA respectively. But despite this, the LRA still received support from parts of 
Khartoum, even if this was only a small fraction of what it received in the 1990s (Doom and 
Vlassenroot, 1999; Dunn, 2007:141-143; ICG, 2005b, 2006:8; Mwaniki and Wepundi, 
2007:2; Prunier, 2004; Ruaudel and Timpson, 2005:11; Van Acker, 2004:352). 
 
Nevertheless, in 2005 the central authorities in Khartoum and the SPLA signed the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that officially marked the end of the war between 
them and of all support to the LRA given by Khartoum, the establishment of the Government 
of Southern Sudan (GoSS) with autonomy from Khartoum, and a possible referendum over 
independence by 2011 (ICG, 2005b:4, 2006; Quaranto, 2007:6). 
 
With Khartoum’s influence over Southern Sudan gradually being reduced, this weakened and 
finally ended the covert support Khartoum had continued to give to the LRA despite of the 
1999 agreement, and made it possible for the SPLA under the new leadership of Salva Kiir, 
who took over in office after Garrang, to threaten the LRA with the use military force to 
remove it from its territory (Ruaudel and Timpson, 2005:11).  
 
This was done by presenting the LRA with three different options: (1) agree to search for a 
peaceful solution to the conflict, or; (2) leave Southern Sudan once and for all, or; (3) be faced 
with a military solution, where the GoSS military forces would remove it by force and 
eventually defeat it (ICG, 2006:16; Mwaniki and Wepundi, 2007:3). The LRA was now faced 
with a situation where it either could agree to find a peaceful solution to the conflict with the 
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GoSS as a mediator between it and the GoU, or face the use of force to remove and possibly 
annihilate it once and for all. This three layered ultimatum towards the LRA was, however, 
not unproblematic, as the SPLA at that stage had yet to be reorganised from a guerrilla force 
to become the armed forces of the GoSS and had because of this, a rather low morale and 
limited capacities to face the LRA (ICG, 2006; Quaranto, 2007:6).      
 
However, the GoSS slowly gained military strength and as will be illustrated throughout the 
rest of this chapter,  together with a number of other factors it forced the LRA to take a seat at 
the negotiation table at Juba (Mwaniki and Wepundi, 2007; Mwaniki et al, 2009:5). 
 
3.8 Operation Iron Fist  
Museveni has neither supported the Amnesty Act providing amnesty to all rebels who 
surrender nor the Acholis’ neo-traditional justice system aimed at reconciling the victims with 
the former rebels. Since the beginning of the conflict he has been convinced of and remained 
focused on a military solution to end the conflict once and for all. This is evidenced by the 
way in which he, independently of these offers put in place, launched Operation Iron Fist in 
March 2002 (Allen, 2006; Bøås, 2004; Dunn, 2007; ICG, 2004:15; Ruaudel and Timpson 
2005; Van Acker, 2004).  
 
This military offensive marked the beginning of a new counterinsurgency strategy, where 
more than 10,000 Ugandan troops entered Sudanese territory for the first time after an 
agreement with the central authorities in Khartoum. By pursuing the rebels over the border 
into Southern Sudan the intention behind this military campaign was to search for and destroy 
the LRA bases, hunt down and kill the rebels wherever they could be found, and ultimately 
eliminate the threat it represented once and for all (Allen, 2006:51; Dunn, 2007:136,141-143; 
ICG, 2004:15; Mwaniki et al, 2009:7-8; Ruaudel and Timpson 2005; Van Acker, 2004)  
 
The UPDF claimed that the main objective behind Operation Iron Fist, to flush out the rebels 
from their bases in Southern Sudan and crush them, had been a success, as it had dealt the 
LRA a decisive blow with several military victories where numerous rebels had either been 
killed, captured or defected. The only thing that the UPDF really achieved by this was to cut 
off and push the large majority of the LRA fighters away from their resource bases in 
Southern Sudan. After this, the rebels reorganised into smaller units, retreated back into 
Northern Uganda where they retaliated by launching more ferocious attacks and committed 
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numerous atrocities against the Acholis. The consequences of this was a sharp increase in the 
number of abductions, killings, lootings and mutilations, but also in the number of people 
living in the IDP camps scattered all over Northern Uganda, resulting in a further 
deterioration of the overall humanitarian situation in the region as a whole (Dunn, 
2007:136,141-143; Hovil and Lomo, 2004; Mwaniki et al, 2009:7-8; Ruaudel and Timpson 
2005; Van Acker, 2004; Quaranto, 2007:3).  
 
This situation reached an all time low by the summer of 2003, as the LRA had increased its 
operational area by blocking all major roads leading into the region, and by bringing the 
fighting to areas previously untouched by the conflict, as well as launching even more attacks 
aimed at replacing its losses by abducting children to serve as combatants (Dunn, 
2007:136,141-143; Hovil and Lomo, 2004; ICG, 2004; Ruaudel and Timpson 2005; Van 
Acker, 2004; Quaranto, 2007:3). It was in this situation that Museveni referred the situation in 
Northern Uganda to the ICC, as will be described in the following subsection.  
 
3.9 Enter the ICC 
In December 2003, Museveni submitted a formal referral of the situation concerning the LRA 
to the ICC, and already on January 29th 2004, he and the Court’s Chief Prosecutor Luis 
Moreno-Ocampo held a press conference in London, where they announced together that the 
ICC would initiate a formal investigation into the crimes allegedly committed by the LRA 
(Allen, 2006; Dunn, 2007; RLP, 2004). On July 8th, 2005, the ICC issued its first ever arrest 
for the LRA’s leader Joseph Kony, his deputy Vincent Otti, and the LRA commanders Raska 
Lukwiya, Okot Odhiambo and Dominic Ongwen by charging them with crimes against 
humanity and war crimes8. As these arrest warrants had been filed under seal, they were first 
made public on October 7th, 2005 (Allen, 2006; Ruaudel and Timpson, 2005). The result of 
this was that the ICC indictments in terms of how they came to influence the LRA rebel 
commanders, as well as whether and to what degree they have had an impact on the ongoing 
conflict between the LRA and the GoU is now at the core of the local ‘peace vs. justice 
debate’ in Northern Uganda, which will be analysed in the next chapter.  
 
                                                           
8
 Kony’s four accomplices have at various stages after the arrest warrant against them were issued either been 
killed in combat or ordered killed by Kony himself, like his deputy Otti in 2007, most likely because he had 
become too powerful and challenging for Kony’s undisputed authority within the rebel movement (ICG, 2008; 
Mwaniki et al, 2009).  
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3.10 The 2004 round of peace talks 
As previously mentioned, throughout the period following the failed 1994 peace talks there 
were sporadic attempts made at launching peace talks again in 1996, 2001 and 2003, but all of 
them have failed utterly by collapsing almost as soon as they started, since none of the parties 
seemed to be committed to pursuing a dialogue in good faith because of their mutual 
suspicion towards each other. This meant that hopes for a peaceful solution to the conflict 
were seemingly crushed once and for all (Allen, 2006:50; Dunn, 2007:136; ICG, 2005a).  
 
Betty Bigombe had, however, throughout this period been able to maintain the contact with 
the LRA rebel leaders. In 2004 hopes for another round of serious peace talks leading to a 
negotiated settlement of the protracted conflict were renewed as the LRA, through Brigadier 
Samuel Kolo, expressed their renewed interest in talks with the government officials and 
urged Bigombe to be their mediator once again (Allen, 2006:50; Dunn, 2007:136,141-143; 
ICG, 2005a).   
 
In mid-November 2004 Museveni therefore declared a seven day ceasefire that was extended 
several times, and with his acceptance, Bigombe launched a new round of peace talks 
between the parties. The chances of a final peace agreement was this time strengthened as 
Bigombe led the talks, as she enjoyed mutual confidence from both sides, and was thereby 
able to establish the seemingly impossible link between the government and the rebels (Allen, 
2006; Dunn, 2007; ICG, 2005a; Ruaudel and Timpson, 2005). But in her efforts to create 
peace in 2004, Bigombe could also rely on her previous experience in dealing with the LRA, 
as she in 1993-1994 explored ways to end the war between them and the GoU. Back then, she 
had been able to initiate talks that resulted in a ceasefire in February 1994, but which was 
broken shortly after and subsequently undermined a final peace agreement because of 
Museveni’s unrealistic two weeks deadline for the LRA to surrender (Ruaudel and Timpson, 
2005). This time the delegations came even closer to a final peace agreement than in 1994, 
and in late December 2004, only a few days before the final deadline on January 1st 2005, a 
meeting took place in the bush in Northern Uganda. Bigombe’s peace team had, before this 
meeting, written a final peace agreement and all that was missing was Kony’s signature 
(Ruadel and Timpson, 2005).  
 
The LRA’s chief negotiator, Sam Kolo, did however ask to extend the deadline with three 
more days, as he was unable to communicate effectively with Kony over radio because of 
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logistical problems. He would therefore have to walk for these three days to Kony’s current 
base in Southern Sudan and personally give the papers to him for a final signature (ICG, 
2005a; Ruaudel and Timpson, 2005). Even if it this final peace agreement was ready to be 
signed, Museveni had at this stage seemingly had enough of the rebels and refused to extend 
the already given deadline. Rather he argued that it was nonnegotiable for resulting in a final 
peace agreement and that after this there would be no more possibilities for negotiating a 
settlement with the rebels (Ruaudel and Timpson, 2005). Museveni and the GoU’s lack of 
commitment to a negotiated outcome to the conflict was therefore demonstrated once again, 
ten years after the first round of Bigombe led negotiations in 1994, as the 2004 round of peace 
talks were likewise thwarted and resulted in a total collapse of the ceasefire when he 
announced an end to it, with the UPDF returning to the battlefield by attacking the former 
ceasefire areas in January 2005 (Allen, 2006; Dunn, 2007:136,141-143; ICG, 2005a; Ruaudel 
and Timpson, 2005). 
 
But in addition to this aspect, and unlike 1994, what finally undermined this second round of 
peace talks led by Bigombe and illustrated Museveni’s reluctance against supporting a 
negotiated outcome to this conflict was his referral of the situation concerning the LRA case 
to the ICC. After its involvement he also urged the Court to prepare arrest warrants for a 
number of its leaders, which the Court soon after issued against Kony and four of his 
commanders (Allen, 2006; Dunn, 2007:136, 144; ICG, 2005a). By becoming involved in the 
process, the ICC had come in the way as a major stumbling block, and according to Dunn 
(2007:136), this time ‘the peace talks collapsed (...) after the [ICC], at President Museveni’s 
urging, announced that it was preparing arrest warrants for Kony and four of his 
commanders’.  
 
Whether the LRA wanted a genuine dialogue or just a breathing space to regroup is 
impossible to say for sure, but what seems certain is that the 1994 and 2004 negotiations 
could both have resulted in a permanent peace agreement (Ruaudel and Timpson, 2005).  
 
3.11 The Juba peace talks between 2006 and 2008 
The LRA was at this stage between 2005 and 2006 literarily caught between a rock and a hard 
place. Among these numerous factors that together challenged the LRA, it is possible to 
identify pressure at the international, regional, national and more local levels. At the 
international level, the ICC arrest warrants against the LRA leadership served as an ever 
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increasing threat against them (Allen, 2006; Dunn, 2007; ICG, 2007, 2008; Mwaniki and 
Wepundi, 2007; Mwaniki et al, 2009:9-10). But although the ICC was partly responsible for 
strengthening the pressure against them, this must also be seen in relation to the regional 
challenge in the shape of the GoSS three layered ultimatum (ICG, 2006). As the GoSS had 
gained military strength and coupled with the CPA, which meant a definitive end to the arms 
supply from Khartoum in 2005 and Southern Sudan as a safe haven, the LRA had to find a 
new hiding place in the Garamba National Park in the easternmost part of the DRC (see 
appendix A). This dramatic reduction in alternative hideouts has also resulted in a significant 
limitation of their manoeuvring space. Even in the DRC they were feeling the heat at their 
new hiding place at Garamba, because of the nearby presence of the UN Mission in the DRC 
(MONUC), that was deployed there as a peacekeeping force. The LRA eventually ended up 
encountering and killing eight of its personnel to make its presence felt. Although this 
demonstrated their skills in guerrilla warfare, it also serves as a symbol of their vulnerability 
in the DRC (ICG, 2007, 2008; Latigo, 2008:93; Quaranto, 2007:2). Furthermore, the UPDF 
threatened to pursue the LRA over the border from Uganda and into the DRC in a similar way 
as they had in Southern Sudan during Operation Iron Fist in 2002 (ICG, 2007; Mwaniki et al, 
2009:4-5; Quaranto, 2007:2). Last, but not least, the recent collapse in the second round of 
Bigombe led peace talks had left the LRA leaders without any possibility for negotiations 
through a mediator they could trust (Allen, 2006; Dunn, 2007; Ruaudel and Timpson, 2005).  
 
Nevertheless, this changed in the middle of 2006, as the vice-president of Southern Sudan, 
Riek Machar, offered to mediate between the LRA and the GoU, while maintaining the three 
layered ultimatum towards the rebels. As GoSS offer to mediate this time around was clearly 
positive, as a sustainable peace would gain both Southern Sudan and Northern Uganda, by 
taking into consideration that both countries are already struggling with more than enough 
internal problems on their own to have another and wider regional problem to deal with in 
addition (ICG, 2007, 2008; Latigo, 2008:98; Mwaniki and Wepundi, 2007:2-3; Mwaniki et al 
2009; Quaranto, 2007).  
 
These peace talks, also referred to as the Juba talks, were a series of negotiations taking place 
between the GoU and the LRA from July 2006 to April 2008, concerning the conditions for a 
ceasefire and a possible final peace agreement between them. On a five point agenda in this 
agreement, the third point dealing with accountability and reconciliation, and hence the issue 
of peace and justice by regulating the relationship between the ICC indictments, the amnesty 
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procedures and the Acholis’ neo-traditional justice system through Mato Oput is clearly the 
most important in this regard for this study (ICG, 2007, 2008; Mwaniki et al, 2009; Ogora, 
2009; Oomen and Marchand, 2007). In the following, this subsection will describe what this 
peace agreement sought to achieve, before moving on to the next chapter, with a basis in point 
three concerning accountability and reconciliation, will discuss the strengths and weaknesses 
of these three transitional justice mechanisms being mentioned here.  
 
The first round in the Juba talks began on July 14th 2006 (Batanda, 2009; Latigo, 2008:98; 
Mwaniki et al, 2009; Ogora, 2009; Quaranto, 2007). While the LRA clearly expressed from 
the start that they wanted to discuss and address the deeper underlying economic, political and 
social root causes of the conflict, the GoU in comparison entered the negotiations by 
perceiving it as a possible political solution to a military problem where they hoped to 
negotiate a solution with a ‘soft landing’ allowing the LRA leaders to avoid punishment. 
These completely different perceptions of what should be included on the agenda, illustrated 
that there still was a great deal of common mistrust between the two warring factions that was 
understandably extremely difficult to overcome. Because of this, there was constantly a 
‘blame game’ between them, which threatened to undermine the Juba peace talks throughout 
the negotiations. This had to stop for a permanent solution to be reached, meaning that both 
parties would have to realise that it was now time to bring about an end to the fighting as no 
good would come out of constantly blaming each other for what had happened in the past 
(Batanda, 2009; ICG, 2008; Latigo, 2008:98; Mwaniki et al, 2009; Ogora, 2009; Quaranto, 
2007). 
  
Slowly, as the talks progressed, the delegations were able to bridge this divide by agreeing on 
a five point agenda which outlined what had to be discussed and agreed upon before a peace 
agreement could be reached at all. These five points, which included both military and more 
structural issues covered; (1) cessation of hostilities; (2) a comprehensive frame of solution to 
economic and social development; (3) accountability and reconciliation; (4) disarmament, 
demobilisation and resettlement (DDR), and; (5) a final comprehensive peace agreement 
(Batanda, 2009; ICG, 2007, 2008; Latigo, 2008:98-99; Mwaniki and Wepundi, 2007:5; 
Mwaniki et al, 2009; Ogora, 2009; Quaranto, 2007).  
 
After several delays, the first point on the agenda, a cessation of hostilities, was finally 
reached through a ceasefire agreement on August 26th, 2006, that was renewed for the first 
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time in December 2006, and later again in April 2007 (Batanda, 2009; ICG, 2007, 2008; 
Latigo, 2008:99-100; Mwaniki and Wepundi, 2007:2-4; Mwaniki et al, 2009:4; Ogora, 2009; 
Quaranto, 2007). Even if the situation on the ground remained tense, it was nevertheless 
peaceful, as there were only being reported some sporadic clashes between them after the 
talks began, and no outbreak of violence after this first agreement had been signed, which 
contributed to improving the humanitarian situation in Northern Uganda (ICG, 2007, 2008; 
Mwaniki and Wepundi, 2007:2-4; VG, 2009). After this, the parties were seemingly much 
closer to a final settlement than ever before, and the Juba talks were therefore being described 
as the best chance ever for reaching a negotiated settlement between the GoU and the LRA in 
the conflict, which at this stage had lasted for more than two decades, and throughout this 
period no kind of negotiations, whether being mediated by a third party or not had resulted in 
a successful outcome (Batanda, 2009; ICG, 2007, 2008; Latigo, 2008:98-99; Mwaniki and 
Wepundi, 2007:2;  Mwaniki et al, 2009:4,9-11; Ogora, 2009; Quaranto, 2007). 
 
But this cessation of hostilities through a ceasefire was only the first item out of five points on 
the agenda, and many other difficult aspects had yet to be solved at numerous meetings before 
a final peace agreement could be reached. In January 2007, the first round of Juba peace talks 
did however collapse, since the LRA delegation argued that their safety was at stake. This was 
understandable given the increased pressure they were faced with from different angles at this 
stage (Batanda, 2009; ICG, 2007, 2008; Latigo, 2008:99; Mwaniki and Wepundi, 2007:8; 
Mwaniki et al, 2009; Ogora, 2009; Quaranto, 2007).   
After a two month delay the peace talks resumed in April 2007. When the Juba process had 
entered its second year, Machar was still in charge of the negotiations, but the team of 
negotiators was beefed up considerably, as he was now assisted by Joaqim Chissano, the 
former president of Mozambique and now a UN special envoy, in addition to monitors from 
the DRC, Kenya, Mozambique, South Africa and Tanzania (Batanda, 2009; ICG, 2007, 2008; 
Latigo, 2008:99; Mwaniki et al, 2009:8-9; Ogora, 2009; Quaranto, 2007).  
 
Since only the first one of the five items on the agenda had been dealt with, the parties 
therefore decided to renew the ceasefire for another two months to be able to move on to the 
second item concerning a comprehensive solution to the conflict. This had to do with issues 
such as social and economic development for Northern Uganda, land titles and more detailed 
security arrangements for the rebels once they returned from the bush. As most of these issues 
had been discussed on previous occasions, they were able to move on to the third item on the 
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agenda dealing with the issue of accountability and reconciliation related to the questions 
about transitional justice (Batanda, 2009; ICG, 2007:5 and 2008; Latigo, 2008:99-100; 
Mwaniki and Wepundi, 2007:6-8; Mwaniki et al, 2009; Ogora, 2009; Quaranto, 2007).   
 
This ‘peace vs. justice’ dilemma was another issue that had complicated the Juba peace talks 
from the very beginning. Although the ICC indictments against Kony and four of his 
henchmen were just one of the several important issues that had to be resolved, the ICC 
clearly represented the biggest major obstacle threatening to undermine the whole process, 
and it provoked a great debate about this dichotomy between peace and justice concerning 
which one of them should come first (Batanda, 2009; ICG, 2007, 2008; Latigo, 2008:100; 
Mwaniki and Wepundi, 2007:9-10; Mwaniki et al, 2009:11; Nielsen, 2008; Oomen and 
Marchand, 2007; Ogora, 2009; Quaranto, 2007). 
 
The LRA leaders demanded the withdrawal of the ICC indictments against them to make sure 
of that the peace talks would continue smoothly, as well as stronger guarantees about their 
fighters’ security. As such, a successful outcome with a comprehensive peace agreement 
depended on the Court to let the LRA leaders off their judicial hook by removing the 
indictments, which represented a massive obstacle for continued peace talks (Batanda, 2009; 
ICG, 2007, 2008; Latigo, 2008:99-100; Mwaniki and Wepundi, 2007:9-10; Mwaniki et al, 
2009:10-11; Ogora, 2009; Quaranto, 2007). For its part, the GoU insisted that the ICC would 
not stand in the way as an obstacle when the prospects for achieving the greater good through 
a peace agreement was in sight, and promised to approach the Court to have the indictments 
against the LRA leaders lifted, but only after they had agreed to sign an agreement (Latigo, 
2008:99; Mwaniki and Wepundi, 2007:9-10). The problem with this was that even if 
Museveni clearly expressed his willingness to have them withdrawn and prepare the ground 
for a ‘soft landing’ for the rebel leaders, this is extremely difficult to achieve and not up to 
him to decide by himself. For its part, the ICC did not show any sign of removing the 
indictments, but to the contrary indicated that they interpreted this ‘soft landing’ through 
amnesty as a continuance of the practice of impunity that it sought to root out (Mail and 
Guardian, 2009c; Ogora, 2009). The arrest warrants would therefore remain in place as long 
as the Court had more than enough evidence to charge Kony and his four commanders for war 
crimes and crimes against humanity, and the GoU made no attempts to prosecute the rebel 
leaders by themselves. But as long as the arrest warrants remained in place, the LRA would 
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refuse to sit down and talk peace at all (Batanda, 2009; ICG, 2007, 2008; Latigo, 2008:99; 
Mwaniki et al, 2009; Ogora, 2009; Quaranto, 2007). 
 
Most likely in an attempt to convince the Court of the need for greater flexibility and 
sensitivity to the local needs on the ground in Northern Uganda, and to create a ‘win-win’ 
situation, the Acholis’ neo-traditional justice system was introduced as a third and more 
viable solution to this impasse between the two polar opposites between the ICC and impunity 
through blanket amnesties. It was hoped that the ICC would be convinced of that there were 
other possible venues for justice where Kony and his four commanders would be held 
accountable and sufficiently dealt with through the use of national prosecutions coupled with 
the neo-traditional Acholi justice system (Batanda, 2009; ICG, 2007, 2008; Latigo, 2008:99-
100; Mwaniki et al, 2009; Ogora, 2009; Quaranto, 2007).  
 
On the 29th of June 2007, the GoU and the LRA finally signed an agreement on item three 
concerning accountability and reconciliation, which deals with the relationship between the 
ICC arrest warrants, amnesty procedures and the Acholis neo-traditional justice system 
(Batanda, 2009; ICG, 2007, 2008; Latigo, 2008:108; Mwaniki et al, 2009; Ogora, 2009; 
Oomen and Marchand, 2007:168; Quaranto, 2007). This agreement on agenda item number 
three concerning accountability and reconciliation was based on an acknowledgement of the 
atrocities committed by both parties throughout 22 years of conflict and ‘commits the parties 
to prevent impunity and to promote redress in accordance with the constitution as well as 
international obligations’, but it has also recognised the need for adopting appropriate justice 
mechanisms, including customary processes of accountability (Beyond Juba Project quoted in 
Batanda, 2009:5). This agenda item stresses the need for implementing neo-traditional justice 
mechanisms like Mato Oput in an attempt to achieve a sustainable and lasting peace in 
Northern Uganda (Batanda, 2009:5). As such, the signing of item number three concerning 
accountability and reconciliation on the agenda for the Juba peace agreement explicitly deals 
with the relationship between formal and non-formal transitional justice mechanisms. 
Whereas the former is expressed through the establishment of a Special Division of the High 
Court (SDHC) and the latter through the neo-traditional justice mechanisms associated with 
the tribes living in Northern Uganda, as for instance the Acholis Mato Oput rituals (Batanda, 
2009; ICG, 2007, 2008; Latigo, 2008:108; Mwaniki et al, 2009; Ogora, 2009; Oomen and 
Marchand, 2007:166; Quaranto, 2007). 
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At the core of the more formal transitional justice mechanisms being referred to in this 
agreement, the SDHC is intended to prosecute the individuals who allegedly had been 
responsible for committing the most serious crimes of concern for the international 
community throughout the entire conflict (ICG, 2008:8-9; Ogora, 2009). The Chief Justice of 
the Ugandan High Court did, however, clarify that the creation of the SDHC just like other 
conventional forms of justice elsewhere, especially with regards the ICC, would only be able 
to prosecute a handful of the most senior commanders in the LRA. This would either be the 
very same five LRA top commanders indicted by the ICC or a few more individuals (ICG, 
2008:8-9; Ogora, 2009:3-4). Ogora (2009:3-4) argues that by assuming how ten individual 
LRA leaders would face formal prosecution by the SDHC, with the LRA’s current strength 
estimated at about 4000 fighters, this meant that it was not likely that any more than one 
percent would be dealt with in this way. The prospect of prosecuting such as low number 
seemed highly unlikely to have any major impact concerning the reconciliation at the 
grassroots level, as the large majority of mid-level rebels together with the rank and file 
combatants would not be prosecuted through the SDHC. They would instead have to be sent 
back to their respective communities and dealt with through the non-formal system of 
restorative mechanisms associated with the neo-traditional justice by undergoing 
reconciliation processes before being fully reintegrated back into society (Ogora, 2009:4-5). 
 
This is a reflection of the situation in Rwanda six years after the genocide, where more than 
120,000 individuals were still in prison awaiting trial, and at that current stage it was believed 
that it would take the formal court system more than 180 years to deal adequately with all of 
these individuals. Despite this, more resources were directed towards the ICTR than to the 
development of the Gacaca courts (Quinn quoted in Ogora, 2009:3; van Zyl, 2005).  
 
It also explains why neo-traditional justice mechanisms practiced by the Acholi and other 
neighbouring ethnic communities being affected by the conflict also should be promoted with 
necessary modifications as a central part of the framework for the principles of accountability 
and reconciliation being mentioned in item three of the Juba agreement. These non-formal 
mechanisms refer to the traditional and customary mechanisms being practiced for decades 
among the local tribes living in Northern Uganda for conflict resolution and maintaining a 
stabile social order within their societies. Except from the Mato Oput being practiced among 
the Acholis, among several others it is worth mentioning Culo Kwor and Kayo Cuk by the 
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Acholis and Lango, Ailuc by the Iteso and Tonu ci Koka by the Madi9 (Ogora, 2009; Latigo, 
2008:108; Oomen and Marchand, 2007:173). This is also a reflection of how, across the 
African continent, other similar neo-traditional justice mechanisms have been revived over 
the last few decades, like the Inkundla in South Africa, the Gacaca courts in Rwanda, 
Magamba in Mozambique, and Bashingantahe in Burundi10. Although they differ in their aim 
to achieve and way of being practiced, these traditional justice mechanisms are all being 
associated with the concept of Ubuntu, since most of them deal with restoring broken 
relations (Huyse 2008; Ogora, 2009).   
 
This illustrates how retributive and restorative forms of transitional justice have different, yet 
equally important roles to play, whereas the former focus on bringing an end to the practice of 
impunity, the latter focus on restoring broken community relationships (Ogora, 2009:4). 
Many local NGOs and other actors in the local civil society in Northern Uganda supported the 
introduction and use of these unconventional neo-traditional justice mechanisms to be used as 
part of the transitional justice strategies to deal with the war crimes and crimes against 
humanity being committed after the conflict had ended. This was, however, not welcomed by 
human rights organisations like the AI and the HRW, who expressed their preference for the 
use of more direct punitive models associated with retributive justice. The result of this was 
arguably that the local ‘peace vs. justice’ debate from that stage went from being perceived as 
a dilemma between the ICC and impunity to become a confrontation between amnesties, the 
neo-traditional and the international forms of justice (Latigo, 2008:99-100; Ogora, 2005:1-3).  
 
After this major obstacle had been dealt with, the peace talks advanced further to the issue of 
DDR. For its part, the GoU demanded that the LRA laid down their weapons and 
subsequently moved all of its fighters to the assembly points. This meant that the LRA would 
have to respect the conditions in the cessation of hostilities, by moving all of their fighters to 
the assembly points. In their response to these demands, the LRA asked for protection by the 
                                                           
9
 ‘Ailuc’ refers to the traditional rituals performed by the Iteso to reconcile parties who formerly have been in 
conflict after full accountability; ‘Culo Kwor’, referring to the compensation to make up for homicides, and to 
any other form of reparations, again after full accountability, which is practiced by the Acholi and Lango, one of 
the neighbouring ethnic communities to the Acholi; ‘Kayo Cuk’ or the biting of charcoal, is a traditional ritual 
performed by the Lango, to reconcile parties formerly in conflict, after full accountability; ‘Tonu ci Koka’, the 
traditional rituals performed by the Madi to reconcile parties formerly in conflict, also after full accountability 
(Latigo, 2008:108; Oomen and Marchand, 2007:173).  
 
10
 For an excellent cross comparison between these traditional practices and their strenghts and weaknesses, 
please see International IDEA’s (2008) report ‘Traditional Justice and Reconciliation after Violent Conflict: 
Learning from African experiences’. 
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UPDF once a final peace agreement had been reached, but also that their monthly allowances 
were raised. All of these demands were accepted by both sides. The GoU would also through 
this negotiated solution to the conflict have to start a serious and thorough analysis of how to 
address the issues associated with the North vs. South divide, as a central part of the Acholi 
grievances and the LRA’s insurgency, to avoid a repetition with a similar tragic conflicts 
unfolding in this part and elsewhere in Uganda in the future (ICG, 2008; Mwaniki et al, 2009; 
Ogora, 2009).  
 
Without disregarding the other points on the agenda for the Juba peace talks, but for this 
thesis item number three concerning accountability and reconciliation is by far the most 
important point in this regard, as it deals with the issue of transitional justice in the ‘peace vs. 
justice’ debate concerning Northern Uganda. 
 
To sum up and refer to the introductory theoretical discussion in chapter two, based on the 
work of Galtung (1969, 1996), Lederach (1997), Mani (2002, 2005), Nielsen (2008), Oomen 
and Marchand (2007) and van Zyl (2005), the conflict in Northern Uganda at this stage 
seemed to be situated somewhere between the stages of peacemaking and peace building. 
Since the agreement on cessation of hostilities was reached between the parties in August 
2006, the demand for peacekeeping had clearly been met, as the high level of destructive 
behaviour through direct and indirect forms of violence had been significantly reduced 
afterwards (Galtung, 1969, 1996; Ledearch, 1997; Mani, 2002, 2005). The next stage in this 
process, namely peacemaking, which refers to the mediation and negotiations that were taking 
place at Juba during this period, as well as changing the hostile attitude that existed between 
the warring factions, is something that will not be fully achieved in the foreseeable future, 
given the long period of animosity. The final and most important stage, namely peace 
building, is intended to adequately address the more structural issues by transforming the 
situation from a violent conflict into sustainable and lasting peace, in order to provide for that 
the relationship between the conflicting parties also will function properly in the foreseeable 
future (Galtung, 1969, 1996; Lederach, 1997). This creation of such a conducive environment 
associated with sustainable and lasting peace in Northern Uganda was at this stage being 
explored and clearly on its way, evidenced by how the parties had agreed to the different 
items on the agenda. The deeper and underlying root causes of the conflict would however 
have to be properly analysed and genuinely addressed in order for this to work.    
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This could have given reason to hope for that at this stage the preconditions for a sustainable 
and lasting peace had slowly emerged, but as the Economist (2009b) reported in its article ‘A 
country adrift, a president amiss: The government fails yet again to defeat the Lord’s 
Resistance Army’ dated 12th of February 2009, illustrates the negative development since the 
negotiations ended in April 2008, that will be further addressed in the last main subsection of 
this chapter: 
 
The north of the country, terrorised by the (...) LRA, has been a blood-spattered mess for two 
decades- and still awaits a real peace. (...) A million-plus people, most of them resentful 
Acholis, still live in squalid camps in the north. The monstrous ragtag militias that drove them 
out of their villages are still at large; a recent military campaign against the LRA in 
neighbouring Congo has been indecisive. Troops from Uganda, Congo and South Sudan backed 
by Ugandan air raids and American intelligence, hammered the LRA’s camps towards the end 
of last year. But, like mercury, the LRA fighters slipped away through the jungle in several 
directions, burning villages, butchering hundreds of civilians and kidnapping children to slave 
for it. The UN’s head of humanitarian affairs, Sir John Holmes, says the campaign’s result was 
‘catastrophic’. The war goes bloodily on.   
 
3.12 The developments since the end of the Juba peace talks in 2008 
As discussed over the last subsections, although some of the previous attempts being made at 
peace talks and negotiations had shown positive signs of bringing the parties together, they 
were however not producing any significant results before the Juba peace talks began in July 
2006, which made significant progress in this regard concerning the fact that all of the five 
points on the agenda were signed. Although negotiations were concluded in April 2008, the 
final peace agreement had yet to be signed, and this round of peace negotiations unfortunately 
ended in April 2008 as Kony argued that he needed some more time to analyse the signed 
items before he could commit himself by signing a final peace agreement (Batanda, 2009:3-4; 
ICG, 2008; Mwaniki et al, 2009:1). Part of the reason for why he withdrew from this round of 
negotiations was arguably the ICC indictments and arrest warrants were still hanging over 
him and his four top commanders (Batanda, 2009:3-4; ICG, 2008; Mwaniki et al, 2009:10). 
Kony was at that stage situated in the Garamba region in the eastern DRC, where several 
reports have claimed that the LRA has attacked in both the DRC and Southern Sudan. With 
the breakdown of the peace process, this understandably led to widespread fear of renewed 
use of military force in the ongoing conflict. This fear turned into reality when the UN and the 
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DRC made it clear that they would join forces in a combined military campaign against the 
LRA, but in November 2008 the President of the DRC, Joseph Kabila, promised to put the 
military campaign on halt so that Kony could sign the final peace agreement. The GoU had 
eventually become tired of waiting for over 6 months by the LRA to sign the final agreement 
and on several occasions demanded that the LRA should be forced to sign the papers or face 
the consequences. When such a deadline finally was made and the LRA broke it, forces from 
the DRC, Southern Sudan and Uganda in Operation Lightning Force together attacked the 
LRA hideouts in Garamba on the 14th of December 2008. The LRA responded by 
indiscriminately retaliating against Congolese civilians who were killed or abducted in their 
tens or hundreds as it retreated towards the CAR. After several of the LRA top commanders 
had been wounded and numerous of its fighters had been killed or surrendered to the UPDF, 
the offensive ended on the 15th of March 2009 when the UPDF withdrew its forces based on 
an agreement with the DRC about the duration of the offensive. Kony, together with a small 
number of rebels, that was believed to be the remnants of the LRA, was still on the run and 
heading towards the CAR (Batanda, 2009:3-4; Mwaniki et al, 2009:1-2). 
 
In one of the latest reports about the LRA, the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) 12th of September (quoted in Verdens Gang, 2009), argued that although 
Northern Uganda had been at peace since the signing of the ceasefire agreement in 2006, it 
was a widespread fear of that the LRA had used these three years that had past to regroup its 
forces and stockpile weapons in the DRC and Southern Sudan.  
 
The UNHCR also reported that the whole region is still being affected by the LRA’s 
atrocities, as it continued to spread fear and terror among the civilian population in both 
Southern Sudan and the eastern parts of the DRC by retaliating against them for Operation 
Lightning Bolt between December 2008 and March 2009. Since the end of July 2009, in the 
eastern part of the DRC more than 1,270 civilians had been reported killed, over 650 children 
abducted and 125,000 people had fled from their villages, making the number of internally 
displaced in this country alone reaching more than half a million in less than one year. In the 
same period from the end of July 2009, more than 200 people had been killed and 230,000 
had fled from the LRA in Southern Sudan (VG, 2009). This seems like a repetition of how the 
conflict has developed in the past, as described throughout this chapter, with failed peace 
negotiations and unsuccessful military counterinsurgencies, which begs the question of how 
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the transitional justice mechanisms mentioned here can assist in solving this conflict once and 
for all that will be analysed in the next chapter.   
  
3.13 Conclusion 
The first subsection of this chapter has looked at the violent history of Uganda, mainly from 
independence in 1962 and onwards. It illustrates how the root causes to the current conflict 
originates from an ethnically dominated cleavage introduced by the British colonialists 
between the Northern Nilotic and the Southern Bantu tribes of the country, which resulted in 
extreme disparities concerning economic, military and political power. This served as a useful 
tool for consecutive Ugandan rulers like Amin, Obote and Okello who all came from the 
north to maintain their power, but which ended in 1986, when Museveni, as a southerner, and 
his NRA came to power. Through his statements after becoming president, Museveni created 
great concern among northerners, especially with regards to the Acholis, who feared for their 
very existence as an ethnic group, which resulted in their support for three insurgencies 
against him by the UPDA, HSM and LRA respectively.    
          
Based on this context, the second subsection describes how Kony emerged as a rebel leader in 
1987, and how he by 1990, after the defeat of the UPDA and the HSM, was in charge of the 
only remaining insurgency in Northern Uganda, namely the LRA. He and his rebel movement 
initially enjoyed sympathy from their fellow Acholis, by promising to fight for their political 
cause against Museveni’s government in the south. Based on a vision Kony had allegedly 
received from God to create a ‘new’ Acholi society cleansed through violence the LRA did, 
however, soon radically change the objectives by instead targeting their very own next of kin.   
 
The third subsection illustrates how the Acholis turned against Kony and the LRA, by 
supporting the NRA through militias during Operation North in 1991. This apparently pushed 
Kony over the edge as he accused his fellow Acholis of betraying their common cause.  From 
then on the conflict was to be characterised by forced recruitment of child soldiers through 
abductions. Another unique aspect compared to other insurgencies is how the LRA has 
retaliated against their fellow Acholis, with extreme levels of violence through indiscriminate 
mutilations and killings. The establishment of the militias are therefore partly to blame for the 
increased attacks by the LRA against the Acholi civilian population. If this was not bad 
enough in itself, the GoU in 1996 launched a new counterinsurgency strategy aimed at 
undermining the LRA forced Acholis in their thousands away from their villages and into IDP 
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camps. As this was done without proper planning, these camps lacked even the most basic 
infrastructure, like running water and sanitation, resulting in that their inhabitants are 
experiencing appalling living conditions resulting from overcrowded and unhygienic 
standards. The UPDF has also proved its complete inability to protect these camps, enabling 
the LRA to frequently attack them and use them as their new resource bases after the villages 
were emptied. As such, the Acholis are placed in a difficult situation, as they have to fear 
continued attacks by the LRA rebels, but also have to face the harsh treatment from the UPDF 
in these camps.  
            
As described in the fourth subsection of this chapter, the failed 1994 peace talks, and to a 
certain extent the 1996 incident, served as a catalyst for three interrelated events, stretching 
from the LRA receiving military support and facilities from the central authorities of Sudan in 
Khartoum, the civil society in Northern Uganda pushing for an amnesty law to create an 
incentive for the LRA to give up its insurgency and the revival of neo-traditional Acholi 
justice aimed at reconciliation and conflict resolution. These three different transitional justice 
mechanisms analysed in this thesis were introduced at different times, with the Acholis’ neo-
traditional justice already in 1997, the Amnesty Act in 2000 and the ICC between 2004 and 
2005.   
        
The Sudanese support to the LRA after 1994 complicated and prolonged the conflict, as the 
LRA not only received ammunition and weapons from Khartoum, but could also use Southern 
Sudan as a safe haven by retreating into bases there after attacks in Northern Uganda. 
Although this was supposed to have ended with an agreement between Sudan and Uganda in 
1999, the LRA still received support from parts of Khartoum at least until 2002. The signing 
of the CPA between Khartoum and the SPLA in 2005 gradually ended this support, and with 
the newly established GoSS three layered ultimatum towards the LRA in the same year, the 
rebels were forced out of Southern Sudan into the Garamba region of the DRC.         
   
The peace talks and further negotiations led by Bigombe in 1994 and 2004 respectively, as 
well as the ones in 1996, 2001 and 2003, being described in various subsections, have all 
failed because of mutual mistrust between the GoU and the LRA and a lack of confidence in 
that talks would result in a lasting peace. Clearly, both the 1994 and 2004 talks could have 
resulted in peace, as the LRA rebel leaders expressed their interest in surrendering in return 
for receiving amnesty. Both of them were, however, thwarted by Museveni, as he in 1994 
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expressed his preference for a military solution to the war and acted accordingly. In 2004 this 
military engagement was combined with his referral of the conflict to the ICC, which served 
to further complicate the conflict. The LRA are also partly to blame for this, as they 
seemingly have only expressed their interest in peace talks when being in a difficult position, 
by using these breathing spaces to regroup and stockpile weapons for new rounds of conflict, 
as was done following the 1994 peace talks with the Sudanese support and in the three years 
after the 2006 ceasefire. Likewise, the military counterinsurgencies during Operation North, 
Iron Fist and Lightning Force described throughout this chapter have all proved their 
complete failure to deal a final and decisive blow against the LRA.  
            
The penultimate subsection looks at how the LRA, between 2005 and 2006, were literally 
caught between a rock and a hard place by facing challenges at different levels. These 
stretched from the collapse of the second round of Bigombe led negotiations between 2004 
and 2005, a threat from the GoU to pursue it over the border into the DRC just like it had in 
Southern Sudan three years before, the GoSS three layered ultimatum to force it out of its 
territory, and the nearby pressure of a UN peacekeeping force in the DRC, as well as the ICC 
indictments. It was in this context that the Vice-President of Southern Sudan, Riek Machar 
offered to mediate between the GoU and the LRA. Talks began in July 2006 and resulted in a 
ceasefire one month later. The parties then agreed on a five point agenda stretching from the 
cessation of hostilities; comprehensive solutions to the conflict; reconciliation and 
accountability; a formal ceasefire; and DDR. Because of this, the Juba negotiations were 
described as the best chance for peace so far in the two decades long conflict. The most 
problematic item on the agenda was number three concerning reconciliation and 
accountability, as it dealt with the issue of transitional justice. The LRA demanded the 
removal of the indictments before continuing the talks, whereas the GoU argued that it would 
approach the Court to have them removed once the LRA had signed a final peace agreement. 
This proved to be problematic, with the ICC’s refusal to give in and remove the arrest 
warrants as long as Kony and his henchmen would receive amnesty and thereby enjoy 
impunity for their crimes. Most likely to convince the Court of removing the arrest warrants, 
the parties signed a deal on agenda item number three in June 2007 to strike a balance 
between different perspectives concerning the demands of justice. 
 
Whereas conventional forms of justice would be guaranteed through the establishment of the 
SDHC to deal with Kony and his commanders, more unconventional forms of justice, like the 
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Mato Oput, would be used to reconcile the victims with their perpetrators and reintegrate the 
large majority of rebels. The negotiations over all five agenda items were concluded in April 
2008, and this agreement, based on the Juba talks, could have been the decisive step towards 
success by ending this long war in Northern Uganda, but which unfortunately stranded partly 
due to the ICC arrest warrants against the LRA leadership. More importantly in this regard is 
the explicit reference that was made to the role of neo-traditional justice mechanisms in the 
wider context of peace building and justice, which is a confirmative signal to the important 
role that such mechanisms should play in the transition from war to peace. Acknowledging 
the importance of these other items, the main focus here will be on how the June 2007 Juba 
agreement made between the GoU and the LRA was intended to strike a balance between 
amnesties, neo-traditional and more conventional forms of justice to create sustainable peace 
in Northern Uganda.  
 
The last subsection has briefly described the development since the negotiations ended in 
April 2008, which unfortunately collapsed toward the end of 2008, with Operation Lightning 
Bolt resulting in the LRA retaliating against the civilian population in the DRC and Southern 
Sudan. This is done to stress the need to find a permanent solution to this conflict, based on 
these three transitional justice mechanisms, which will be analysed in the next chapter.  
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4 A critical assessment of the ICC, the Amnesty Act and the Acholis’ neo-
traditional justice contribution towards creating sustainable peace in 
Northern Uganda  
 
4.1 Introduction 
After more than two decades of civil war, negotiations over a peace agreement with a five 
point agenda stretching from the cessation of hostilities; comprehensive solutions to the 
conflict; reconciliation and accountability; a formal ceasefire, and; DDR between the GoU 
and the LRA was concluded in April, 2008 at Juba in Southern Sudan (Batanda, 2009; ICG; 
2008; Mwaniki et al, 2009; Ogora, 2009). This agreement was the first real and promising 
sign of peace since 1994 and could have been the major decisive step towards a success in 
bringing about a peaceful end to this long war in Northern Uganda, but was severely affected 
by the ICC arrest warrants against the LRA leadership. But more importantly in this regard 
for this thesis is point three on the agenda, which deals with the issues of reconciliation and 
accountability, in terms of the relationship between the ICC indictments, amnesty and the 
Acholis’ neo-traditional justice system aimed at reconciliation and conflict resolution 
(Batanda, 2009; ICG; 2008; Latigo, 2008; Mwaniki et al, 2009; Ogora, 2009; Oomen and 
Marchand, 2007:166).  
 
This explicit reference being made to the role of neo-traditional justice instruments in the 
wider context of peace building and justice, is clearly a confirmation about the important role 
that such mechanisms can contribute with in times of transition from war to peace, and which 
began nearly ten years earlier with the Gacaca courts dealing with the genocide in Rwanda 
(Huyse, 2008; Latigo, 2008; Ogora, 2009). With a basis in the Juba peace agreement, the only 
mechanisms that will be taken into consideration here are those that are directly associated 
with the local ‘peace vs. justice’ debate in Northern Uganda, namely; international legal 
proceedings through the ICC, amnesty laws, or the Acholis’ neo-traditional justice system. 
This is not concerning which one of them is best suited to bring an end to the violence in the 
wake of more than twenty years of conflict by striking the appropriate balance between peace 
and justice, but rather how they can be combined to achieve this. 
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This chapter will elaborate on the fifth step in the theoretical framework of this thesis, namely 
how to optimise these different transitional justice mechanisms in order to create and support 
the conditions conducive for a sustainable peace in Northern Uganda. In the following, each 
of these mechanisms’ main characteristics, in terms of their historical background, 
development and current impact will be assessed in order to gain insight into their strengths 
and weaknesses, and thereby be able to analyse how they best can be optimised to work 
together on a parallel track in a combined transitional justice approach to create sustainable 
peace in Northern Uganda.  
 
4.2 The International Criminal Court  
As the process leading up to the establishment of the ICC in 2002 has already been 
thoroughly dealt with in the second chapter describing the historical development of 
transitional justice, this section will only give a brief summary of it. The main emphasis will 
therefore instead be concerned with giving an introduction where the functions and structures, 
as well as the mandate and jurisdiction of the ICC is explained, by describing how a case is 
being processed by the Court. This is done to provide a thorough background understanding 
of the challenges that the Court is faced with in the current ‘peace vs. justice’ debate in 
Northern Uganda and elsewhere in order to be able to analyse this issue to look for ways to 
overcome it and be able to use the Court in a combined approach. 
 
4.2.1 The establishment of the ICC 
In international criminal law, the notion of how some crimes are international, in the sense 
that they are of concern to humanity as a whole has existed for almost a century. The idea of a 
permanent international institution in the shape of a court capable of enforcing these laws is 
also an old one, as it has developed steadfast alongside it throughout major historical events 
ranging from World War One, the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals after World War Two, and 
the Rwanda and Yugoslav tribunals in the early 1990s. It would however take almost a 
century between this idea taking shape before it eventually culminated with the adoption of 
the Rome Statute in 1998, and the coming into existence of such an international criminal 
court (du Plessis, 2005:174-177; van Zyl, 2005). The main reason for why this process was 
delayed for so long is mostly due to the hostile reception that this idea received on both sides 
in the Cold War (du Plessis, 2005:174-175; van Zyl, 2005). 
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It was therefore not until the end of the Cold War that any serious progress in the direction of 
establishing an international criminal court could take place. This idea was however 
catapulted forward with the UN Security Council’s (SC) decision to establish the first war 
crime tribunals since Nuremberg and Tokyo after the Second World War, with ICTR and 
ICTY respectively, which gave it widespread attention and as a consequence much stronger 
support than anticipated (du Plessis, 2005:176). These events served as a basis for the Rome 
Diplomatic Conference, between June and July 1998 (du Plessis, 2005:176-177). After 120 
out of 148 participating states attending the negotiations had voted in favour of it, the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court was adopted on July 17th, 1998. This first ever 
global criminal court with jurisdiction to prosecute individuals responsible for committing 
certain international crimes became operational on July 1, 2002 60 days after the 60th state 
had ratified the Statute (du Plessis, 2005:177).  
 
In sum, the ICC can be described as the most recent manifestation of an increasingly 
acknowledged perception of how certain human rights override the principle of state 
sovereignty, as it was established as a permanent international tribunal especially designed to 
prosecute individual perpetrators accused of committing genocide, crimes against humanity 
and war crimes (du Plessis, 2005:178). According to some legal scholars, the ICC could 
therefore ‘easily be considered to be the crown jewel among the transitional justice 
institutions, a shining example of how the ‘age of implementation’ of international human 
rights had finally come about’ (Ignatieff quoted in Oomen and Marchand, 2007:167). The 
establishment of the ICC is perceived as a success story of international cooperation, as 108 
states have ratified the Rome Statute by now, thereby acknowledging and effectively giving it 
the authority under certain circumstances, to intervene in internal matters of state affairs when 
it is assumed that the alleged perpetrators of these crimes are going unpunished (Mail and 
Guardian, 2009c; Nielsen, 2008). 
 
4.2.2 Functioning and structure of the ICC based on the main provisions of the 
Rome Statute 
 
The Rome Statute (1998) consists of 13 parts with 128 articles in total. Based on the Statute, 
the ICC is created as a permanent international organisation independent of the UN, although 
the SC can report a situation and intervene in the legal process. Following article 34, the 
Court is organised in four main Organs: (1) the Presidency; (2) the judiciary branch known as 
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the Chambers, consisting of a Pre-Trial Division, Trial Division and an Appeals Division; (3) 
the Office of the Prosecutor, and; (4) the Registry (du Plessis, 2005:178-179; Rome Statute, 
1998:19). According to article 112 the highest decision making organ of the Court is the 
Assembly of States Parties, where the states that are Parties to the Statute has one 
representative each (Rome Statute, 1998:59). In order to become a State Party a state must 
ratify the Statute, whereby it unconditionally accepts the jurisdiction of the Court, as article 
120 makes it clear that once it is ratified ‘No reservations may be made to this Statute’ (Rome 
Statute, 1998:61). There are 18 judges serving in the Court elected by the Assembly of the 
States Parties for nine years in office without any possibility of re-election (art. 36). All 
judges, including the Presidency, were elected in 2003, in the same year as the Chief 
Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo was sworn in (du Plessis, 2005:178; Rome Statute, 
1998:19-21). 
 
The Preamble read in accordance with article 1 of the Rome Statute makes it clear that the 
States Parties to the Court all have an obligation to ‘put an end to impunity for the most 
serious of international crimes and thus to contribute to the prevention of such crimes’. The 
ICC will thereby be capable of prosecuting individuals for ‘the most serious crimes of 
international concern’ after July 1, 2002 when the Treaty became effective (Rome Statute, 
1998:3).  
 
4.2.3 Mandate and jurisdiction of the ICC 
The mandate and jurisdiction of the ICC is best illustrated by the process of bringing a case to 
the Court and the following handling and proceeding of it, which can be described in these 
nine following steps. 
 
4.2.3.1 Necessary acceptance of jurisdiction  
 
Article 5 to 8 makes it clear that the ICC based on its jurisdiction, is concerned with the most 
serious crimes of concern to humanity as a whole, namely genocide, crimes against humanity 
and war crimes (du Plessis, 2007:179-192; Rome Statue, 1998:4-9). These crimes included in 
the ICC’s jurisdiction are, however, far from all crimes regulated by international law, but 
only those perceived as the most serious ones of concern to everyone. This is a deliberate 
consideration of striking a balance between the principle of state sovereignty and the goal to 
end impunity for crimes that are regulated by international law. Unlike the ICTR and ICTY, 
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which both take precedence over national jurisdiction, the international crimes covered by the 
Statute will therefore primarily be prosecuted in the national courts of States Parties, with the 
ICC complementing them (du Plessis, 2005:192-193). 
 
Whereas the Court’s jurisdiction over these crimes are regulated in Part 2, articles 5 to 11, of 
the Rome Statute (1998:4-10), the preconditions for when it can exercise its jurisdiction over 
them are further defined in articles 12, 13, 14 and 20, where article 12 is the most important 
one in this regard. The preconditions for the ICC to exercise its jurisdiction is either if the 
territorial state where the crimes were committed (art. 12(2)(a)), or if the state of nationality 
of the accused (art. 12(2)(b)), has accepted the Court’s jurisdiction by being a State Party or 
ad hoc on a case to case basis (art. 12(3)) (Rome Statute, 1998:10). This means that if these 
preconditions are met, where either a state that is a Party to the Court by ratifying the Rome 
Statute thereby has given its consent for all cases, or a state that is not a Party can give its 
consent ad hoc for a specific case, the Court can exercise its jurisdiction over the crimes 
specified in article 5, where ‘a situation (...) is referred to the Prosecutor by a State Party’ (art. 
13 (a)) (Rome Statute, 1998:10). A third possibility which does not require consent is if the 
SC acting according to its responsibilities under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter refers a case to 
the Court (art. 13(b)) (du Plessis, 2005:192-193; Rome Statute, 1998:19). 
   
4.2.3.2 Admissibility or inadmissibility after a referral of a ‘situation’ to the ICC 
 
For the very same reason of striking this balance between ICC’s jurisdiction and state 
sovereignty, in addition to the preconditions there are also further limitations to safeguard 
against the potential abuse of the ICC’s jurisdiction, where articles 17, 18 and 19 describes the 
‘admissibility’ of cases to the Court. The most important one in this regard is the principle of 
complementarity in article 17 read in accordance with the Preamble and article 1. Following 
this principle, domestic courts take precedence over the ICC, except for certain cases 
admissible to the Court where it can exercise its jurisdiction (du Plessis, 2005:193-196; Rome 
Statute, 1998:12-14;).    
 
Although the Court’s jurisdiction only becomes effective after a referral by a State Party or 
the SC, at a subsequent stage, the complementarity principle also requires that a case must be 
perceived as inadmissible in the following situations: (1) the case has already been properly 
investigated by the state in question with jurisdiction over it, unless it is either unwilling or 
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unable to carry out the investigation or prosecution (art. 17 (1)(a)), or; (2) if the case where 
the crimes defined in article 6, 7 and 8 has already been tried by a domestic court, the ICC is 
under article 20(3) not permitted to conduct a trial unless it was inadequate or conducted in 
such a way as to protect the accused, or last, but not least; (3) in accordance with the 
Preamble and article 1 which makes it clear that the Court can only deal with genocide, 
crimes against humanity and war crimes as ‘the worst crimes of concern to the international 
community’, the case is inadmissible if it is not of sufficient gravity to justify further action 
by the ICC (du Plessis, 2005:193-196; Rome Statute, 1998:12-14). 
 
It is, however, up to the judges of the Court to determine if these conditions apply with a state 
deemed as unwilling or unable genuinely to investigate or prosecute either if the case is 
undertaken with the purpose of shielding the accused person, if there are unjustified delays or 
if the proceedings were not conducted independently and impartially (art. 17(2)(a), (b) and 
(c)) (Rome Statute, 1998:12).  
 
As such, all of these provisions concerning jurisdiction and admissibility expressed through 
the complementarity principle clarifies that the ICC is complementary to national courts, and 
will only be able to exercise its jurisdiction if or when such a court proves to be unwilling or 
unable to judge over a case where ‘the most serious crimes of concern to the international 
community’ are taking place (du Plessis, 2005:193-196; Rome Statute, 1998:3). 
 
4.2.3.3 Initiating investigations and prosecutions 
 
After a State Party or the SC has referred a case to the Court, it is up to the prosecutor based 
on the information received to decide on whether or not to continue with an investigation into 
the case. It is based on an analysis of whether a crime actually has taken place, whether it is 
admissible and if such an investigation will serve the interest of justice. If the prosecutor 
decides to proceed, the prosecutor will start collecting evidence and testimonies. This decision 
must be approved by the Pre-Trial Chamber who determines whether it has ‘reasonable basis 
to proceed’ and to which extent the case falls under the crimes covered by the Courts 
jurisdiction (article 15). If the case is referred by the SC, the Court is able to exercise its 
jurisdiction without any preconditions, and the next step in the process will be step 4.2.3.5 (du 
Plessis, 2005:192-193; Rome Statute, 1998:11).  
 
103 
 
4.2.3.4 Possible deferral after decision of the UN Security Council  
 
At this stage, the SC is, according to article 16 of the Statute, given the authority to put an 
investigation on halt for 12 months which can be renewed when it expires. If the SC makes a 
resolution under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, whereby the ICC is requested not to begin 
proceedings, this means that in situations with national amnesties, the Court must respect this, 
even if it goes against its mandate of preventing impunity. Three requirements must however 
be met before the SC can adopt such an resolution, as this decision requires that the conditions 
of actions against a threat to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression described 
in Chapter 7 of the UN Charter have been determined and the resolution and request must be 
consistent with the UN’s purposes and principles (du Plessis, 2005:193; Rome Statute, 
1998:11).  
 
Most importantly in this regard is that if no such resolution exists, the Chief Prosecutor can 
close down investigations or prosecutions by requesting the Pre-Trial Chamber to respect 
such amnesties for peace if he, after the legal considerations, concludes that there are 
‘substantial reasons to believe an investigation would not serve the interest of justice’ (Article 
53 (1) (c)). This decision of whether or not the ICC will exercise its jurisdiction under such 
circumstances will be made by the Court itself (du Plessis, 2005:195; Nielsen, 2008; Oomen 
and Marchand, 2007:172; Rome Statute, 1998:27-28).  
 
4.2.3.5 Issuance of orders and warrants 
 
Following article 57 and 58, the prosecutor must at this stage request the Pre-Trial Chamber 
to issue summons to appear, arrest warrants, and necessary measures to preserve evidence 
(Rome Statute, 1998:30-32).  
 
4.2.3.6 Confirmation of charges  
 
Before the trial can take place, the Pre-Trial Chamber must arrange a hearing where both the 
defence and the prosecutor participate. The prosecutor must here provide a sufficient level of 
evidence to support the claims behind each charge, so there are ‘substantial grounds’ to 
believe that the accused is responsible for the crimes he or she is accused of committing. 
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According to article 61, based on this Pre-Trial Chamber will either dismiss or confirm each 
of the charges put forward (Rome Statute, 1998:33-34).  
 
4.2.3.7 Trial  
 
The trial takes place in the Trial Chamber, where the prosecutor must prove that the guilt of 
the accused is beyond reasonable doubt. The trial cannot take place without the presence of 
the accused, who also has the right to a defence lawyer. The decision of guilt is made by a 
majority of three judges and the highest possible penalty is life imprisonment of a maximum 
of 30 years. Fines and confiscation of profits can be added on top of this (du Plessis, 2005: 
205-207; Rome Statute, 1998:43). 
 
4.2.3.8 Appeal  
 
After the verdict is reached with the decision of guilt and sentence has been made, the case 
can be appealed either by the prosecutor or the defence, and the case will then be taken to the 
appeals chamber. Appeals can be based on new evidence, procedural error, error of facts, 
error of law or fairness and reliability of the proceedings or decision (Rome Statute, 1998:44-
46).  
 
4.2.3.9 Serving of sentence  
 
The convicted will serve the sentence in a state appointed by the ICC from a list of states 
willing to accept him or her. After 2/3 of the sentence has been served, the Court is obliged to 
re-examine the sentence to consider whether there are reasons to reduce it (du Plessis, 
2005:205-207; Rome Statute, 1998:42-43). 
 
4.2.4 The ICC’s contribution towards creating sustainable peace in Northern 
Uganda   
 
In line with the arguments made by the ‘justice’ approach described in chapter two, in 
situations with countries torn apart by civil war and where there is a clear need to arrest and 
prosecute the perpetrators responsible, an international criminal trial by the ICC might ease 
the heavy burden for a domestic judicial system in the following situations: it does not have 
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the capacity to prosecute itself, or; a national trial would not be impartial due to a perception 
of being biased, or; the courts are crippled by corruption, or; the controversial impact of a 
judgment in the case might threaten the stability of a country. Based on this it was hoped that 
States Parties would perceive the Court as a useful instrument to assist them in such times of 
national crisis, but it was seemingly able to exceed beyond even the most positive 
expectations (du Plessis, 2005:176-179; Nielsen, 2008:34-35; Oomen and Marchand, 
2007:166-170). 
 
A short time after the ICC started operating effectively, Museveni, after several unsuccessful 
attempts to negotiate peace in the 1990s, and an effort to get the rebel leaders to surrender by 
offering them amnesty, decided to refer the ongoing conflict in Northern Uganda to the ICC’s 
Chief Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo in December, 2003. By asking the ICC to start 
investigating the alleged atrocities committed by the LRA and thereby invoking its 
jurisdiction, Museveni made Uganda the first State Party ever to voluntarily refer a case to the 
Court since the entry into force of the Rome Statute in July, 2002 (Allen, 2006; Oomen and 
Marchand, 2007:167; RLP, 2004). On January 29, 2004, a historic press conference took 
place in London, where Moreno-Ocampo and Museveni made this referral public (Allen, 
2006; Oomen and Marchand, 2007; RLP, 2004). On July 7, 2004, after longer legal 
considerations Moreno-Ocampo officially indicated his decision to start investigating the 
supposedly grave international crimes taking place in Northern Uganda. In deciding to open 
investigations he argued that Uganda’s civil war had not only caused immense suffering, but 
also led to war crimes and crimes against humanity that clearly fell within the Court’s 
jurisdiction (Oomen and Marchand, 2007:167-168; RLP, 2004).   
 
Little more than a year later the Court’s Pre-Trial Chamber had issued arrest warrants for the 
LRA rebel leader Joseph Kony and four of his commanders, as they, by being in charge of the 
LRA, were perceived as being most responsible for having engaged in a cycle of violence and 
established a pattern of brutalization of civilians by acts including abduction murder, 
mutilation and sexual enslavement (Allen, 2006; Latigo, 2008:98; Nielsen, 2008:35; Oomen 
and Marchand, 2007:168-169).   
 
Other cases followed suit, first when the government of the DRC in March 2004 as another 
African State Party formally referred the situation in the eastern parts of the country to the 
ICC. Based on this, Moreno-Ocampo decided to investigate the serious international crimes 
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taking place in the DRC since July 1, 2002. In January 2005, a third state in the region, the 
CAR referred the situation taking place in the country to the ICC. On March 31, 2005, the SC 
referred the situation unfolding in the Darfur region of Western Sudan to the ICC (du Plessis, 
2005:178; New African, 2009; Nielsen, 2008:35).  
 
Based on the premise of active state cooperation, the ICC had seemingly been given an ideal 
start, as these affected States Parties referred these situations by themselves almost 
immediately after the Rome Statute became effective in July, 2002, and as such clearly 
indicated their preference for letting the ICC investigate and prosecute the atrocities being 
committed. The Court’s existence was thereby apparently justified, and it was able to reach its 
objective of making a global impact with regards to the fight against impunity for the most 
serious crimes of concern to everyone (Oomen and Marchand, 2007:166-170).  
 
A widely held perception in the justice camp is therefore that one of the main challenges for 
the LRA is now constituted by the continued and ever increasing threat from the ICC. This 
has led some observers to argue that this form of international pressure also has had a large 
influence on the LRA’s decision to pursue a more peaceful outcome of the conflict through 
negotiations, as the warrants provided the LRA with an incentive to entering negotiations at 
Juba in order to have the indictments against their top leaders lifted or to influence Museveni 
to grant them amnesty and protection against the ICC prosecutions. Although this external 
pressure forced the LRA to participate in the Juba peace talks, this pressure was not only 
constituted by the ICC, but also came from other sources, like the unsuccessful 2004 peace 
talks and the three layered ultimatum from the GoSS, as described in the previous chapter. 
Whether or not the ICC indictments finally forced the LRA to take a seat at the negotiation 
table at Juba, this issue soon became one of the most disputed and remained one of the central 
stakes that contributed to undermine the Juba peace talks (Latigo, 2008; Nielsen, 2008; 
Ogora, 2009; Oomen and Marchand, 2007).  
 
Generally, more than seven years after its establishment, the potential impact that the ICC 
could have had on conflicts is, however, at best contested and at worst largely unsuccessful. 
More specifically, nearly six years after its initial involvement in the process and exactly four 
years after the announcement of its five indictments against the top five LRA commanders, 
the ICC has at this stage proved to be a futile attempt by failing to bring about an end to the 
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conflict, just like the military operations and former negotiation attempts described in the 
previous chapter.  
 
As will be illustrated in the following, unlike their opponents in the ‘justice’ camp’s 
perception being discussed above, observers and commentators of this debate in the ‘peace’ 
camp remain unconvinced about what positive effect the ICC warrants could have, as the 
Court instead contributed to make the LRA rebels much more prone to violence and reluctant 
to lay down their arms, as they fear being arrested and sent off to The Hague to stand trial 
(Dunn, 2007; Mwaniki et al, 2009; New African, 2009:20; RLP, 2004).  
 
In the following months after the January announcement, the killings by the LRA continued, 
including a massacre in February 2004 at Barlonya IDP camp, where two hundred unarmed 
civilians were hacked to death (Oomen and Marchand, 2007:168). Although it is impossible 
to draw the conclusion that a specific announcement made by the ICC resulted in the LRA 
retaliating with certain massacres, as the one in Barlonya IDP camp in February 2004, ‘the 
announcement of the ICC investigation has the potential to raise the stakes in the conflict and 
make the LRA become even more elusive and aggressive (...) it may increase the incentive, 
especially of the LRA leadership to fight and avoid capture at all costs’ (RLP, 2004:6). 
Although the civil society and aid agencies working on the ground in Northern Uganda 
expressed their grave concerns about what the consequences of this would be, the ICC made a 
public announcement on July 28th 2004 that it ‘would commence on a formal investigation 
into alleged crimes against humanity committed by the LRA’ (RLP, 2004:1).  
 
After the ICC issuance of the five arrest warrants against the LRA leadership was known by 
the public in October 2005, this renewed the fear of that the rebels would unleash a new 
campaign of violence in retaliation against these indictments (Ruaudel and Timpson, 2005). 
Soon after, the LRA responded by further intensifying its attacks in Northern Uganda and 
Southern Sudan, with the result that many aid agencies had to put their activities on halt, as a 
number of their workers had been ambushed and killed by the rebels (Allen, 2006:189-190). 
This is supported by Dunn (2007:136), who points to how ‘after that the military campaign 
further intensified, with attacks by the LRA increasing in number and severity’. According to 
Allen (2006:187-190) another aspect is how the ICC indictments enabled the LRA to 
consolidate and strengthen its position, by preventing its fighters from defecting to pursue the 
amnesty option analysed in the next subsection out of fear of being prosecuted instead. As 
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such, the ICC had seemingly provided the LRA with an incentive to continue their insurgency 
by ruling out a number of other options, as reflected on in the second chapter concerning New 
African’s (2009) analysis of the Taylor and al-Bashir cases respectively.  
 
In March 2005 a group of Acholi traditional leaders visited Moreno-Ocampo in The Hague. 
At this meeting, they argued that if the ICC continued with its proceedings it would interfere 
with the fragile peace process, and they asked him to respect the local amnesty procedures 
and neo-traditional justice mechanisms already put in place (Allen, 2006). The prosecutor did, 
however, continue with the investigation and convinced the Pre-Trial Chamber to issue the 
arrest warrants (Oomen and Marchand, 2007:167). Shortly thereafter, the first signs of what 
would prove to be stiff resistance came out of Uganda, as the traditional leaders were joined 
in their demands by other local religious leaders as well as the most powerful actors in the 
Ugandan society, including the government responsible for referring the situation to the ICC 
in the first place (Nielsen, 2008; Apuuli, quoted in Oomen and Marchand, 2007:168-169).  
 
The main reason for this opposition was that the peace talks that had broken down on several 
previous occasions was now revitalised, with a new round of serious negotiations taking place 
at Juba. These were believed to be the most promising until then, as they then seemed to be 
creating results (Nielsen, 2008:37; Oomen and Marchand, 2007:169). The LRA rebel leaders 
did, however, make it very clear from the beginning of the negotiations that a peace 
agreement would not be signed unless it had provisions giving them immunity against 
prosecutions by the ICC (Nielsen, 2008:37). This fear of being arrested and sent to The Hague 
was clearly evident at the negotiations taking place at Juba as none of the LRA commanders 
were physically present, but instead negotiated through a mediator over a satellite phone 
(Grono and O’ Brien, 2008; Nielsen, 2008:37).  This can be seen in line with the New 
African’s (2009:20) argument about ‘why rebel leaders would come to roundtable talks if they 
think that such talks might just be a trap to arrest them and send them to The Hague’. 
 
This change of mind, especially by the GoU in the middle of 2006, was that they saw a 
possible end to the conflict by taking a more accommodating approach favouring alternative 
accountability mechanisms rather than the retributive justice associated with the ICC 
prosecutions. Most of the Acholis supported this approach as they were in favour of the Mato 
Oput and other neo-traditional rituals emphasising reconciliation, forgiveness and integration 
as an alternative to the ICC (Cobban, quoted in Nielsen, 2008:37). The result of this was an 
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ever increasing pressure on Moreno-Ocampo from NGOs, scholars and aid workers to drop 
the indictments in order for the peace process to continue smoothly. He instead argued that 
the indictments issued by the Court would ‘remain in effect and have to be executed’ 
(Nielsen, 2008:37).  
 
This led the spokesperson for Uganda’s Amnesty Commission to argue that: ‘This is going to 
make it difficult for the LRA to stop doing what they are doing’ (Apuuli, quoted in Oomen 
and Marchand, 2007:168). Bigombe, the chief negotiator behind the previous rounds of peace 
talks, has expressed similar worries, as ‘the ICC arrest warrants meant that there is now no 
hope of getting the LRA commanders to surrender’ (Apuuli, quoted in Oomen and Marchand, 
2007:168). An international scholar involved in Northern Uganda for a long time summarised 
these worries about the ICC among the Acholis in the following way: ‘it is biased; it will 
exacerbate the violence; it will endanger vulnerable groups, notably witnesses and children; it 
is spoiling the peace process by undermining the amnesty and the ceasefire; and it ignores and 
disempowers local justice procedures’ (Oomen and Marchand, 2007:168). 
 
Many activists and lawyers from Uganda and elsewhere have agreed with these critical 
considerations by focusing on the principle of complementarity in article 17 read in 
accordance with article 1 and the Preamble as one of the cornerstones of the Rome Statute 
(1998:12) regulating the ICC’s jurisdiction. According to this principle, a case is only 
admissible to the Court if the State Party itself ‘is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out 
the investigation or prosecution’ (art. 17 (1) (a)) (Rome Statute, 1998:12). In addition to this 
aspect, the Chief Prosecutor can, after having taken into consideration the gravity of the crime 
and interests of the victims, decide that an investigation would not serve the interests of 
justice. Based on this they argue among other things that the local amnesty and neo-traditional 
justice procedures should be considered domestic remedies excluding involvement by the ICC 
(Apuuli, quoted in Oomen and Marchand, 2007:169).  
 
Some of these activists and lawyers in favour of conditional amnesty through local rituals for 
the LRA leaders have also referred to article 53 (1)(c) and (2b) of the Rome Statute (1998:27-
28) regulating the ICC’s jurisdiction (du Plessis, 2005:194-195). According to them, this 
article creates an opportunity to accept local practices as an alternative, as it provides the 
Chief Prosecutor with the authority to withhold or even withdraw investigations and 
prosecutions if it is believed to be in the ‘interests of justice’ after having taken into 
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consideration the gravity of the crimes in question and the interests of the victims. The 
problem with the notion ‘interests of justice’ is that this is an extremely technical and diffuse 
concept, and both Huyse (2008:192) and Nielsen (2008:41-42) illustrate the emptiness in this 
argument as this is based on a matter of interpretation. 
 
Despite this widespread criticism being raised by the opponents of the Court, Moreno-
Ocampo has, on the contrary, on several occasions repeated the necessity of his decision to 
have the LRA rebel leaders brought to book for the crimes they have committed against 
humanity. For instance, on July 6th, 2006 Moreno-Ocampo repeated the argument about the 
crimes committed by the LRA, but also indicated that ‘while the current situation is delicate, 
we believe that peace and justice can work together’ (Oomen and Marchand, 2007:169). 
Similarly, in an internal policy paper concerning the ‘interest of justice’ the Office of the 
Prosecutor recognised the importance of peace processes, although it made it clear that ‘the 
broader matter of peace and security is not the responsibility of the Prosecutor’ (Nielsen, 
2008:42). Based on this, on July 13, 2007 Moreno-Ocampo repeated that: ‘I cannot be a 
political actor in the talks, I am only a judicial actor at the ICC, I have to do my judicial work’ 
(Oomen and Marchand, 2007:169). When being asked about the protests against the arrest 
warrants issued for Sudan’s Al-Bashir and what the implications for the country’s already 
fragile peace process would be, the ICC President Sang-Hyun Song’s reply (Mail and 
Guardian, 2009c) was more or less a repetition of the statements made above:  
 
Darfur was referred to the Court by resolution 1593 of the UN Security Council whose 
preamble stated ‘that the situation in Sudan continues to constitute a threat to international 
peace and security’. The Security Council re-affirmed not only that justice and peace are 
compatible, but also that justice is an important factor in restoring peace and security. One 
must make a distinction between a political process and a judicial one. The ICC does not have a 
humanitarian mandate and has no jurisdiction with respect to peace negotiations. Its role in 
helping to bring peace to Darfur lies in holding fair judicial proceedings. 
 
While it is important not to glorify neo-traditional mechanisms, one must also be aware of 
that the Western retributive model is not a perfect solution on its own. The comments made 
by Moreno-Ocampo and Song can also be perceived in another way, like the researchers 
Hovil and Quinn from the RLP do in their article ‘Peace First, Justice Later: Traditional 
Justice In Northern Uganda’ (2005:37):  
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The implementers of retributive institutions see their task as mainly technical in nature, and 
often fail to consider contextual factors. This has been called “global legalism from above” and 
is seen as one of the biggest difficulties of outside experts participating in the building of 
appropriate institutions in post-conflict societies. These programmes are often “one-size-fits-
all” and therefore less effective than tailor-made solutions, since they target institutions and 
structures rather than getting to the heart of the problem. In other words, while many of the 
ideals are good in theory, when applied to a complex conflict such as the one in northern 
Uganda, they look inadequate if applied in isolation. It is a mistake to assume that simply 
prosecuting and, hopefully, convicting Kony and a few of his senior commanders will satisfy the 
needs of justice in this context.  
  
Item number three in the Juba peace agreement concerning accountability and reconciliation, 
that was signed in June 2007 between the GoU and the LRA, eventually confirmed this 
increasing gap between the GoU and the ICC. This agreement had provisions regulating the 
relationship between retributive and restorative justice, acknowledging the ‘need for adopting 
appropriate justice mechanisms, including customary processes of accountability that would 
resolve the conflict while promoting reconciliation’ (Latigo, 2008:99-103; Oomen and 
Marchand, 2007:169-170). While recognising neo-traditional justice procedures, both parties 
at the same time also agreed to apply formal criminal justice mechanisms to deal with the 
perpetrators of human rights violations during the conflict. Museveni made it quite clear that 
the intention behind the agreement was to protect the LRA’s top leadership from prosecutions 
by the ICC: ‘If they go through the peace process, then we can use alternative justice, 
traditional justice, which is a bit of a soft landing for them. But if they persist and stay in exile 
then they will end up in The Hague for their crimes’ (Oomen and Marchand, 2007:170). Even 
if the more specific details in the agreement were left open, it was clear that national trials 
would be combined with the amnesty law and neo-traditional justice mechanisms already put 
in place. This also led the GoU to argue that the ICC would have to withdraw from the case, 
since domestic remedies had not yet been exhausted (Latigo, 2008:99-103; Oomen and 
Marchand, 2007:169-170).  
 
The ICC frowned upon this agreement and in October, 2008, the Pre-Trial Chamber initiated 
a review of the admissibility of the case based on the establishment of the SDHC in Uganda’s 
High Court to try serious crimes in the conflict in Northern Uganda. In March 2009, after 
considering submissions from the GoU, the Chamber found that the case remains admissible 
112 
 
(Mail and Guardian, 2009c). Either way, arguably partly due to the ICC indictments, the Juba 
process collapsed in 2008, leaving the prospects for peace currently in a limbo (Batanda, 
2009; Mwaniki et al, 2009; Nielsen, 2008:37; Ogora, 2009).   
 
4.2.5 The strength and weaknesses of the ICC 
The discussion above illustrates how the perspectives in the ‘peace vs. justice’ debate in 
Northern Uganda continue to operate within a narrow framework of common misperceptions, 
where justice is perceived as ICC prosecutions only and negotiations with amnesties and the 
Acholis neo-traditional justice through Mato Oput reconciliation procedures as the incarnation 
of peace. The two concepts are thereby treated as totally incompatible to such an extent that 
the use of one of them goes totally against the other (Nielsen, 2008; Simpson, 2008). 
 
One of the main challenges for the ICC relates to the aspect of perceived impartiality and 
overall legitimacy in the way in which it has made its public announcements, and how the 
public opinion in Northern Uganda was subsequently outraged by this injustice, as the Court 
only decided to try one of the sides in the conflict, namely the LRA rebels, despite of the fact 
that the UPDF has also committed serious crimes covered by the Court’s jurisdiction. The 
main reason for this is that in the three years prior to the indictments and throughout the same 
period as the Court’s jurisdiction became effective, most of the grave crimes were allegedly 
committed by the LRA. But as a consequence of the Court’s ill-perceived activities in 
Northern Uganda, this has also affected the incentives for States Parties for further 
cooperation with it, not only with regards to Uganda, but in other cases as well, evidenced by 
the AU’s recent decision to end its cooperation because of the indictments made against 
Sudan’s President al-Bashir (New African, 2009; Nielsen, 2008; Ruaudel and Timpson, 
2005).  
 
This decision to only charge the LRA for being responsible for committing the worst part of 
the crimes since its entry into force also relates to another problematic challenge for the 
Court, namely its temporal jurisdiction. The temporal jurisdiction limiting the ICC’s 
jurisdiction means that it is prevented from investigating or prosecuting any crimes covered 
by the Rome Statute that were committed before its entry into force on July 1st, 2002 (du 
Plessis, 2005:192). This formal hindrance on the Court’s jurisdiction means that the root 
causes are far beyond the reach of the ICC, as the Court is only given access to addressing 
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only a very small fraction of the total sum of atrocities that have been committed in the 
conflict in Northern Uganda.  
 
As such, one of the main reasons for why the implementation of international criminal justice 
during conflict, and in some instances parallel to ongoing peace processes, has proved to be so 
difficult for Moreno-Ocampo is due to the fact that the ICC can only prosecute crimes that 
have been committed after the Rome Statute came into force on July 1, 2002. Because of this, 
the ICC has been involved in the CAR, the DRC, Sudan, and especially with regards to 
Uganda, who all are affected by and involved in protracted internal conflicts that are still 
raging or have just recently been concluded and found itself unable to fully address their root 
causes as they date back to the colonial era, way beyond its jurisdiction from 2002 (Nielsen, 
2008:35). These aspects clearly show that the belief in the ‘justice’ camp about the ICC being 
the only transitional justice mechanism being able to bring about a lasting peace has clearly 
proved its futility and will continue to do so, unless this perception is changed in the direction 
of perceiving the Court from another angle, where it is seen as one of several mechanisms that 
must work together in order to achieve this outcome.  
 
As a new and quite controversial international institution that has been met with scepticism by 
some states and outright hostility by others, the ICC is therefore clearly in need of political 
legitimacy, which requires it to show strength through exercising its powers which 
necessitates prosecutions (Nielsen, 2008:42). But in its aspiration to be seen as an impartial 
and apolitical actor, the Court clearly disregards the fact that by exercising its jurisdiction 
over nationals of states with conflicting legal and moral values, it does little if anything to 
resolve this diversity in perceptions of justice (Nielsen, 2008:42). It thereby fails to take into 
consideration for whom justice actually is made for, the victims or an international legal 
regime put in place to punish the perpetrators in these affected post conflict societies, as the 
obsession with criminal prosecutions to uphold it by punishing alleged perpetrators has 
resulted in that the pursuit of making justice through prosecutions has become an end to 
achieve in itself instead of being a means to achieve an end (Nielsen, 2008:39-40).   
 
However, quite ironically, it is a certain possibility that realpolitik will be the central 
motivator for the prosecutor to pursue indictments in the face of a political reality to which he 
claims to be impartial (Nielsen, 2008:42). This is supported by malicious rumours that point 
to how the criticism against it influenced the ICC’s decision to first open proceedings in the 
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situation in the DRC, by trying the case against Thomas Lubango Dyilo. In addition to this, 
the ICC’s public relations office increased its activities in the affected communities in 
Northern Uganda to promote a better understanding of how the Court functions (Oomen and 
Marchand, 2007:169).  
 
But as prevention of conflict is the ultimate goal of the ICC, the Court is forever bound to 
operate in such societies torn apart by conflict. This means that the Chief Prosecutor will 
increasingly be faced with such situations where the pursuit of international criminal justice is 
fundamentally at odds with peace building efforts and intricate processes of national 
reconciliation, to such an extent that it increases the risk of failure with these societies trying 
to prevent it from doing its job (Nielsen, 2008).  
 
A major step away from avoiding such a destiny would be to distance itself from the current 
narrow understanding with the pursuit of justice only in the form of prosecutions as an end in 
itself, by taking into consideration that justice is actually made for the victims. By doing so, 
the Court would acknowledge that the retributive form of justice that it represents is only one 
among of several accountability mechanisms that must work in a well orchestrated effort in 
order to build a sustainable peace. This in turn means when it becomes engaged in post war 
peace building, the Court’s impact depends on cooperation in a well orchestrated effort with a 
number of other actors and institutions at the local, national and international levels 
collectively pursuing the purpose of furthering the overall process of building a sustainable 
peace in post-conflict societies, where justice is merely one of the important dimensions to 
take into consideration in this complex endeavour.  
 
As illustrated in the second chapter, by moving the focus away from a negative to a positive 
understanding of peace, and from justice solely based on being retributive to a balance 
between this and the restorative form of justice, where the interests of the victims are the point 
of focus, it is possible to come up with a more satisfying combined approach to deal with this 
issue of transitional justice turning the whole ‘peace vs. justice’ dilemma obsolete. In this 
approach, where the two concepts are perceived as mutually dependent on each other, the 
only way forward when dealing with the difficult issue of conflicts in transition it is thus not 
to decide on whether peace or justice is most important, but to the contrary to apply a process 
where the appropriate measures are negotiated over and compromises are being made.  
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In this combined approach, the prosecution of alleged perpetrators being most responsible for 
committing gross human rights violations is a central element in any transitional justice 
process being undertaken to properly deal with a legacy of abuse. Prosecutions thereby serve 
several important purposes as an important source to provide a sense of comfort to the 
victims, deterring future crimes and reflecting a new set of social norms (van Zyl, 2005:210). 
It is, however, important to realise that criminal justice systems are not designed for societies 
where violation of the law was the main rule and not the exception. As criminal justice 
processes are expected to meet a scrupulous commitment to fairness and due process, this 
requires a significant amount of time and resources. In situations where such violations have 
been widespread and/or systematic by involving tens to hundreds of thousands of crimes, 
ordinary criminal justice systems will simply be overwhelmed and cannot cope with all of 
them (van Zyl, 2005:210). Acknowledging the fact that criminal justice systems have such a 
structural inability to deal with mass atrocity is not about dismissing the important role of 
prosecution or punishment when dealing with past crimes. This means that even if the 
Nuremberg and Tokyo trials or the prosecution of Slobodan Milosevic for that matter only 
represented a very small percentage of the total amount of criminally responsible individual 
perpetrators, they cannot be dismissed once and for all (van Zyl, 2005:210). Even in Uganda, 
the establishment of the SDHC in the Juba peace agreement would only be able to deal with 
an extremely small fraction of those most responsible for the crimes committed (Ogora, 
2009). Thus, trials should not only be seen as the expression of a societal desire for retribution 
by the affected society itself or the international community for that matter, but also that they 
play a vital role in confirming that when essential norms and values are violated this will give 
rise to sanctions. Trials by domestic or international courts can thereby help re-establishing 
the trust between citizens and the state by demonstrating a commitment to those whose rights 
have been violated and that state institutions will protect instead of violating their rights, and 
might thereby help or restore the dignity of victims and reduce their sense of anger, 
marginalisation and grievance (van Zyl, 2005:210).  That said, according to van Zyl 
(2005:210):  
 
It is nevertheless important to recognise and accept the fact that prosecution can only ever be a 
partial response to dealing with systematic human rights abuse. The overwhelming majority of 
victims and perpetrators of mass crimes will never encounter justice in a court of law, and it is 
therefore necessary to supplement prosecutions with other complementary strategies. 
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The two following subsections will take a closer look at these complementary strategies in the 
form of amnesty and neo-traditional justice through procedures aimed at reconciliation and 
conflict resolution. 
 
4.3 Amnesty 
As outlined in chapter two, a transitional society can choose between two different forms of 
issuing amnesties, namely unconditional with blanket amnesties or through witnessing in 
front of a TC/TRC with strict conditions attached to it. Uganda is clearly a transitional society 
with regards to the situation in the northern parts of the country, and could thereby choose 
between these two forms of amnesties. It decided on the former, as an Amnesty Act passed 
through its Parliament in 2000 (Allen, 2006:74). In order to be able to understand why 
Uganda opted for the first alternative it is necessary to go briefly into the history behind the 
decision to apply it, as well as a short summary of the theoretical discussion concerning 
amnesties in the second and third chapter, before looking at its strong and weak sides, and 
how it as a transitional justice mechanism can be optimised for use in a combined approach.  
 
4.3.1 Introductory background to the Amnesty Act  
According to Kaufman (2005:63), in general, amnesty refers to a formal or informal 
agreement between the ruling authority and those who for some reason are rebelling against 
this authority, by exempting the latter from facing any kind of prosecution and punishment 
from the former. Although the practical implementation of it differs between different 
contexts, the granting of amnesties to war criminals is however not a new phenomenon. While 
amnesty in the past was based on religious foundations with a focus on mercy and 
forgiveness, more modern forms of amnesty are in comparison based on a political strategy 
rather than religious commitments (du Plessis, 2005:193-195; Oomen and Marchand, 
2007:170; van Zyl, 2005).  
 
As described in the previous chapter, after the failed 1994 peace talks and the 1996 incident, 
the Acholis in Northern Uganda began mobilising at the grassroots level in search of a 
peaceful resolution to the conflict through a comprehensive amnesty. What began as a local 
initiative pushing for amnesty following the renewed attacks in Northern Uganda after the 
failed 1994 peace talks, resulted in the establishment of the ARLPI in 1998 (Allen, 2006:78). 
Although this initiative by the ARLPI did not result in any direct negotiations, it was decisive 
in the process of lobbying for the Amnesty Act, which is described more thoroughly below in 
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the following section (Allen, 2006:78). Finally, after years of persistent activism by Acholi 
religious and traditional leaders in the ARLPI, as well as other NGOs, and despite Museveni’s 
declared preference for a military solution to the ‘LRA problem’, the Amnesty Act was 
passed by the Ugandan Parliament in December 1999, and was enacted by the government in 
2000 (Allen, 2006:74; Hovil and Lomo, 2005; Oomen and Marchand, 2007:170-171).  
Even if President Museveni after referring the situation in Northern Uganda to the ICC, 
initially promised Moreno-Ocampo that the Amnesty Act of 2000 would be amended to 
exclude the LRA’s top leadership, this never happened (Allen, 2006:82; Oomen and 
Marchand, 2007:172). The 2007 agreement between the warring factions could instead have 
lead to amnesties on a large scale, as it allowed for amendments to be made on the Amnesty 
Act in the other direction (Oomen and Marchand, 2007:172).  
 
But although this question concerning amnesties was brought back again during the latest 
rounds of peace negotiations from 2006 onwards, and formalised as one of the main 
provisions to deal with the issue of justice in the 2007 agreement, the LRA commanders had 
made it clear since 1994 that they would settle for amnesty if they could trust President 
Museveni in securing their personal safety. Amnesty procedures were therefore almost from 
the very beginning of the conflict one of the local remedies offered to the LRA, long before 
the ICC became involved in the process (Oomen and Marchand, 2007:170).  
 
4.3.1.1 The Amnesty Act  
In the Act amnesty is defined as ‘a pardon, forgiveness, exemption or discharge from criminal 
prosecution or any other form of punishment by the State’. The Amnesty Act provides an 
offer of amnesty for any Ugandan citizens, including the members of the LRA, who have 
engaged in armed rebellion and committed crimes against the State since January 26th 1986, 
which is the day that the current administration under President Museveni took office (Allen, 
2006:74; Hovil and Lomo, 2005:6-7; Oomen and Marchand, 2007:170).  
 
The Amnesty Act gives former combatants an amnesty package which consists of money, 
basic utilities and advice on housing and employment possibilities. In addition to this, the 
amnesty regulation seeks to offer the high-ranking LRA combatants the opportunity of living 
an ordinary life that is no worse than the one they lived in the bush. But except from 
promising not to return to the bush and start fighting again, the rebels do not have to give 
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truthful confessions of the crimes they have committed in return (Hovil and Lomo, 2005:7-8; 
Pham et al quoted in Oomen and Marchand, 2007:171-172).  
 
All persons seeking amnesty must report to designated individuals to hand in their weapons, 
but also renounce and abandon all involvement in the war or armed rebellion (Oomen and 
Marchand, 2007:170). In return for doing so, these persons are granted an Amnesty certificate 
protecting them from prosecution and punishment, as well as providing them with DDR 
assistance. In practical terms, with regards to the situation in Northern Uganda, by claiming 
amnesty from the Ugandan state this means that the Amnesty Act allows former LRA 
combatants not only to avoid national state prosecution, but also ICC prosecution (Allen, 
2006; Hovil and Lomo, 2005:7-8; Oomen and Marchand, 2007:171). 
 
The Amnesty Act illustrates how, after many years of unsuccessfully trying to use the military 
option as a stick to hit the LRA and defeat it, the GoU moved away from it by instead using 
amnesties as a carrot to offer the rebels a more peaceful return from the bush (Hovil and 
Lomo, 2005; Oomen and Marchand, 2007:172). The Acholis themselves initially expressed 
enthusiastic support for the prospects of peace that came along with the introduction of the 
Amnesty Act, as it promised amnesty to all rebels in Uganda who surrendered. This initial and 
cautious optimism was, however, soon torn apart by Museveni’s lack of enthusiasm, which is 
illustrated by the military offensive ‘Iron Fist’ in 2002, described in the previous chapter, and 
later with the involvement of the ICC being analysed in the following subsection (Allen, 
2006:74; Dunn, 2007:136; Hovil and Lomo, 2005; Oomen and Marchand, 2007).   
 
4.3.1.2 The ICC undermining the Amnesty Act  
As previously mentioned, at the press conference in London on January 29th 2004, the ICC’s 
Chief Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo and President Museveni went public with the Court’s 
decision to start investigating the situation in Northern Uganda after the latter’s referral of the 
conflict in December 2003. This was followed up with the Court’s announcement that it 
would proceed with formal investigations in July 2004, and finally the arrest warrants against 
the LRA leadership in October 2005 (Allen, 2006; Oomen and Marchand, 2007; RLP, 2004).  
 
The ICC arrest warrants are thereby aimed at bringing justice to the Acholis for the atrocities 
being committed against them by the LRA through targeting its leadership as most 
responsible in this regard. However, a combination of an extremely bad timing for when it 
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issued the indictments and a rather inappropriate one-way communication in this case was 
perceived as hampering the efforts being made by the local civil society organisations 
working on the ground in Northern Uganda to support the peaceful return and reintegration of 
former rebel combatants under the auspices of the Amnesty Act (Hovil and Lomo, 2005; 
Ruaudel and Timpson, 2005:12). The main reason for this hostility was that the Amnesty Act 
up until that stage had been the only transitional justice mechanism providing the rebels with 
an incentive to leave the LRA, and the intervention by the ICC was clearly perceived by 
some, if not most of these NGOs as undermining their only viable exit strategy in this 
situation. The Amnesty Act has often been described as being in line with Acholis tradition 
about forgiveness and reconciliation and the amnesty process has received wide support, 
especially in Northern Uganda (Allen, 2006:82; Hovil and Lomo, 2005;  Ruaudel and 
Timpson, 2005:12). 
  
Being the first and thereby also the landmark case of the ICC, it is important for the Court to 
establish itself as a international legal force to be reckoned with by overcoming the 
expectations of total failure by its sceptics, and it apparently decided to brush aside these local 
worries from the very beginning (Nielsen, 2008). These were seemingly confirmed as the 
LRA in late 2005 increased its attacks in the North and started targeting relief organisations, 
resulting in that some of them were forced to put their operations on halt (Allen, 2006:189-
191; Dunn, 2007). Questions have therefore been raised about whether Moreno-Ocampo has 
taken the political context into consideration at all when deciding to undertake investigations. 
Concern about a lack of such a consideration has also been raised about the timing by starting 
investigations while the conflict is still raging, and how the ICC communicates with the 
public through its announcements could result in the LRA targeting the civilian population 
(Hovil and Lomo, 2005; Ruadel and Timpson, 2005). 
 
In relation to this political context and also being at the core of the ‘peace vs. justice’ debate, 
the ICC investigations in Northern Uganda highlights two very different perceptions of 
justice. Whereas the ICC by deriving its jurisdiction from the Rome Statute of 1998, it is the 
institutional cornerstone and embodiment of the international criminal justice fight against 
impunity primarily through punishment and accountability (du Plessis, 2005; Hovil and 
Lomo, 2005; Oomen and Marchand, 2007:166-170; van Zyl, 2005). In Northern Uganda 
many people are, on the contrary, operating with a totally different mindset concerning what 
restorative and retributive justice implies, as evidenced by the findings in many of the studies 
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and surveys undertaken by local NGOs (Oomen and Marchand, 2007:175-177).  This is 
illustrated by the RLP’s (2004:8) statement concerning the ICC’s involvement: 
 
According to the majority of the people who support the Amnesty Law, criminal justice—in this 
sense, punishing the LRA leaders for the crimes they have committed- must lead to an end of the 
conflict. Seen from their perspective, criminal justice is a process of confessions, forgiveness, 
cleansing, reconciliation, responsibility, restoration, rehabilitation, stability, and continuity. 
Unlike the adversarial nature of existing national and international concepts of criminal justice, 
the sense of justice described here is consensual and restorative with the primary aim of re-
establishing social cohesion and ending communal violence. 
 
But beyond contradicting the local history, traditions and perspectives, there seems to be a 
genuine fear, if not outright hostility, as to whether the investigations by the ICC is a genuine 
conflict resolution method at all, evidenced by the fact that five years down the line it has 
clearly failed in bringing about an end to the conflict. On the contrary, by merely aiming at 
arresting and prosecuting the five worst and most wanted perpetrators the ICC only deals with 
the direct symptoms of the conflict rather than the needs of the wider society by addressing its 
deeper root causes (Hovil and Quinn, 2005; Ruaudel and Timpson, 2005). If one is to believe 
the subsequent reactions expressed by the local NGOs on behalf of the population in Northern 
Uganda, the ICC has demonstrated a complete incompatibility as a transitional justice 
mechanism that is able to bring about a sustainable peace.    
 
Among those who underline the local Amnesty Act instead of ICC prosecutions are the two 
RLP researchers Hovil and Lomo (2005). Through their research they found that although the 
impact the Act could have had is being undermined both by the GoU’s lack of support by 
emphasising the military option through Operation Iron Fist, and the challenge by the ICC 
intervention, it seems to be a widespread support for amnesty among the victims of this 
violent conflict (Hovil and Lomo, 2005). Based on these findings they draw the following 
conclusion (Hovil and Lomo, 2005:24): 
  
It is extraordinary that, after 19 years of civil war, many of those who have suffered most are 
willing to allow Kony to be granted amnesty if he voluntary leaves the bush. This is not an 
indication of their support for him, or of empathy for what he is doing, but reveals the fact that 
they are willing to allow him to be granted amnesty if it means an end to the war. In other 
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words, the desire for long-term stability outweighs the demands of modern justice as articulated 
in international law. This clearly raises huge questions with regard to issues of impunity. 
 
4.3.2 Strength and weaknesses of the Amnesty Act 
Between four and five years after it was launched, the Amnesty Act had seemingly been a 
success, as a substantial amount of rebels from Northern Uganda had been granted amnesty 
and received amnesty certificates (Lomo and Hovil, 2005). According to Allen (2006:75), 
since 2003 large numbers of LRA fighters had surrendered and accepted the amnesty on offer, 
and by mid-2004 this amount had increased to more than 5,000 former LRA rebels (Allen, 
2006:75). Allen mentions several reasons for why this happened: The UPDF’s military 
operation in Southern Sudan had increased the pressure on the LRA and resulted in that some 
of its fighters were either captured, rescued or surrendered altogether, such as former 
‘Brigadier’ Kenneth Banya, at that time LRA’s fourth highest commander, and some of 
Kony’s so-called ‘wives’. Others again were separated from their commanders and could 
escape, or were unable to access food supplies and thereby starved into surrendering. Another 
reason was that Mega Radio, a local radio station, broadcasted radio interviews with former 
LRA rebels, who after receiving amnesty urged their fellow rank and file combatants to 
surrender or defect as well (Allen, 2006:75).  
 
Despite this initial success in undermining the LRA from within, by late 2004 the numbers of 
LRA rebels returning from the bush and accepting amnesty was, however, reduced to a trickle 
for a number of reasons (Allen, 2006:75). The Amnesty Act had been based on a vague hope 
that Kony and his senior commanders would accept the amnesty as well. But to the contrary 
of these expectations, former LRA rebels reported that Kony condemned the amnesty and 
threatened abductees and followers alike with reprisals if they tried to accept it by defecting or 
escaping, as the growing numbers who did ‘were understandably perceived as a threat’ (Allen, 
2006:74-75).  
 
In May 2004, words were followed by action from the LRA after a number of key 
commanders surrendered together with their units. A week after an interview with one of 
these commanders had been broadcasted on Mega Radio, LRA attacked the Pagak IDP camp 
where he now lived, and clubbed or hacked about 30 of its inhabitants to death. Some days 
later, a similar retaliation against another IDP camp, Lukodi, left 28 people dead (Allen, 
2006:75-76). Whereas it is very difficult to directly link statements made by the ICC to 
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retaliations from the LRA, these two massacres clearly illustrate that the senior commanders 
in the LRA knew about the amnesty process, but were unwilling to accept it. This indicates 
that it could not be a final solution to the conflict in itself as, instead of accepting it, they 
responded with a killing spree (Allen, 2006:75-77).  
 
After the ICC arrest warrants became known in October 2005, this has also seemingly had an 
effect in galvanising the LRA against defections. According to Allen (2006:187-190), several 
observers point to how the arrest warrants helped consolidate and strengthen the LRA’s 
position, by preventing its fighters from defecting to pursue the amnesty option in fear of that 
it would not be genuine. Dunn (2007:136), as one of these observers, argue that after 
becoming familiar with the ICC’s arrest warrants the LRA intensified its military campaign 
by increasing the number and severity of its attacks.  
 
This aspect of a more international character also represents a challenge to the Amnesty Act 
(Hovil and Lomo, 2005; Oomen and Marchand, 2007:172). The Rome Statute (1998) article 
17(2)(a)), makes it clear that a national decision of implementing amnesties with the intention 
of shielding the person concerned from criminal responsibility implies a national 
unwillingness to prosecute and thereby enables the ICC to prosecute instead (du Plessis, 
2005:193-195). Based on this, in their more recent reports AI and HRW have both argued that 
the perpetrators behind the worst crimes against humanity in Northern Uganda deserve their 
rightful punishment instead of forgiveness (AI and HRW, quoted in Oomen and Marchand, 
2007:172). Shortly after the ICC published the arrest warrants AI (quoted in Allen, 2006:188-
189; Oomen and Marchand, 2007:172) went so far as to declare that with regards to the 
Amnesty Act ‘(...) Uganda must (...) revoke its unlawful national amnesty seeking to protect 
perpetrators of the worst possible crimes from justice (...)’.   
 
As can be derived from the description of it in the previous subsection, the rationale behind 
the Ugandan Amnesty is thus to make the decision for the LRA combatants to stop the 
fighting, looting and rape by renouncing their arms easier (Allen, 2006; Hovil and Lomo, 
2005; Oomen and Marchand, 2007). But even if former child soldiers complain about their 
horrible experiences and traumas haunting them after being forced to participate in 
committing horrendous atrocities, senior LRA commanders have a different viewpoint on the 
life in the bush. As one former LRA combatant described it in an interview quoted by Oomen 
and Marchand (2007:171): ‘Once rebel commanders return to the community, they lack the 
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authority they were accustomed to in the bush, and also the free access to (stolen) foods, 
medicines, technological advices, and ‘wives’. This reflects yet another disincentive for 
current LRA commanders to make the decision to leave the bush and returning to an ordinary 
life as they fear a reduction in their personal economic wealth (Annan et al quoted in Oomen 
and Marchand, 2007:171-172). 
 
In an extension of this argument, problematic aspects are also arising over the amnesty or 
demobilisation packages on offer to the rebels. Van Zyl (2005:216) argues that, in general, the 
relationship between the resources provided to demobilising combatants and reparations 
offered to the victims of human rights abuses requires careful consideration. In many cases, 
former combatants are receiving far more generous demobilisation packages than their 
victims are given through reparations, which create a great sense of injustice among their 
victims, thereby making them more hostile towards the reintegration of former combatants 
back into society (van Zyl, 2005:216). Ruaudel and Timpson (2005:12) already noted in 2005 
that more emphasis had been placed on receiving and returning former fighters to their 
communities in the north than on genuine accountability and reconciliation. Based on this, 
they argued that it would be better ‘to make use of the full ambit of the amnesty law, as the 
Amnesty Act provides for the application of appropriate reconciliation and justice 
mechanisms, which could provide for accountability by perpetrators’ (Ruaudel and Timpson, 
2005:12). This multifaceted transitional justice process would be one of that embraces trials, 
limited amnesties, truth telling, reparations, reintegration and community rebuilding (Ruaudel 
and Timpson, 2005:12).   
 
Northern Uganda is thereby no exception in this regard, where a painful aspect among the 
people living in the IDP camps is the fact that the Amnesty Act has a narrow focus on the 
perpetrators. In their view, the Act is an agreement between the government and the rebels, 
reducing the space for the local community’s involvement in the process through neo-
traditional procedures, meaning that the victims are not given a chance to reconcile with their 
offenders, thereby creating a mental gap between the former rebel and the community that 
person is supposed to be reintegrated into. Also, while the individual perpetrators responsible 
for committing the most serious of crimes against humanity are entitled to apply for amnesty 
with a DDR package, their victims in the IDP camps are not receiving anything from the 
government; no excuse, respect, confirmation of human dignity, or even a financial 
compensation. This one-sided focus of the Act on the perpetrators not only hurts their feelings 
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and reduces their willingness to accept the return of former rebels, but is also more than likely 
to reduce its effectiveness (Hovil and Lomo, 2005; Oomen and Marchand, 2007:171).  
 
In a similar manner, many Acholis are adamant that it is no longer possible for them to 
reconcile with the LRA rebel leaders, as they are responsible for the massive atrocities being 
committed that are not supported by the majority of the population, as well as the randomness 
of the attacks by targeting the government forces one day and fellow Acholis the next day. 
The combination of this inhumane treatment of civilians with the randomness of the attacks 
has therefore caused many Acholis to close the door to reconciliation (Oomen and Marchand, 
2007:171).  
 
When added up, even if the intentions behind the Amnesty Act were good, the results have 
been far from promising. Not only has it failed to end the ongoing conflict in Northern 
Uganda after 9 years, but in some cases it has also been the cause of increased violence as the 
LRA has deliberately targeted the families of former rebels after their surrender. In addition to 
this, even if the GoU partly accepted the Act as another mean to end the conflict, it has 
nevertheless still pursued the military option to deal with the rebels. Furthermore, the ICC 
arrest warrants has also undermined the effectiveness of the Act. But most importantly, and 
maybe the final nail in the coffin of the Act was that all of these aspects together served to 
spread disappointment not only about the Act itself in Northern Uganda, but also a feeling of 
disenfranchisement and alienation from the GoU (Allen, 2006; Hovil and Lomo, 2005;  
Oomen and Marchand, 2007; Ruaudel and Timpson, 2005).   
 
4.3.3 The Amnesty Act’s contribution towards creating sustainable peace  
The situation described above reflects van Zyl’s (2005:216) argument about how in those 
instances where courts and blanket amnesties are framed respectively as the only transitional 
justice mechanism being able to create peace, they might thereby produce unintended and 
counterproductive results.  
In situations where a court with universal jurisdiction declares that it will prosecute all of the 
perpetrators being responsible for committing atrocities, including those who already have 
been granted amnesty, thereby disregarding their position in the rebel movement and the 
gravity of the crimes they have committed, this will most probably result in preventing those 
who consider surrendering or defecting from doing so. As mentioned under the previous 
section discussing the ICC as a transitional justice mechanism, no court will ever be able to 
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prosecute all of the individual perpetrators responsible for committing human rights violations 
(van Zyl, 2005:210). It is therefore rather unwise to dissuade rebels from defecting or 
surrendering, based on a false threat of facing prosecutions, which cannot be realistically 
fulfilled and rather prevents an end to the conflict (van Zyl, 2005:216).   
 
This would have been the consequence if AI’s (quoted in Allen, 2006:188-189; Oomen and 
Marchand, 2007:172) dismissal of the Amnesty Act had been taken seriously by the GoU. 
Likewise, the ICC has rather avoided this debate by arguing that it is up to the GoU to deal 
with the issue of amnesty and done nothing to further the understanding of itself as a Court of 
last resort whose intention is not to prosecute the large majority of rank and file rebels, but 
only the most senior commanders perceived as the worst perpetrators in the conflict (Allen, 
2006:195).  
 
But even if impunity for war crimes through blanket amnesties will increase the number of 
rebels surrendering or defecting, this is, according to van Zyl (2005:216) yet another 
undesirable solution. Not only does it go against the prohibition of and fight against impunity 
under international criminal law, but it will also create a climate of impunity, which could 
result in a return to conflict at later stage.  
 
There are, however, better ways to balance the relationship between the role of amnesties and 
courts as transitional justice mechanisms in this process. Van Zyl (2005:216) uses the 
Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CRTR) in East Timor as his example. It 
utilised a new technique to promote the reintegration of low-level perpetrators by allowing 
them to come forward, provide a full disclosure of the crimes they had committed as a 
precondition to avoid being punished for their crimes, and agree to undertake an act of 
reconciliation, usually community service. The CRTR thereby reduced the probability of a 
return to conflict by promoting reintegration into society, but it also saved the authorities of 
the expense and effort of dealing with thousands of low-level perpetrators through 
prosecution and imprisonment. This conditional amnesty was however explicitly limited to 
the rank and file perpetrators, whereas persons responsible for committing serious crimes such 
as rape and murder were still liable for prosecution. By doing so in the following way, a 
balance is made between encouraging the reintegration of individuals’ responsible for certain 
offences, and achieving accountability for those carrying the greatest responsibility (van Zyl, 
2005:216).  
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Although the Ugandan authorities launched a TRC in 1986, which remained in place until 
1994, it differs significantly in this regard compared to East Timor, as the local ‘peace vs. 
justice’ debate is not concerned with TRCs as a transitional justice mechanism, but initially 
the ICC and the Amnesty Act and later on the Acholis’ neo-traditional justice mechanisms 
like the Mato Oput. According to Hovil and Quinn (2005:19-21), there are several reasons for 
this, as the Commission of Inquiry into Violations of Human Rights (CIVHR) as it became 
known as, rather serves as an illustration of how it not should be done. CIVHR was launched 
almost immediately after Museveni took office in 1986 to look into the abuses of previous 
regimes, but time proved to be a challenge, as many people had died after nearly twenty years 
of permanent instability. The CIVHR lacked sufficient funding and qualified staff, but also 
broke its time schedule by more than six years, and finished its work after more than eight 
years instead of the initial two. Most importantly is maybe that it tapped into the interests of 
the new rulers who responded with death threats and the disappearance of vital evidence. 
When it finally presented its findings in 1994, it had not been able to make any final decisive 
conclusions, due to a combination of these challenges. Its legacy is thereby extremely limited, 
evidenced by the fact that most Ugandans are totally unaware of its existence and those who 
are remain highly critical to it (Hovil and Quinn, 2005:19-21).  
 
So instead of a TRC giving out conditional amnesties in return for truthful confessions, the 
Amnesty Act was launched and used as an alternative to provide former combatants with 
blanket amnesties. Clearly, the amnesty process initially worked as it was intended to, with 
more than 5,000 former LRA combatants leaving the conflict because of the guaranteed 
amnesty that awaited them. But this ended after the referral of the situation by Museveni in 
December 2003 to the ICC, and its investigations into the case made it clear that Ugandan 
authorities was violating its obligations under international criminal law to combat impunity, 
as well as that the two processes of the ICC and the blanket amnesties were fundamentally at 
odds with each other (Hovil and Quinn, 2005:31).  
 
Hovil and Quinn (2005:32) argue that as a result, in addition to the creation and 
implementation of the Amnesty Act, to guarantee perpetrators that they will not face 
prosecutions at a later stage by the GoU, coupled with the customary mechanisms of the 
Acholi neo-traditional justice rituals serving as an alternative to a TRC seems to offer a 
middle ground between impunity and prosecution. According to Oomen and Marchand 
(2007:175), their argument translates people’s preferences into a combination of conditional 
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amnesty and neo-traditional reconciliation mechanisms as Hovil and Quinn (2005:32) argues 
that:   
 
If, indeed, such traditional mechanisms are able to meet the needs of the community through 
already-understood mechanisms that can adjudicate, arbitrate, mediate, reconcile, and 
compensate, then perhaps they can be called upon to provide these services in the context of a 
complicated legal minefield. With some revisions, these mechanisms might even be able to 
incorporate the retributive aspect that many seem to desire. The gacaca process in Rwanda 
followed this model, and appears to be meeting these same kinds of goals.  
 
It is this aspect that the following and last subsection will explore in more detail.  
 
That said, in relation to this is how the current focus has been on a regional form of 
reconciliation, which fails to take into consideration Uganda’s history of conflict (Batanda, 
2009:7). Already in 2005, before the Juba peace agreement, Ruaudel and Timpson (2005:13) 
expressed their concern about that:  
 
While the ICC focus is mainly on the LRA leadership, more attention and efforts ought to be put 
on the restoration of the rule of law in northern Uganda and on monitoring, redressing human 
right violations that are perpetrated on a daily basis (...) The government needs to lead 
emerging efforts towards a peaceful solution including reconciliation within the Acholi 
community, between communities in the north and in the entire country, and discourage any 
action that has the potential to fuel renewed ethnic tension. 
 
This is a major problem, given the weaknesses associated with only pursuing reconciliation at 
the regional level. The rest of this section will therefore briefly describe what is being done 
about this, and why it currently is not a viable option. Item number three in the Juba peace 
agreement has been used by NGOs as a entry point to argue for the need of discussing a 
national reconciliation process, given Uganda’s violent history of armed conflict since 
independence, whose causes needs to be properly addressed in order to avoid renewed 
outbreak of conflict in other parts of the country (Batanda, 2009). In this regard the Beyond 
Juba Project (BJP) is among the most important civil society organisations that have 
perceived this as a possibility to prepare the ground for a national reconciliation through a 
truth-telling forum as a way to properly address the past wrongs of previous regimes 
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(Batanda, 2009). The BJP is a transitional justice project by the RLP, intended to create 
support for this national reconciliation process in Uganda, by illustrating how conflicts and 
their legacies are not regional, but rather national problems and assist in the development of 
transitional justice mechanisms, most notably a draft National Reconciliation Bill (Batanda, 
2009: 6-7).  
 
This Bill would result in the creation of a Truth Forum, the equivalent of a national truth 
process, but avoids being associated with a TC or TRC, as Uganda’s history concerning 
commissions has been far from unproblematic and the term ‘Forum’ was therefore selected to 
move away from the perception of commissions as the solution to all of Africa’s current 
problems. The problem in Uganda is that there have been so many commissions of inquiry 
that the public has lost their faith in them and are widely perceived as wasting taxpayers’ 
money with no result to show for it (Batanda, 2009:6-7).  
 
The draft National Reconciliation Bill was first presented to a group of members of the 
Ugandan Parliament by the BJP in July 2008, and later to members of the GoU’s committee 
on the Justice, Law and Order Sector (JLOS) in January 2009, in an attempt to convince them 
of the need for such a Bill. The implementation proved to be problematic, since the NRM as 
the ruling party refused to support the Bill in Parliament. This is a consequence of how the 
Bill would result in investigations from the present and back to independence in 1962. The 
implications for the NRM as the ruling party are that it will be held responsible for the gross 
human rights violations it committed when fighting as a rebel group before coming to power 
in 1986. As long as the NRM disagrees with it and also dominates in the Parliament, this Bill 
will not be implemented into Ugandan law, and its proponents will therefore have to proceed 
carefully in order to convince the NRM of the need for this process (Batanda, 2009:6-7).  
 
Despite the positive impact that a national approach to reconciliation could have had, it seems 
highly unlikely that it will happen in the near future. It should not be dismissed once and for 
all as a completely unrealistic alternative, but further coverage is beyond the scope and space 
of this thesis.  
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4.4 Neo-traditional reconciliation and conflict resolution procedures in 
Northern Uganda 
 
4.4.1 Introduction  
This subsection will in the following first analyse the strong and weak sides of the Acholis 
neo-traditional justice mechanisms associated with reconciliation and conflict resolution and 
then discuss how it can be placed within a combined approach to contribute to the creation of 
sustainable peace.  
 
4.4.2 The strengths of the Acholis neo-traditional justice  
Allen (2005, 2006 and 2008), identifies the NGO International Alert as being the main actor 
responsible for establishing the notion of what he perceives as a previously non-existing 
notion of neo-traditional restorative justice in Acholiland. Based on the current situation 
described above, it published the report ‘The Bending of Spears: Producing Consensus for 
Peace and Development in Northern Uganda’ written by Dennis Pain, an English sociologist, 
who, in the 1990s, conducted several detailed observations of the conflict in Northern 
Uganda. Pain found that despite the violence and suffering they had experienced throughout 
the conflict, the Acholis were able to endure the situation, as they had a unique form of 
forgiveness performed through a long and thorough reconciliation process. This involved an 
investigation of the circumstances, an acceptance of responsibility and an indication of 
repentance, with the elders laying down terms of compensation and the reconciliation is 
sealed by a traditional ritual known as Mato Oput, where the parties share a bitter root drink 
from a common calabash (Pain, 1997:82). Pain (1997:82) further explains the reconciliation 
ceremony as:  
 
Between groups the process required a delegation of elders to investigate the fault and identify 
the cause and for those concerned to accept their responsibility. The acceptance of 
responsibility is a group acceptance, not so & so, son of X, but we have done this. Then the 
compensation is determined, traditionally cattle or girls, and lastly reconciliation occurs with 
the ‘bending of the spears’ and ‘mato oput’. There should be individual mato oput for children 
at the sub-country level and a final mato oput between groups- Acholi, Government and LRA- at 
a public event.  
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One of the several studies that have been conducted afterwards, thereby representing the 
‘legacy’ of Pain’s initial study by quoting his work, is the RLP researchers Hovil and Quinn’s 
(2005) working paper with the title ‘Peace First, Justice Later: Traditional Justice in 
Northern Uganda’. In the Ugandan context, they found that not just the Acholi society, but 
most of Uganda’s many different ethnic communities, such as the Karamojong, the Buganda 
and the Lugbara, had traditionally used such mechanisms in order to deal with conflicts. But 
whereas these forms of local traditions in some instances had disappeared under the pressure 
from the ‘Western’ form of retributive justice under colonialism, which was later upheld by 
post-colonial rulers, it was still an active part of the community’s everyday life in other 
places, such as in the Acholi society (Hovil and Quinn, 2005:22-25). 
 
In later reports with titles such as ‘Beyond Truth Commissions: Indigenous Reconciliation in 
Uganda’ proponents of the Acholi restorative justice system have gone even further by 
pointing to its superiority over retributive justice, as it deals with crimes against humanity and 
war crimes through reconciliation rather than punishment (Quinn, quoted in Oomen and 
Marchand, 2007:174). Based on this Oomen and Marchand (2007:174) found that many 
NGOs, as well as local traditional and religious leaders have claimed that over time, this 
systems key principles and the rituals associated with them have been passed on orally to the 
next generations. This means that even if the majority of the current Acholi generation have 
been prevented from putting these reconciliatory rituals into practice because of the war, the 
memory of how to practice them has not been forgotten (Oomen and Marchand, 2007:174). 
 
For their research, Oomen and Marchand (2007:173) gathered a group of Acholi elders in an 
IDP camp, who explained to them how these traditional ceremonies work in detail. The main 
idea behind the Acholi justice system to deal with the war crimes taking place is based on a 
notion of forgiveness by the victimised family and community. A criminal case is thus a 
communal event, as it is not only involving the perpetrator and their family, but particularly 
the victim(s). The general procedure in this system focuses on the offending clan or family 
confessing the crimes committed in public, expressing public remorse by going through 
different communal rituals and giving material compensation to the victimised family, 
whereby the latter promise to forgive the former for their misdeeds (Oomen and Marchand, 
2007:173).  
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But despite this emphasis on forgiveness for such serious crimes aimed at reintegrating former 
rebels into society requires the victims to show a strong will to reconcile with them, the public 
expression of guilt and remorse is in a way a form of psychological punishment. Also, the 
assumption that the Acholi society has a strong capacity to forgive includes a detailed 
memory of their communal history concerning events involving grave crimes and violent 
episodes affecting their communities. As such, the victims and perpetrators do not reconcile in 
terms of promising each other to forget what has happened, but in terms of coming along on a 
daily basis in order to avoid possible revenge, but they are far from overlooking the past in 
their historical accounts (Oomen and Marchand, 2007:175)  
 
This should be seen in relation to the RLP’s (2004:8) explanation of how the rationale behind 
the neo-traditional justice mechanisms is to deal with crimes being committed through 
reconciliation and conflict resolution: 
 
In some traditional communities, such as the Acholi and the Kakwa, there is no death penalty or 
prison sentence for the ‘convicted’ murderer. However, this is not to say that those who commit 
crimes are not made accountable. There is punishment and accountability. For example, a 
person who commits murder not only might be required to make material restitution to the 
family of the bereaved, but also might be assigned the responsibility of taking care of the family 
for the rest of his/her life. Particularly for communities such as those living in northern 
Uganda, which live in extreme poverty and marginal conditions, this ‘replacement’ of the role 
and service of the deceased usually seems more ‘just’ than punishing both communities by 
imprisoning or killing the offender.  
 
Although in the past the Acholi people performed a number of different ceremonies, in the 
present situation the focus is primarily on two rituals, namely Nyono Tong Gweno and Mato 
Oput. Both of these rituals symbolises the different stages of the process of restorative justice 
(Hovil and Quinn, 2005:25; Oomen and Marchand, 2007:174). Nyono Tong Gweno and Mato 
Oput were traditionally used respectively to welcome back a traveller and in those instances 
where a member of one clan has killed a member of another clan, but in the current situation 
with the conflict taking place both rituals are often used interchangeably. Nyono Tong Gweno 
is a welcome ceremony where an egg is being stepped on and is used by the Acholi society to 
welcome back anyone who has been away from their home for a longer period of time (Hovil 
and Quinn, 2005:25). This ceremony is, however, not in itself a ceremony for dispute 
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settlement, as it traditionally was used to cleanse someone from whatever ills that had 
attached themselves to the person during the travel. But for someone who returns as a 
wrongdoer, this cleansing ceremony is only a necessary precondition before the much more 
thorough reconciliation ceremony of Mato Oput can take place (Hovil and Quinn, 2005:25).  
 
In cases involving violent conflict or even murder between families and clans, the final 
overarching reconciliation ritual that must be passed is the Mato Oput. This refers to the 
drinking of a bitter root extracted from the Oput tree, which is a ritual that all parties involved 
must perform together in order to be reconciled. The most important aspect of the Mato Oput 
ritual is the perpetrators willingness to show remorse and compensate the victim(s) for the 
loss they have suffered (Oomen and Marchand, 2007:174).  
 
The overall intention behind this is to enable the Acholi society to send out the signal that 
these persons have been accepted back into the community and that the community is glad to 
have them back. Whereas abductees will only need the simple cleansing ceremony, former 
combatants also need Mato Oput, and will thereby have to undergo both upon their return to 
be welcomed back home (Hovil and Quinn, 2005:25; Oomen and Marchand, 2007:174). 
Almost all of the LRA returnees, of which the total numbers were estimated to be over 12000 
in 2007, have undergone this ceremony, either conducted by their respective families, or 
collectively with the support from the United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID) through its funding of NUPI. In comparison, the USAID through funding NUPI 
supported 54 Mato Oput ceremonies between 2004 and 2006 (Latigo, 2008:107).  
 
4.4.3 The weaknesses associated with the Acholis neo-traditional justice  
Oomen and Marchand (2007:173) argues that compared to the Rome Statue regulating the 
jurisdiction of the ICC and to a lesser extent, Uganda’s Amnesty Act of 2000, the Acholis 
neo-traditional justice system’s ability to handle criminal offences have hardly been 
documented. As an expert on Northern Uganda, the social anthropologist Tim Allen has, 
because of this, made an effort out of deconstructing the whole notion of a unique local 
Acholi neo-traditional justice system by writing extensively about the subject in several 
publications, most notably in his book ‘Trial Justice: The International Criminal Court and 
the Lord’s Resistance Army’ from 2006. Starting off by illustrating how confusing some of 
the critical notions in the local language may be for external observers Allen (2006:76-77) 
argues that:  
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(...) In the Lwo language, ‘amnesty’ and ‘forgiveness’ are not distinct- the same word (timo-
kica) is used for both. The Christian organizations and the ‘traditional’ leaders were especially 
prone to confuse the two ideas, even arguing that there is an Acholi system of justice based on 
forgiveness which is superior to more conventional law-making and enforcement. Rather 
naively, many NGOs have taken this at face value. 
 
Allen illustrates how the influential report ‘The Bending of the Spear’ from 1997 started this 
trend, where Pain argued that the conflict was eroding ‘Acholi culture’ and what was needed 
to solve it was a community based approach drawing on their traditional values. Pain 
highlighted how the Mato Oput ceremony mediated by elders requires the wrongdoer to admit 
responsibility, asking for forgiveness and agreeing to pay compensation. Thereafter both 
parties drink the blood of the sacrificed sheep mixed with Mato Oput and the ceremony ends 
with Gomo Tong, or bending of the spears, to symbolise reconciliation (Allen, 2006:132-
133).  
 
According to Allen, Pain’s report has created a great deal of confusion by obfuscating two 
distinct ceremonies. Mato Oput is a ceremony intended to deal with the consequences in the 
aftermath of a killing by reconciling social divisions, where those who participate are the 
wrongdoer and one member representing the family of the killed, together with clan elders. 
Gomo Tong is a totally different ceremony of peacemaking undertaken to bring a peaceful 
resolution to conflicts between clans or other ethnic groups. The last time it was performed 
was, however, in the early 1980s to reconcile social unrest between the Acholis and the 
people of the West Nile after Amin’s downfall (Allen, 2006:132-133). In this regard Doom 
and Vlassenroot (1999:11) and ICG (2005a:7) seem to represent these authors and NGOs 
confusing these rituals, as they mention Gomo Tong alongside Mato Oput as illustrating these 
local reconciliation ceremonies. 
 
Another negative aspect concerning these Acholi rituals is the way in which they are 
presented as local and genuine initiatives which have their foundations in ancient traditions 
(Oomen and Marchand, 2007:174). Allen argues that statements made in favour of this culture 
of restorative justice, based on the perception of a supposedly unified Acholi identity 
established a long time ago must be treated with utmost caution, and rather be understood as a 
deliberate mythmaking (Allen, 2006; Oomen and Marchand, 2007:174). He illustrates this 
point by arguing that ‘to the extent that there was ever an integrated Acholi justice system, it 
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was introduced and regulated under the indirect rule of the British protectorate’ (Allen, 
2006:162). With regards to the unified Acholi society, the current borders of the area which is 
now known as Acholiland, were formed by the British colonisers (Allen, 2006:162). Last, but 
not least, evidence suggests that, to the contrary of this perception of the Acholis ability to 
forgive and that murder was not in their nature in pre-colonial times, killings were widespread 
in this region, especially in the period between 1860 and 1910 (Allen, 2006:162).  
 
Nevertheless, shortly after Pain’s report the Belgian government provided funding to 
ACORD, another local NGO in Northern Uganda, to conduct a study to verify Pain’s findings 
(Allen, 2006:133). Allen notes that despite of what are for him obvious facts, because of the 
international aid agencies’ willingness to support it and the increased press coverage by local 
and global media, local traditional and religious leaders, NGOs and ordinary people living in 
the IDP camps have all been strengthened in their perception of the uniqueness of the Acholi 
justice system by regarding it as an institutionalised ‘traditional’ system (Allen, 2005).  
 
Oomen and Marchand (2007:174) argue that this is a consequence of how the international 
aid community became increasingly frustrated with the seemingly unsolvable ‘peace vs. 
justice’ debate and therefore started looking for alternative remedies to deal with this impasse, 
which they seemingly found in the local approach to conflict resolution in Acholiland by 
expressing its interest in contributing with finances to stimulate these apparently authentic 
traditions. Another reason for why the donors have supported these NGOs emphasised 
reconciliation relates to how many of the organisations most closely involved have a religious 
background and agenda (Oomen and Marchand, 2007:174). Both the ARLPI and the various 
Acholi traditional leaders’ associations have received most of their funding from international 
donor agencies (Allen, 2005). Thus, in addition to the local actors, they play a very strong role 
in supporting these neo-traditional forms of conflict resolution. 
 
4.4.4 The neo-traditional justice mechanism’s contribution to sustainable 
peace in Northern Uganda  
 
The ongoing conflict in Northern Uganda has clarified the existence, although imperfect, of a 
neo-traditional justice system reflecting both retributive and restorative elements of conflict 
resolution focusing on how to reintegrate the perpetrators back into their communities by 
135 
 
reconciling them with their victims through a process which includes establishing the truth, 
confession, reparation, repentance and forgiveness (Latigo, 2008:108).  
There has been some degree of success in the implementation and use of neo-traditional 
justice mechanisms, such as the Mato Oput, to mediate in the Northern Ugandan conflict 
thanks to the ground breaking agenda item number three of the Juba peace talks calling for the 
use of neo-traditional justice mechanisms alongside formal justice procedures (Ogora, 2009).   
 
This illustrates how neo-traditional justice practices are increasingly perceived as being a 
potential mechanism to deal with the issues of conflict resolution and transitional justice, and 
Northern Uganda is currently one of the most important cases in this regard, as neo-traditional 
justice mechanisms like the Mato Oput are about to be used to deal with resolving war crimes 
and crimes against humanity committed throughout more than two decades of conflict (Ogora, 
2009:1).  
 
In this regard, Uganda is already at an advanced stage, as it has gone further than any other 
country in this regard after the failed Juba peace talks by incorporating and codifying certain 
principles of neo-traditional restorative justice in the amnesty law in conformity with 
‘Western’ standards (Latigo, 2008:111).  
 
In relation to this, Sverker Finnström, a Swedish social anthropologist, who did extensive 
field work in Northern Uganda between 1997 and 2002 for his PhD published in 2003 with 
the title ‘Living with Bad Surroundings: War and Existential Uncertainty in Acholiland, 
Northern Uganda’ (quoted in Hovil and Quinn, 2005:25), argues that:  
 
It is important to note that drinking the bitter root (mato oput) is not simply a tradition of some 
glorious past. In the midst of war this reconciliation ritual is conducted in Acholiland and clan 
feuds are settled there. Even though a murderer is sent to prison, a reconciliation ritual ought 
to be conducted (...) These practices, far from being dislocated in a past that no longer exists, 
have always continued to be situated socially. They are called upon and performed to address 
present concerns. Of course, like any culturally informed practice, with time they shift in 
meaning and appearance. 
 
In defence of the proponents of these neo-traditional justice procedures it should therefore be 
noted that their confusion might have been the result of changes in these procedures over time 
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and because of the conflict itself. In their report on the neo-traditional Acholi rituals, the local 
staffs of Caritas in Northern Uganda (quoted in Oomen and Marchand, 2007:173) have noted 
that in the past, it was normal procedure for the perpetrators to give their young daughters to 
the victimised clan, whereas they by giving birth to a child would replace the lost clan 
member(s). In modern times, this procedure has changed to compensating through money or 
cattle. Furthermore, the Mato Oput ritual requires a large amount of material resources and 
organisation, such as ‘a sheep from each clan, a bull, several goats, new knives, spears, 
calabashes, bowls and baskets, communally brewed beer and local bread, and large financial 
court fines to the local chiefs’. This might be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to obtain 
given the current situation with war and restricted movement resulting from being placed in 
an IDP camp, and the Mato Oput procedure has therefore not been performed frequently since 
the LRA began its insurgency (Caritas quoted in Oomen and Marchand, 2007:173). The 
Acholi society has therefore understandably been forced to welcome LRA returnees back into 
society with other rituals, such as Nyono Tong Gweno (Caritas quoted in Oomen and 
Marchand, 2007:174).  
 
However, neither Latigo (2008), Hovil and Quinn (2005), or Oomen and Marchand (2007), 
denies the fact that despite of continued existence in the Acholi society compared to other 
ethnic communities in Uganda, even here the role of the neo-traditional mechanisms of justice 
has changed, both relates to how colonialism and in modern times government in Kampala 
has altered the way in which justice is administered. All of them had noted the complaints 
about how the youth do not adhere to them anymore, as well as how the introduction of other 
religions, especially Christianity, had led some to reject the mechanisms altogether, even if 
some saw no contradiction between their personal belief and the Acholi justice system.  
 
Also, none of these authors mentioned here refers to Gomo Tong, the bending of the spears, in 
the same way as Pain (1997), but instead put an emphasis on describing Nyono Tong Gweno 
and Mato Oput. Rather they refer to it in the same way as Allen does, by being an intertribal 
reconciliation ceremony between two or more conflicting parties to end their hostilities 
(Latigo, 2008:107-108; Quinn and Hovil, 2005:25). 
 
A major problem in this regard is, however, that even if times have changed drastically with 
new conflicts where mass atrocities on an unprecedented scale have taken place and new 
generations who are unaccustomed to these neo-traditional practices have been brought up, 
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neo-traditional rituals are still presented in their ‘ancient’ and ‘archaic’ forms like they were 
practiced in the past. The result of this has been that neo-traditional justice mechanisms are 
perceived by many as at best a supplementary mechanism to more direct Western forms of 
retributive justice (Ogora, 2009:1).  
 
The Mato Oput procedures in Northern Uganda are, for instance, still being presented and 
discussed in such a way that it makes outsiders like Tim Allen (2005, 2006 and 2008) draw 
the conclusion that it will remain ‘as it was in the beginning, is now and forever, amen’, and 
resulted in that many analysts and scholars have dismissed neo-traditional justice mechanisms 
as unable to deal with ‘modern’ war crimes and crimes against humanity (Ogora, 2009). This 
is despite of the fact that the lessons from Rwanda’s Gacaca courts clearly indicates that neo-
traditional justice mechanisms can indeed be remodelled to deal with the challenges 
associated with contemporary conflicts (Huyse, 2008; Ogora, 2009). This is also the main 
reason behind why traditional justice mechanisms have not been taken more seriously into 
consideration until now, as most of them are still being presented and discussed in their 
‘archaic’ and ‘ancient’ form without taking into consideration the challenges they are being 
faced with in contemporary conflicts and the environments in which they would be operating 
in.  
 
The reality on the ground in Uganda is therefore that these neo-traditional mechanisms are 
still primarily understood as supplementary rather than the equivalent to formal mechanisms. 
For instance, the GoU has for a long time seen the use of such traditional mechanisms as a 
‘soft landing’ for the LRA leaders to avoid punishment. This is illustrated by how it, in July 
2008, through the JLOS started developing a transitional justice framework towards the 
signing of the final peace agreement. It was, however, never considered necessary to give 
priority to include consultation by the traditional and religious leaders or the researchers who 
have a lot of knowledge about the neo-traditional justice system to contribute with their input 
(Ogora, 2009:2-3). Because of this, there have been many preparations for the establishment 
of the SDHC, while in comparison there has been very little progress on the work to prepare 
the traditional justice for the same thing (Ogora, 2009:2-3).  
 
Ogora (2009:2-3) points to how neo-traditional justice mechanisms can and will need to adapt 
to the changing circumstances in order to properly address contemporary challenges of 
transitional justice. In this regard, he tries to address the problematic way that neo-traditional 
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justice mechanisms are still presented in contemporary settings as holding on to the past. 
Overall he suggests that there is a clear need to remodel neo-traditional justice mechanisms in 
order to adapt them to contemporary settings, as well as the need to consider them as 
alternative justice mechanisms that are equivalent, rather than supplementary to Western 
models of justice (Ogora; 2009:3-4). As the case of Northern Uganda illustrates, more effort 
and attention is being aimed at making sure that judicial mechanisms are functioning while 
restorative mechanisms like neo-traditional justice are often left in the cold to ‘sort themselves 
out’. While the GoU has made arrangements for establishing the SDHC, very little has in 
comparison been done to prepare for the use of neo-traditional justice (Ogora, 2009:3-4).   
 
Ogora (2009:4) therefore argues that there ‘is an urgent need to begin considering traditional 
justice mechanisms at least as equally significant to formal judicial justice mechanisms’. The 
relevance of traditional justice mechanisms should not only be recognised but significant 
amounts of resources and time need to be allocated towards developing them (Ogora, 2009:6).  
In order to be able to move forward, it is necessary to take into consideration contemporary 
realities on the ground by analysing whether and to what degree neo-traditional justice 
mechanisms can evolve and be adapted to deal with these aspects so that they can 
complement the limitations in more conventional transitional justice mechanisms (Ogora, 
2009:1). 
 
Unfortunately, this practice of conditional amnesties through the Amnesty Act coupled with 
forgiveness and reconciliation through Mato Oput and Nyono Tong Gweno will clearly be 
perceived from the perspective of the ‘justice approach’ focus on retributive justice as defying 
the ends of justice and result in impunity. It does, however, fail to take into consideration that 
in the Acholis restorative justice there are no contradictions between accountability and 
reconciliation, as they are aligned, which makes the practice of impunity difficult, as it is 
never accepted. This is due to the fact that the Acholi traditional justice and reconciliation 
system reflects many, if not most of the elements in the concept of transitional justice through 
investigations into the crimes of the past in order to forge out the future. This investigative 
process is brought to the fore through the Mato Oput reconciliation ceremonies (Latigo, 
2008:109).  
 
Furthermore, the role of the ICC, or the SDHC for that matter, and the applicability of their 
retributive form of justice in resolving more than two decades of conflict in the region will 
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only result in the conviction of the LRA leaders for being the worst and most responsible 
perpetrators for the atrocities being committed. This is despite the fact that after more than 
two decades of conflict, it will be an extremely difficult task to establish the truth about the 
atrocities taking place, where neither restorative or retributive mechanisms of transitional 
justice by themselves will ever be able to cope with the sheer magnitude of cases and create a 
sense of justice (Latigo, 2008).  
 
However, as most conflicts today are intrastate, this means that more often than not, both 
perpetrators and victims will have to live together. This conflict is no exception in this regard, 
meaning that the large majority of the perpetrators responsible for committing these atrocities 
mostly against their own people will stay around their victims even long after that the 
hostilities have ended (Latigo, 2008:117). This will result in that victims and perpetrators as 
well as their families or clans will have to live alongside each other and share a common 
social future for generations to come. It is therefore imperative that the Acholis neo-
traditional justice system for all its flaws and weaknesses must be used to deal with this as 
best as possible.  
 
What can be derived from all of this is that the neo-traditional approach to justice should not 
be perceived as the only way to deal with the conflict. But neither should it be dismissed 
outright as mythmaking, as these traditions hold the key to the successful reintegration of 
former combatants by providing them with an alternative to the life in the bush, but also 
reconciling them with their victims (Latigo, 2008:109-111, 118-119).  
 
Although the differences between retributive and restorative justice are seemingly vast, it 
should by now be understood that peace and justice can only be achieved in Northern Uganda 
through a comprehensive and all inclusive approach, where the two different mindsets should 
be reconciled in the process. In this alternative and combined approach to transitional justice 
in Northern Uganda, the different mechanisms associated with both forms of transitional 
justice should be utilised in a positive way, so that they are not seen as working against each 
other by contradicting or competing, but as complementary (Latigo, 2008:118-119; Ogora, 
2009). Thus, by being critically aware of the influence of religions and religious aid 
organisations, most notably Christianity, by continuing to trace the processes which led to the 
development of certain traditional processes, the decay of others and the emergence of new 
ones, the Acholi way of promoting reconciliation and conflict resolution for the whole society 
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should be drawn upon alongside the contributions associated with the Western mechanisms 
associated with retributive justice (Latigo, 2008; Ogora, 2009). 
  
The complications of this combined approach lie in how to make the two systems operate 
simultaneously in order to guarantee that no form of impunity is accepted. While 
acknowledging that the retributive forms of justice associated with the ICC and the SDHC 
should be targeting the LRA leadership for being most responsible for two decades of 
mayhem that deserve punishment rather than amnesty, whereas its rank and file combatants 
are offered conditional amnesty by the government to avoid punishment and prosecution at a 
later stage, but are at the same time obliged to undergo a process of reconciliation through the 
local restorative system associated with neo-traditional justice.  
 
4.5 Conclusion  
Based on the balance in item number three on the agenda for the Juba peace agreement, this 
chapter has elaborated on the fifth step of the theoretical framework used throughout this 
thesis, namely how to optimise these three transitional justice mechanisms in order to 
facilitate and support the conditions conducive for a sustainable and lasting peace in Northern 
Uganda. This is done by assessing each of these mechanisms’ main characteristics 
respectively, in terms of their historical background, development and current impact in order 
to gain insight into their strength and weaknesses, and to be able to analyse how they best can 
work together on a parallel track in a combined transitional justice approach to create 
sustainable peace in Northern Uganda.  
 
The ICC as a transitional justice mechanism is described by first looking at the process behind 
how it evolved until the Rome Treaty in 1998. With its basis in this Treaty regulating the 
Court’s jurisdiction, the next section explains the processing of a case through this judicial 
system in nine steps. Then the Court’s strength is described, in terms of how several African 
States Parties approached the ICC a short time after it became fully operational in July, 2002, 
by requesting it to assist them in dealing with various atrocities taking place on their 
territories. The ICC had thereby seemingly been given a more or less ideal start. However, 
shortly after it had become involved in Northern Uganda, first by expressing that it would 
investigate the atrocities committed by the LRA in 2004, and later on in 2005 by indicting 
five of its leaders, it experienced heavy resistance from the Acholis themselves, their 
traditional and religious leaders, as well as the GoU. The reasons for this were that, until then, 
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blanket amnesties were the only transitional justice mechanism on offer to the rebels 
providing them with a return to their communities, which the Court demanded an end to, as 
well as how the ICC had a one-way communication with the public. Although its opponents 
expressed grave concern about what the consequences of this would be in terms of the rebels 
becoming much more violent and refusing to give up their insurgency at all, the Court 
seemingly brushed them aside, since it as a relatively new international Court seemed eager to 
establish itself as a legal force to be reckoned with and thereby make its presence felt in 
conflicts worldwide. It thereby disregards the fact that it has jurisdiction over individuals in 
countries with conflicting forms of justice and for who it should be for, an international legal 
human rights regime or the victims.  
 
In a combined approach, the retributive forms of justice associated with the ICC is one among 
several available forms of justice that together address the root causes of a conflict, rather 
than merely treating the symptoms. That said, prosecutions serve several important functions, 
such as clarifying where the guilt lies, and that crimes against humanity and war crimes are 
not tolerated and will result in punishment, re-establishing the trust between state institutions 
and the citizens they are supposed to serve. But prosecutions cannot be the only response 
when dealing with perpetrators, especially in conflict situations like Northern Uganda, where 
tens to hundreds of thousands of crimes have been committed. Here the only viable solution is 
to prosecute the rebel leaders, who are to blame for being most responsible behind the 
atrocities, but the mid-level leaders and rank and file combatants will have to be dealt with 
through other remedies. In this regard, that refers to Uganda’s Amnesty Act of 2000 and the 
Acholis neo-traditional justice, like the Mato Oput ceremonies.  
 
The Amnesty Act, which passed through the Ugandan parliament in 2000, was the result of 
increased pressure from the ordinary Acholis and the NGOs in the civil society in Northern 
Uganda, such as the ARLPI, following the failed 1994 peace talks and the 1996 incident. 
Although it initially had some success in making LRA combatants defecting or surrendering 
in return for unconditional amnesty until 2004 and 2005, this mechanism has failed for a 
number of reasons. First and foremost is the LRA’s response by retaliating against former 
rebel fighters, their families and surroundings in IDP camps that had defected or surrendered 
in return for amnesties. Then is the aspect that rebel commanders have become accustomed to 
a life in relative material and physical wealth based on looting and forcibly abducted ‘wives’. 
In relation to this are the DDR packages former rebels receive upon their return without them 
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having to accept the guilt of their crimes, whereas their victims in return are left without 
apologies enabling them to come to terms with their past experiences or compensation for 
their losses. Many have therefore closed the door to reintegration and reconciliation with 
former rebels. Another aspect of a more international character is the ICC’s dismissal of the 
Amnesty Act, by serving as a symbol of the unacceptable practice of impunity that it is meant 
to bring an end to. This has in turn meant that rebels have refused to surrender as they fear 
being prosecuted instead of receiving amnesty upon their return. When added up, these 
aspects together illustrate how the amnesty as a transitional justice mechanism in its present 
form has failed and will need to be amended in order to become relevant again.  
 
Although the ICC’s retributive justice and the practice of impunity is seemingly at odds, they 
share a major weakness. By declaring that it will prosecute all perpetrators irrespective of 
their status, a court will reduce the probability of rebels surrendering or defecting and thereby 
serve to continue an already ongoing conflict, although it will never be able to adequately deal 
with all of them. Even if blanket amnesties increases the probability of rebels defecting or 
surrendering, it will create a climate of impunity, which increases the risk of a return to 
conflict at a later stage. In this regard, it has been pointed to how a TC or TRC can serve as a 
middle way by giving conditional amnesties in return for truthful confessions, and how the 
weakness in the current approach to reconciliation is regional and not national. Although 
work is being done in this regard with the proposed National Reconciliation Bill, given 
Uganda’s negative experience with such institutions in the past, and Museveni’s reluctance to 
accept it as it will tap into his interests, it seems highly unlikely for now. It is suggested in this 
regard that the Amnesty Act be amended, so that the rebels receive a state based amnesty 
protecting them from prosecution from the GoU at a later stage. Such an amnesty should, 
however, be conditional and dependent upon the rebels agreeing to participate in neo-
traditional reconciliation ceremonies with their fellow Acholis upon their return and before 
being fully reintegrated into society.  
The Acholis neo-traditional justice was just brought to the fore in 1997, but was one decade 
later fully integrated as a transitional justice mechanism alongside the ICC and amnesty in the 
Juba peace agreement. Reconciliation ceremonies like the Mato Oput and the Nyono Tong 
Gweno are intended to reconcile the victims with their perpetrators in order to overcome a 
difficult past and build a peaceful future together. This form of justice is however challenged 
by several aspects. The most problematic aspect concerning neo-traditional justice is the way 
in which it is still being presented in its ‘ancient’ and ‘archaic’ form, which makes it 
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irrelevant when dealing with the ‘modern’ crimes against humanity and war crimes. It is 
therefore neither taken seriously by the GoU who perceives it as a ‘soft landing’, the ICC who 
understand it as a continuance of the unacceptable practice of impunity, or researchers like 
Allen, who describes it as mythmaking. Another aspect is related to how NGOs, especially 
religious ones, have influenced the process of re-establishing this form of justice, reflecting 
how neo-traditional justice is possibly the product of deliberate mythmaking of the Acholis 
supposedly peaceful past before the introduction of Western justice under colonialism that 
was later upheld by the post-colonial rulers. In order for the Acholis neo-traditional justice to 
have a purpose in a combined transitional justice approach, a thorough historical account with 
regards to their origins, influence by religions and financing by NGOs, especially religious 
ones, to undertake such procedures, the impact of colonialism and post-colonialism, the effect 
of the conflict and how they are being practiced in the current context is required. Only then 
can these procedures be fully integrated into a combined transitional justice approach. That 
said, it clearly has a purpose to serve in avoiding the practice of impunity, by dealing with the 
large majority of rebels upon their return, as the more conventional forms of justice being 
expressed through either the ICC or the SDHC will only be able to handle an extremely small 
fraction of the most responsible perpetrators in the shape of Kony and his top commanders.   
 
This chapter has thereby illustrated how these transitional justice mechanisms when being 
presented as the only solution respectively to deal with the conflict has failed and will 
continue to do so, unless a more comprehensive approach where they are combined is applied 
instead. Such an approach will, however, require a careful consideration and negotiation 
between various stakeholders in the process without dismissing each others’ perceptions, but 
not uncritically accepting the conventional ‘wisdom’ about each mechanism either. Only then 
can the hopes for sustainable peace be renewed and a more viable solution to the conflict in 
Northern Uganda be presented. 
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5 Conclusion 
This last and concluding chapter will in the following draw conclusions and make 
propositions for future research, based on the central assertion originating from the two main 
theoretical and empirical research questions, as well as the research sub-questions of a more 
peripheral, but still important character, that all have guided this study. 
 
(1) To what degree is it possible to reconcile the two opposing perspectives in the ‘peace vs. 
justice debate’ through a combined approach? 
 
Based on the work of leading theorists within peace and conflict studies, such as Galtung 
(1969, 1996), Lederach (1997) and Mani (2002, 2005), this study has developed a theoretical 
framework to analyse the more theoretical side of the ‘peace vs. justice’ debate. It finds that 
despite their seemingly vast differences, both perspectives are based on the same 
misperceptions associated with negative peace, reflecting the mere absence of more direct and 
physical forms of violence through prosecution and punishment and peace negotiations 
respectively. Both perspectives would thereby at best end a conflict by dealing with its 
symptoms but, however, without addressing the reasons behind its outbreak in the first place. 
 
By first deconstructing the perceived differences between these two opposing perspectives 
concerning their understanding of what the concepts of peace and justice consist of, to later 
reconstruct them, it is possible to come up with a more inclusive and combined approach. 
Here the essence of both perspectives is encapsulated into one, where both are clearly needed 
in order to build a future based on a sustainable and lasting peace. ‘Peace’ is here extended to 
the notion of ‘positive peace’ which in addition to physical violence also addresses its deeper 
and underlying background through the societal structures and institutions inherent in all 
societies, like economic and political inequalities, or a colonial legacy resulting in grievances. 
In comparison, ‘justice’ is not only being concerned about the past through retribution and 
punishment, but also focuses on restoration through reconciliation and more socioeconomic 
forms of justice.  
 
There are clearly weaknesses associated with applying such an all-inclusive approach, but as 
long as the existing perspectives still remain locked, it is important to look for venues where 
these perspectives are not opposing each other, but rather mutually reinforces their common 
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goal for transitional justice mechanisms of contributing to the creation of the conditions that 
allows a process of lasting and sustainable peace to take place in conflict zones. Concerning 
the main theoretical question guiding this study, it has thereby been able to illustrate that 
despite of the perceived incompatibility at the current level, it is not impossible, but at the 
same time a very difficult challenge to come up with a better approach through a combined 
perspective emphasising the inclusion of central elements from both perspectives in the 
‘peace vs. justice’ debate.  
 
As this theoretical perspective reflects a debate with far reaching empirical implications, a 
case study was deemed necessary to determine the practical relevance of this combined 
approach. For this purpose the case of Northern Uganda was chosen, as it is where the 
practical implications of the ‘peace vs. justice’ debate has lasted for the longest period of time 
since the establishment of the ICC in 2002, and its involvement in the conflict from 2004 
onwards. Thus, the more empirical research question this thesis has answered is:  
 
(2) How can such an approach help create sustainable peace in the case of the ongoing 
conflict in Northern Uganda? 
 
This conflict, which has lasted for more than twenty years between the GoU and the LRA 
rebels represents a humanitarian disaster on an unprecedented scale, which involves atrocities 
against the Acholi civilians through killings, mutilations and forced abduction of children to 
serve as child soldiers in the rebel movement, but also eviction from their homesteads and 
villages into IDP camps with appalling living conditions and harsh treatment from the UPDF. 
Previous attempts at ending this conflict through military counterinsurgencies from the GoU, 
peace negotiations in 1994 and 2004, and blanket amnesties have all shown initial promising 
signs of ending the conflict, but then failed utterly with the rebels retaliating through violent 
attacks against the civilian population, with a further deterioration of an already bad situation.  
 
It was in this context that the ICC, on Museveni’s request, became involved between 2004 
and 2005, by first launching formal investigations and later indicting Kony and four of his 
commanders for war crimes and crimes against humanity. This move was not welcomed by 
the local NGOs and aid workers who feared that the rebels would become more violent and 
refuse to end their insurgency. It can also be prescribed to the way in which the Court utilised 
a one-way communication strategy and without taking such local worries into consideration, 
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by rather brushing them aside in the pursuit of enforcing a global human rights regime. The 
result of this was the local Ugandan ‘peace vs. justice’ debate between proponents of justice 
favouring the ICC’s retributive justice and advocates for peace emphasising amnesty and neo-
traditional justice aimed at reconciliation and conflict resolution.  
 
In all of this, the Juba peace talks between July 2006 and April 2008 with the GoSS mediating 
between the two warring factions made significant contributions to end the hostilities with a 
five point agenda addressing both the direct symptoms and the deeper root causes behind this 
conflict. Unfortunately, this attempt at ending the conflict peacefully broke down in April 
2008 with the parties resuming the hostilities. More importantly in this regard for this thesis is 
the way in which agenda item number three concerning accountability and reconciliation, if it 
had been successful, would have resulted in striking such an balance between the retributive 
and restorative forms of transitional justice mechanisms in Northern Uganda, namely the ICC, 
the Amnesty Act of 2000, and the Acholis neo-traditional forms of justice.  
 
With a basis in this item, the second part of this thesis finds that only a combined approach 
can help bring about a sustainable peace in the case of the ongoing conflict in Northern 
Uganda, by striking such a balance between these three transitional justice mechanisms, 
where Kony and his top commanders are prosecuted in a court, whether this is in Uganda by 
the SDHC or in The Hague by the ICC, but at the same time also dealing with the rank and 
file rebel fighters and the mid-level officers, by offering them conditional amnesty against 
state prosecution in the Amnesty Act, in return for them agreeing to participate in neo-
traditional reconciliation and conflict resolution ceremonies with their victims to overcome 
the difficult past and be able to move on into a peaceful future.  
 
Although Northern Uganda might be at relative peace and calm at the moment, with the 
Acholis returning to and reconstructing their villages, this is only in the negative sense of the 
word with an absence of the more direct and physical forms of violence. So far, the deeper 
underlying root causes of a more structural character associated with ‘positive’ peace have not 
been addressed, meaning that the Acholis grievances against Museveni’s rule are unsolved 
and will continue to complicate the situation unless something is done.  
 
Furthermore, Kony and most of his rebels are still at large in the bush spreading death and 
destruction as they pass by villages in the CAR, the DRC and Southern Sudan. Although it is 
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too soon to tell, but given the UPDF’s complete inability to defeat the LRA over the past two 
decades, it is most likely not a question of if, but rather when the rebels are back to launch a 
new round of ferocious attacks against the civilian population in Acholiland and other parts of 
Northern Uganda.  
 
In the conclusion of his article Dunn’s (2007:148) argument illustrates the main empirical 
findings of this thesis:  
 
Perhaps the LRA would collapse if Kony were to be arrested or die, as did União Nacional para 
a Independencia Total de Angola (UNITA) after Jonas Savimbi’s death. But there is no reason 
to anticipate such a turn of events. Despite heightened expectations, the massive self-
repatriation of thousands of displaced persons in the north, and evidence that the LRA 
leadership seems to have reached a level of exhaustion with their struggle, nothing indicates 
that the conflict will reach a conclusive resolution soon. Given the history of the struggle, it is 
likely that the underlying roots of the conflict will continue to keep both sides emboldened and 
embittered.  
 
How this conflict will end, whether it is in a violent way or with a more peaceful outcome 
remains yet to be seen, but what is for certain is that it will continue to haunt not only the 
local Acholi communities in the north of the country, but also the much wider Ugandan 
society for decades to come unless something is done about it. All good measures will 
therefore have to be utilised and work together in a well orchestrated peace building effort to 
solve the underlying grievances fuelling this conflict for so long in a best possible way 
through neo-traditional justice procedures, conditional amnesty and the ICC. More research 
analysing how this can be achieved are therefore clearly needed. 
 
Thus, with basis in the main theoretical and empirical research questions guiding this study, 
this thesis has proved its central assertion about how the existing perspectives are wholly 
inefficient in addressing transitional justice in conflict zones, as their attempts have clearly 
failed due to a number of deficiencies, and will continue to fail, unless a combined holistic 
approach is applied instead. 
Based on the central assertion, this study has illustrated how the existing ‘peace vs. justice’ 
perspectives are wholly inefficient in addressing transitional justice issues in conflict zones, as 
their attempts have clearly failed due to a number of deficiencies and will continue to do so, 
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unless a more holistic and combined approach is applied instead. The main reason for why 
these existing perspectives are unable to achieve this is because of their common perception 
of total incompatibility, where it must be a trade-off between them. This result in that one 
comes at the expense of the other, where ‘justice’ is only associated with retributive justice 
mainly aimed at punishment and prosecution, while ‘peace’ is merely being obsessed with 
negotiations to end the hostilities. They are thereby only able to deal with the symptoms and 
not the deeper underlying root causes and grievances that caused the conflict in the first place.  
 
In line with the central assertion, this study has, based on the works of leading theorists within 
peace and conflict studies, like Galtung (1969, 1996) and Lederach (1997) developed a more 
holistic and combined approach, where instead of simply relying on one single perspective, 
such as political science, a variety of perspectives within different disciplines have all been 
included to avoid missing important insights. These stretch from those writing within the 
discipline of peace and conflict studies itself, like Mani (2002, 2005), Nielsen (2008) and 
Simpson (2008), political science such as Bøås (2004), Dunn (2007) and Prunier (2004), 
social anthropology like Allen (2005, 2006 and 2008), human rights lawyers like du Plessis 
(2005) and van Zyl (2005), or a combination of both such as Oomen and Marchand (2007).  
 
Based on their work, a more thorough and balanced analysis illustrates how the only solution 
to properly address the issue of transitional justice in the Northern Ugandan context is to  
balance these three mechanisms, with prosecutions against those perpetrators perceived as 
most responsible for committing the worst kind of atrocities, coupled with conditional 
amnesties and the Acholis neo-traditional justice mechanisms aimed at reconciliation and 
conflict resolution through ceremonies, such as the Mato Oput, for the rank and file rebel 
fighters as well as the mid-level officers.  
 
This also relates to the first research sub-question being asked in this study, namely: Does 
transitional justice work in societies deeply divided over social issues or ethnicity? 
 
As the conflict in Northern Uganda illustrates, its root causes can be found in an ethnic north 
vs. south divide between Bantu and Nilotic speaking tribes that was introduced during 
colonialism and later served as a practical tool for successive post-colonial rulers from the 
north, like Obote, Amin and Okello, to exploit in order to remain in power. This practice 
ended when Museveni came to power in 1986 and concentrated the economic, military and 
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political power in the south. This is also the main reason behind the Acholi grievances, which 
in turn resulted in the three successive insurgencies respectively by the UPDA, HSM and 
LRA that all were aimed at overthrowing Museveni and replacing him with a northerner once 
again. Museveni has, however, done little if anything to address the Acholis or other northern 
groups’ grievances, but rather focused on his own southern interests. As such, Uganda is 
described by most analysts used throughout this study as a society deeply divided over both 
social issues and ethnicity.   
 
In relation to this, although the transitional justice mechanisms aimed at ending this conflict 
have had a certain degree of success, like the Amnesty Act until 2004/2005, and the Acholis 
neo-traditional justice mechanisms performed through ceremonies like the Mato Oput, a 
major challenge is that these are only a partial and regional answer to the problems in 
Northern Uganda and not the country as a whole. There is clearly a need for a more thorough 
and genuine national reconciliation process for coming to terms with the past and creating the 
foundations for a permanent future oriented solution within Uganda. In this regard, the efforts 
being made by the Beyond Juba Project at the RLP, based on agenda item number three on 
accountability and reconciliation, aimed at a National Reconciliation Bill should be noted as a 
positive attempt to deal with this issue. But despite the work being done by them, this seems 
highly unlikely to make any impact at the current stage, as it would tap into and expose the 
interests of Museveni’s regime, who therefore has little interest in undertaking such a 
procedure. As for now, the existing regional approach towards transitional justice is more 
likely to succeed, although things could change in the future, and more research is needed to 
analyse this aspect. 
 
Uganda is, however, not unique in this regard, and similar patterns can be found in other 
places where the ICC is currently involved, like the DRC and Sudan. Many other African 
countries also have a similar colonial legacy resulting in the contemporary problems 
associated with extreme levels of social inequality and/or ethnicity, meaning that irrespective 
of what kind of transitional justice mechanisms are deployed, they are faced with a 
tremendous challenge when dealing with the issue of peace and justice in these instances. This 
needs to be analysed before they are deployed in other conflict zones, which is a task for 
future research. 
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This reflects another challenge being framed in research sub-question number two, namely: 
Based on all the experiences that can be drawn from previous empirical and theoretical 
research conducted in transitional justice, is it possible to make generalisations that can be 
applied on different cases, or should they all be interpreted individually because of their 
unique complexities? 
 
In the field of transitional justice, there are clearly two trends concerning the general 
application of transitional justice mechanisms in different conflicts. One relates to the 
perception of universal human rights and core crimes, which cannot be violated, and if it 
happens, will give rise to prosecution and punishment, as reflected in the Rome Statute and 
being expressed and upheld by the ICC. The other refers to how the South African TRC has 
served as a model for similar commissions elsewhere, like in East Timor and Sierra Leone.  
 
Even if some researchers and analysts based on this are in favour of making generalisations to 
apply in each and every post-conflict society going from war to peace, the majority seem to 
caution against this, as it creates ‘one-size-fits-all’ solutions. This is especially relevant when 
discussing the impact of the ICC as a transitional justice mechanism. Until now, this Court 
has unfortunately demonstrated a complete lack of understanding for the necessity of taking 
such a context specific approach, but rather treated the different cases it is currently involved 
more or less in the same way. As this case study of the conflict in Northern Uganda illustrates, 
a drastic change in its perception of justice is therefore necessary in order for it to be a 
relevant transitional justice mechanism in conflict zones.  
 
Although the South African TRC has been used with a certain degree of success in countries 
like East Timor and Sierra Leone, each context is unique in its own right. Another aspect 
illustrated in this study is how the application of such commissions in Uganda is not relevant, 
as they have been abused and therefore have had a rather limited impact. For now, the only 
viable solution is therefore an amendment of the Amnesty Act away from issuing blanket 
amnesties to conditional ones.  
 
But even within the category of neo-traditional justice mechanisms there are big differences, 
as evidenced by the way in which the Gacaca courts in Rwanda were reformed from their 
traditional form to prosecute and punish the large majority of perpetrators. In comparison, the 
Mato Oput ceremony has little if any elements of punishment associated with it, but rather 
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aims at reconciliation and conflict resolution. As such, certain elements from transitional 
justice can possibly be implemented in different settings, but this will require a careful 
analysis of what the situation is like on the ground in specific conflict zones, but also based on 
thorough negotiations of how to do this in each and every instance.  
 
As reflected on in the research design section in chapter one, with regards to the case study 
undertaken in this thesis, this is relevant in the local setting and cannot automatically be used 
to draw wider generalisations beyond this case. As the most recent developments in the 
conflict between the GoU and the LRA illustrates, although the situation on the ground in 
Northern Uganda is calm with a negative peace, it is still fluctuating, and the empirical 
relevance of this study will therefore most likely not have a long lasting impact. It is, 
however, hoped that the theoretical propositions made in the framework used throughout this 
thesis will make an impact that remain more constant, by serving as a source of inspiration to 
researchers elsewhere to conduct more of a similar kind of research in the future on both the 
theoretical and empirical implications of transitional justice in conflict zones, with basis on 
peace and conflict theories by using the works of Galtung (1969, 1996) and Lederach (1997), 
as well as other leading theorists within this field.  
 
This leads to the last group of research sub-questions, related to: What are the strong and 
weak sides of the various transitional justice mechanisms that are available to bring an end to, 
and create sustainable peace in conflict zones? Furthermore, how can the positive aspects of a 
specific mechanism, like amnesties, be optimised, and the negative excluded in a joint 
approach? How can the positive aspects of different transitional justice mechanisms available 
be highlighted and applied in a common framework with the goal of creating sustainable 
peace in Northern Uganda? 
 
The strenghts associated with the ICC include how it can assist transitional societies 
struggling with coming to terms with their past and move on by providing them with a neutral 
venue for trials that might be destabilising if they were conducted nationally, and by stepping 
in where local legal remedies are either non-existent or has collapsed altogether. Trials 
thereby serve several important purposes, by sending out a clear signal to perpetrators that the 
atrocities they commit will give rise to punishment through prosecutions. Furthermore, by 
dealing with the worst of the worst, like the chief architects of war crimes and crimes against 
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humanity, it shows a dedication to human rights and that the unacceptable practice of 
complete impunity through blanket amnesties is now coming to an end.  
 
However, the ICC has until now perceived its retributive justice as the only relevant form of 
justice to deal with such individuals. This perception of how only prosecution of those 
perceived as most responsible will create sustainable peace clearly disregards the fact that 
these persons are the tip of the iceberg, and that they are only dealing with the symptoms and 
not the root causes. Another aspect in relation to this is the way in which it has used a one-
way communication with the public and other stakeholders, thereby overlooking local 
perceptions on the ground, as well as other mechanisms already put in place. This relates to 
how the Court, as a relatively new international organisation must make its presence felt as a 
legal force to be reckoned with and gain legitimacy by overcoming the scepticism among its 
critics.  
 
For a start in a combined approach, the ICC must learn its lessons from past experiences 
concerning that it is far from being the one and only relevant transitional justice mechanism in 
conflict zones, but to the contrary one among many available forms of justice to assist post-
conflict societies to overcome and be reconciled with their past and move on to develop a 
prosperous future with lasting and sustainable peace.  
 
For their part, amnesties also serve several important purposes, but it is important to make a 
distinction between conditional and unconditional forms of amnesties. Although 
unconditional amnesties might increase the probability of rebel fighters surrendering in return 
for receiving it, this sends out the signal that there are no costs attached to committing 
atrocities and might result in a return to conflict at a later stage. This form of amnesty should 
not be dismissed once and for all, but it should only be applied under extraordinary 
circumstances where there are absolutely no other options available.  
 
Conditional amnesties given in return for the perpetrator agreeing to undergo a process of 
remorse, forgiveness and reconciliation should therefore be emphasised instead. This option is 
especially relevant under circumstances where tens to hundreds of thousands of atrocities 
have been committed, and where any court would simply be overwhelmed and totally unable 
to deal with the magnitude of crimes. Conditional amnesties given by TC/TRCs have however 
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been abused in the past to gloss over a difficult past, and in those instances where this is the 
reality, their decisions must unfortunately be dismissed as unlawful.  
 
The neo-traditional forms of justice also has a role to play in this process, as it is often the 
closest and most relevant form to settle disputes in many local African communities. As the 
case of Rwanda with its Gacaca courts illustrates, they can also be used to deal with situations 
where atrocities on a large scale have been committed, and the formal justice mechanisms are 
unable to deal with the scale of atrocities. In the Ugandan context it is however 
understandable that analysts like Allen (2005, 2006 and 2008) remain sceptical towards the 
Acholis neo-traditional justice mechanisms like the Mato Oput, as long as it is being 
presented in its ‘ancient’ and ‘archaic’ form like it was performed in the past, without being 
adapted to the contemporary setting with crimes being committed on a large scale.    
 
These mechanisms associated with the Acholis neo-traditional justice should, however, not be 
dismissed once and for all, as they clearly have a purpose to serve. But in order to become 
relevant, a thorough and vigorous account must be made of their historical origins, the 
influence of colonialism and ‘Western’ forms of justice, the introduction of new religions, 
especially Christianity, the sponsoring by religious donors to perform them, and how they can 
be adapted to meet the international demands of human rights and avoidance of impunity. 
Only by undertaking such a procedure can they be properly implemented and applied in the 
Northern Ugandan context.  
   
Thus, in a combined approach, the strong sides of these mechanisms would be applied in the 
following way: ICC should assist either by prosecuting Kony and his henchmen, as the worst 
perpetrators behind the violence, or by assisting the SDHC to undertake a judicial proceeding 
in this regard. As for now, a TC or TRC is not a relevant mechanism, as Uganda has had 
negative experiences with them in the past and the National Reconciliation Bill would tap into 
the interest of Museveni. Instead, a combination of utilising conditional amnesty in the 
Amnesty Act coupled with the Acholis neo-traditional justice aimed at reconciliation and 
conflict resolution will have to be used. 
 
But the Amnesty Act will have to be amended at the same time, so that it instead of giving out 
blanket amnesties to the rank and file rebels and their mid-level commanders, it rather 
provides them with conditional amnesties that is dependent on them accepting participation in 
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Nyouo Tong Gweno and Mato Oput ceremonies before being reintegrated into their 
communities in Acholiland.  
 
As it is presented now, these ceremonies are however, not relevant enough to deal with the 
‘modern’ crimes against humanity and war crimes taking place on a large scale. The Acholis 
neo-traditional justice must therefore be reformed away from its current ‘archaic’ and 
‘ancient’ form. This reform will have to be based on a thorough analysis of its historical 
background in terms of how they have evolved through the colonial era, post-colonial times 
and more recently with the ongoing conflict, as well as the influence of religions and religious 
NGOs by supporting such procedures financially. Only then can they be integrated as a 
transitional justice mechanism in a combined approach. 
 
Based on this, it is suggested that future research try to address how they can work together in 
such a combined approach in conflicts elsewhere, as it is clearly a need for it in places like the 
DRC and Sudan. 
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